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# Near East/North Africa Report

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## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### PALESTINIAN FORCES REPORTED PLANNING PUSH ON NORTHERN ISRAEL

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 14 Dec 80 p 13

[Article: "A Heated Encounter: Popular Front Military Commander to AL-WATAN: Resistance Plans To Escalate Fighting in the Occupied Territories"]

[Text] Where does Palestinian military action stand? Are the West Bank upheavals escalating or fading? Where do the internal and external struggles coincide, and what is the role of each?

Abu Ahmad Fu'ad has played a distinctive role since the 1978 war in the south, making a pact to fight until martyrdom without withdrawing from the town of Sur, which was menaced by invasion, between his group of forces in the front and the joint forces. This man considered it appropriate that our meeting should be in the field and outside the context of journalistic tradition. Therefore he did not want to stand in front of a camera, and the meeting was not photographed.

Fighting within

He began his conversation with a brief review of developments in the military status of the Palestinian revolution, saying "In spite of all the obstacles and purge conferences [sic] which have in practice been hatched against the armed revolutionary existence of the Palestinian people, the Palestinian revolution, after a stage of its struggle, has managed to obtain a limited, specific volume of armaments and form a military staff. In its fighting, it has proceeded from the premise of reliance on the method of guerrilla war, which is a simple definition of the war of the weak against the strong in the technical and military sense. All detachments have translated this style and have proceeded to take specific steps which have differed from one organization to the next. The line of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has mainly relied on the need to provide the combat wherewithal for our masses within the occupied territories, since actual effective combat must take place within this territory. The presence along the Palestinian-Arab borders is aimed at supporting and backing the forces inside.

"Opportunities were made available to the organizations to support their organizational, political and military presence within the occupied territories at a time when the enemy was in confusion and had not yet taken technical and military measures to guarantee that small resistance units would be prevented from coming onto the occupied territories. The front continued with determination and in

spite of the defenses contrived against this method — all the measures adopted along the Jordanian-Palestinian boundaries, such as minefields, electrified barbed wire and various technical means and high-powered, high-effectiveness equipment — the combat actions of the detachments of the revolution continued, giving birth to a feeling within the Zionist enemy that there was an effective force which had started to find its way and had become a source of real anxiety. Although Dayan, the Zionist minister of defense at that time, said that Israel had the ability to coexist with this phenomenon for a long time, that feeling and that conviction later changed and the enemy started to feel that this phenomenon had to be struck down before it spread. Therefore it outfitted numerous special forces to achieve this objective, but its campaign met with scandalous failure."

#### A Perceptible Development

Question However, to what extent can the Palestinian revolution and its forces persevere against its enemies in the current situation?

Answer The fact is that for sometime the resistance has no longer just been facing the Zionist enemy — it has been facing the instruments of American imperialism. Here we must talk about the fighting in the south, and there are two parts to the Answer.

First, the resistance is not just restricted to an open presence in Lebanon. In fact, there is an effective major role inside the occupied territories, and we consider that the Camp David link has been thwarted thanks to the role of our masses and the armed resistance within the occupied homeland. As for the open presence in Lebanon, that has played an effective role but we do not consider it the main one.

Second, the Palestinian revolution, through the long experience it has gone through, has the material to establish its ability to thwart these schemes. In spite of the state of collapse the area is going through, the resistance in Lebanon has faced the Camp David scheme through a firm alliance between the Palestinian national movement and the domestic masses. Camp David was aimed not just at the revolution but also at the Arab region and its liberation movement. We, as a Palestinian revolution, are a little more concerned than other liberation movements with confronting Camp David, and through the series of events we sense that there is a perceptible development of military forces, since the latest battles against the Zionist enemy have proved that the techniques of confrontation have developed to the same level in military expertise and resources. The 1978 war and the battles which followed it in Arnun and Kafr Tabnit have just been direct proof of the degree of progress that has occurred among the forces joining in the confrontation operations.

#### Power with the Phalange

Question Serious military developments have occurred on the Lebanese stage, most important of which has been the Phalange military extension. How do you view this extension in the light of the recent 'Ayn al-Rumanah events?

/Answer/ The secessionist presence in Lebanon is basically dependent on imperialist Zionist support. The secessionist forces have come into possession of dozens of tanks and have also been furnished with heavy weapons and large quantities of American artillery. They also have French-made field rockets, above and beyond others which they obtained from the Lebanese army. These Phalange capabilities, which are accompanied by a consolidation between secessionist military decisions and the role Sa'd Haddad is playing in establishing a fascist dictatorial Lebanon in the south, indeed in the south, fall under the slogan of what meaning there is in the world. Therefore, this fascist presence in Lebanon is being established through direct action with the Zionist enemy to implement the Camp David schemes and its interconnected links. On this basis, Pierre al-Jumayyil has dominated the Phalange decisions and here is where the Phalange has entered to play this role, being the only force to confront the national presence in Lebanon. Naturally, this does not mean that the powers are not preparing themselves to perform this task, in spite of the limited disputes which do not affect relations between the authorities and the Phalange in their milieu. We believe that the authorities' forces will enter as a single force alongside the Phalange in a short period.

/Question/ However, don't you see evidence, in the trials of certain military persons which have taken place, of deep disputes between the authorities and the Phalange?

/Answer/ The army in practice proceeded to back up the Phalange forces in Tain al-Rumanah and it also played an actual part on behalf of Pierre al-Jumayyil. Sarkis, Butrus and Khuri are in wholehearted agreement with these Phalange measures. As to the trials on which talk has taken and is taking place, these are token; the person giving the orders has not dismissed any officer from his position -- in fact, some of them have probably received raises and promotions from the authorities. Therefore we say that there is no essential contradiction between the Phalange and the authorities.

Dialogue with Them Is a Crime

/Question/ Talk is going on now about opening a Palestinian-Phalange dialogue. The first dialogue was the television debate between Karim Bagraduni and Shafiq al-Hut. What is your opinion on that?

/Answer/ The Popular Front sees no possibility of a dialogue with the secessionist forces in Lebanon except through the language of weapons and resolution, because the separatist forces are an inseparable part of the forces of the Zionist enemy, and we consider our struggle against the former to be a struggle against the enemy to prevent the Zionization of Lebanon and that any dialogue by any force with the separatists will mean a violation of the national path, the strategy of resistance and the national movement, and consequently a service to Zionist schemes in Lebanon. The dialogue which took place under the name of the Liberation Organization is to be considered a crime and a violation of all the political positions and decisions adopted in the resistance command.



## The Security Situation

Question What is your opinion of the current security situation in the western section of Beirut and national areas in general? How do you envision a sound security situation?

Answer It is hard for any force to mobilize its resources to confront the main danger if it has not established a security situation in the areas where it is present. The national areas are still open and the security situation in them is weak. We believe that it is the national movement which is primarily concerned with this matter, and the resistance must cooperate to a large extent in paving the way for the national movement to establish its security agencies and carry out all measures which will guarantee total dominance in the national areas. Our view on the solution of any problem which emerges among the parties to the national movement is that it must be rapidly contained and that these problems must be resolved by democratic dialogue which must be binding on all. As to what happened recently between the al-Murabitun and the National Party, that is extremely unfortunate and we hope it will not be repeated. Preserving a sound security situation can take place through the exertion of serious efforts on the part of all detachments to pursue progressive -- revolutionary -- methods in the course of mobilizing all elements in a direction which will ultimately lead to greater coherence and preparedness for the main struggle with the secessionist forces in Lebanon.

Here we will also point to the need for the detachments of the resistance to commit themselves to the drafts and programs the national movement is setting out. A dialogue will take place on any disputes in viewpoints between the resistance and the national movement in order to create better formats for organizing alliance relationships; in this regard, we must refer to the activities being carried out by the Second Bureau and its agents to create an atmosphere which will have the effect of stirring up security disturbances in a manner allowing hostile forces to consolidate their dominance over the national areas.

Question Some days ago the enemy mobilized its forces on the border strip in the al-Matullah area. What measures have you taken to cope with the possibility of a new aggression?

Answer The current scheme of the parties to Camp David in Lebanon is embodied in two basic focal points:

First, Zionist expansion in the south, up to the waters of the al-Litani, and establishment of a fascist entity on all its territory. Thus we do not rule out, through this analysis, that the Zionist enemy will resort to performing continuous aggressive acts in all areas where the joint forces are concentrated. In the light of this, it has been necessary that the degree of readiness in the resistance and the national movement be increased. The Higher Military Council has taken some decisions, most prominently that of raising the level of combat readiness of the joint forces in the various sectors, and it has taken a decision to strengthen the military presence in the sensitive, strategic areas. It has also adopted a number of defense measures to prevent the enemy from achieving his objectives, and these measures have been carried out within acceptable limits. We are all striving to develop them and apply all the decisions which have been taken. Finally, I must

point out that the Higher Military Council has set out a detailed military plan for the precise handling of any future military confrontation.

#### The Occupied Territories and Armed Confrontation

Question Following the escalation of upheavals in the occupied territories, do you consider that the peaceful upheavals will be turned into an armed one in the face of the occupation?

Answer The upheavals of our masses in the occupied territories express the degree to which our people are prepared to sacrifice and stand up to the occupation by various means. The resistance has programs for escalating the struggle against the occupation and its individual and organizational agents internally, and through these programs we will strive to have these upheavals develop in the near future into armed upheavals. Although fighting effectiveness is gradually escalating internally, it is necessary for us all to put a greater part of our effort into escalating the armed combat inside the occupied nation because the important element in crushing the Camp David scheme and its Palestinian sequence is the masses' internal struggle.

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## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### ISRAELIS REPUTED TO USE CHEMICAL WARFARE

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 8 Dec 80 p 17

[Article by Muwaffaq al-Madani: "The War in Southern Lebanon Enters the Era of Chemical and Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Lebanese political and military circles have been surprised at the military developments which lie within the scope of political forces' programs to face the probabilities of a future of continued war in Lebanon. Last week the joint Lebanese-Palestinian forces entered a new stage of military preparedness to confront what circles in these forces have called a sort of modern war, a chemical, gas and nuclear war. This preparedness includes training in the use of new types of arms and methods to prevent and resist modern tactical war.

Palestinian sources have disclosed to AL-QABAS that after the Arnun (al-Shaqif) battle between the Israeli army (Golan Brigade) and the joint forces, a Scottish doctor working as a volunteer in the Palestinian Red Crescent asked to meet with Mr Yasir 'Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

This doctor disclosed to 'Arafat some grave phenomena whose initial signs have been observed among certain civilians who were recently exposed to Israeli air, sea and ground bombardment.

These sources pointed out that after careful laboratory investigation, it was observed that these sick persons in the south were afflicted with respiratory ailments and serious viruses which could not be treated. About nine of them died.

After medical analyses and studies on this phenomenon, it became apparent to the Palestinian Red Crescent that they had been exposed to diseases as a result of bombardment by chemical-biological weapons. These sources revealed that the Israeli forces recently used this kind of weapon more than once in southern Lebanon, albeit in a limited form, indicating that that was just for preliminary tests.

These military sources in the Palestine Liberation Organization said that during the Israeli attack on al-Shaqif Castle in Arnun, Israel bombed joint forces' hiding places, especially in the castle, with some chemical and gas bombs.



They said that one of these bombs caused a state of drowsiness and nervous lassitude of a type which permanently paralyzes military person's resistance so that he will give up his position to the invading forces.

The sources said that Israel's goal was to paralyze the movement of the maximum number of Palestinian and Lebanese guerrillas with the objective of taking them prisoner.

The gravity of these developments in the war in the south has caused military leaders in the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese national movement alarm, and the Palestine Liberation Organization has held a number of meetings, as sources inside it state, to discuss the possibility that Israel might resort to this type of civilian war in southern Lebanon based on the use of chemical and nuclear weapons in the future.

A few months ago, as these sources say, the decision was taken in the Liberation Organization and the national movement that the joint forces, along with Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, should become fully competent to prepare to resist this type of war and prevent the resulting effects.

In actuality, recourse has been made to foreign experts, especially from Eastern European countries, to train some Palestinian-Lebanese detachments in this type of modern war, which requires the use of a new technological level and field laboratories.

These sources said that a detailed comprehensive plan has been set out by joint Palestinian-Lebanese commanders for embarking on the stage of resistance to chemical-nuclear war, especially chemical-biological war; this plan calls for:

First, promulgation of a military plan through the establishment of staffs trained abroad and domestically in this type of modern war.

Second, the procurement of modern weapons and equipment related to chemical, gas and nuclear war.

Third, comprehensive training of military personnel and civilians in preventive methods for this kind of war and the adoption of all preventive equipment and clothing which have now come to be used in modern countries.

Fourth, setting out a broad media and mobilization policy to publicize civilian use of preventive methods and constructing collective shelters as a deterrent against the possibility of contamination by germs, poisonous gases or atomic radiation.

#### AL-QABA: Witnesses the First Applied Maneuver

Last Thursday, AL-QABA witnessed the first applied military maneuver with live ammunition against this type of chemical, gas and nuclear war.

Palestinian resistance commanders invited some foreign and Lebanese journalists to attend this maneuver in the al-'Arqub area of southern Lebanon along the common Syrian-Occupied Palestinian border. Attending this maneuver were Mr Yasir 'Arafat and senior Palestinian and Lebanese military figures.

The al-Karamah Battalion of the PAMH forces presented a practical demonstration of resistance to three raids and bombing attacks from warplanes with rockets with chemical warheads, poison gases and tactical nuclear warheads.

This military presentation of live maneuvers continued for a period of approximately 3 hours. A Palestinian resistance military convoy was exposed to the first display of an attack by chemical bombardment. The soldiers rushed to evacuate their equipment and deploy in combat conditions, while the force exposed to attack hastily carried out a preliminary laboratory analysis of the type and force of bomb and measured its radiation with the objective of ascertaining ways of acting on the combat field, while this force transferred a sample of soil subjected to bombardment to the laboratory of the military force to which it belonged. After it had made preliminary analyses, this force ordered the elimination of traces of chemical or nuclear explosion, with the objective of extinguishing and containing fires from it, and first-aid vehicles hurriedly evacuated the wounded and injured.

#### Experts Explain

Palestinian military experts proceeded to explain this type of war to Mr. 'Arafat, considering that forces which could protect themselves by preventive means were capable of providing an arm of resistance to the enemy.

During this maneuver the explanation concentrated on the point that the mission of forces exposed to chemical or nuclear attack was to try to rid themselves of the contaminated area on the battleground through coordination which was the responsibility of the observation point.

What is new in this kind of war, as the Palestinian sources said, is that it does not break out suddenly since the observation agencies and the modern methods at their disposal are able to give instructions in various forms of warning, prompting military personnel and citizens to guard against the probability of chemical or nuclear bombardment.

In addition, at the moment of bombardment, the laboratories accompanying the military division or in its command center can specify the measurement or the volume of contamination and thus the type and extent of contaminated dust in a few seconds. The command issues instructions to military personnel and civilians in the contaminated area to go down into special shelters or to don preventive clothing.

In the course of the maneuver which took place in the al-'Arqub in the presence of Mr. 'Arafat, it was seen that the clothing to wear against chemical contamination or nuclear radiation consisted of gas masks and rubber suits which could tolerate a high degree of heat and consequently prevent the leakage of contamination or radiation into the body.

During the military maneuver in the al-'Arqub, it was observed that the people in the al-Karamah Battalion were outfitted with this type of clothing as prevention against chemical and nuclear war.

These sources pointed out that other methods to resist chemical and nuclear war are followed in towns. The political orientation official explained what goes on in the battle and called for the use of preventive methods.

Although there is a difference between the effects of combat that relies on traditional arms and that which relies on chemical and nuclear arms, resistance against the latter of combat depends on consciousness and a level of training and equipment among both military personnel and civilians alike. It is possible for people to receive approximately 50 (ranjes) or heat unit of this radiation and contamination in one day; if the degree is higher than that, the person will risk death.

#### A Review of the Cleanup Process

After completion of the anti-chemical-nuclear war maneuvers, Mr 'Arafat requested these forces to present a performance of the process of cleaning up the traces of the contamination and radiation which they had received in the course of the fighting they engaged in.

This review was presented. It involved giving people water showers; special vehicles belonging to the fire department or civil defense give these showers to military or civilian personnel whose areas are bombarded by field chemical or nuclear bombs and they then hurriedly take off the preventive suits which consist of clothing over the skin and masks.

At the end of this maneuver, Mr 'Arafat said that American imperialism, through the Zionist Army, is using southern Lebanon as a testing ground, using different types of napalm bombs and gases against us.

He said that the Israeli enemy has about 18 to 20 atomic bombs. He added that the United States itself was not able to realize victory in Vietnam and that the revolution triumphed there although the American military command used all types of weapons, including chemical weapons and poison gases.

He said that since then the Palestinian revolution has decided to deal with the Israeli enemy on the assumption that it will not hesitate to use weapons which even the devil might not think of, as Begin put it.

Abu 'Amr considered that the graduation of a class of Palestinian forces trained in resisting this type of chemical and nuclear war was tantamount to a start on the road to coping with every eventuality.

He declared that all Palestinian-Lebanese forces would have such equipment and that that was based on a decision issued by the national movement and the Palestinian command.

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## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### PLO OFFICIALS PROPOSE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRESSIVE FRONT

Kuwait AL-QARAS in Arabic 13 Dec 80 p 17

[Report on an interview with Tal'at Ya'qub and Abu al-'Abbas by AL-QARAS correspondent, Khalil al-Taqi in Damascus; Date of Interview not Given; "Tal'at Ya'qub and Abu al-'Abbas Tell AL-QARAS that Steadfastness and Confrontation Process Must Become an Offensive Process"]

[Text] Messrs Tal'at Ya'qub, the secretary general of the Palestine Liberation Front, and Abu al-'Abbas, the assistant secretary general of the front assured AL-QARAS that what was required at this critical and sensitive stage was the formation of a popular Arab progressive national front to support the National Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in preparation for bringing about a clear separation between the steadfastness and liberation Arabs and the settlement Arabs--America's Arabs.

In the course of discussing his evaluation of the current stage Mr Tal'at Ya'qub told AL-QARAS, "There is no doubt that world imperialism and reactionary forces did make exhausting and rapid efforts during the last decade to re-impose their domination and their control over the Arab region after progressive national and pan-Arab forces in the Arab homeland were able to deal hurtful, painful and strong blows to the imperialist influence in the area during the fifties and the sixties. Consequently, they were able to accomplish some things that helped them develop themselves and build those attitudes which are contributing to the construction and development of their own capabilities for the purpose of building an Arab force that would be capable of confronting the requirements of the stage.

"During the past period our Arab nation, represented by its national and progressive leaders, has proven itself capable of numerous achievements on various grounds. It has taken a group of measures that have thrown imperialism in the Arab region into a state of confusion, and it was actually able to keep imperialism away from the Arab region temporarily by means of finishing off its interests in the Arab homeland. This forced imperialism to reconsider the means by which it could confront our Arab nation and its national and progressive forces. Imperialism has never



given up in the face of defeat, so it made an extraordinary effort to maintain its positions through the local reactionary forces on the one hand and through its special agent in our Arab homeland on the other: the racist Zionist entity. This was an attempt to prove its existence and restore its influence and its control on the Arab region.

"World imperialism has tried hard in our Arab homeland, as it did in many spots in the world, to defend its interests by various ways and means. But it has never been able to achieve significant successes over a long period of time as a result of the growth of nationalist feeling, the growth of progressive national pan-Arabism in numerous Arab countries and as a result of the fact that some of these national and progressive forces came to power in other Arab countries.

"On the one hand this expansion and the expansion in the anti-imperialist mood continued to grow. Accordingly, imperialist attempts to break up this expansion also grew until the June 1967 war took place. It was the initial imperialist attempt to deal a blow to the Arab nationalist and progressive forces on the one hand, and it was followed by other attempts at various intervals of time.

In return, the Arab nationalist and progressive forces were always standing in the position of opposition. To a large extent they foiled the imperialist attempts to control and to re-establish imperialist influence in our Arab region. The October 1973 war of liberation was a fundamental milestone in the Arab progressive national struggle to strike at this imperialist influence and at its principal post: the racist Zionist entity in Palestine.

"It would have actually been possible to utilize the results of the October War to turn the progressive Arab position into a revolutionary position that would actually be capable of making a serious contribution to the formulation of an Arab equation to confront imperialism and its allies.

"It was at this stage in particular that an extremely serious problem occurred. This was al-Sadat's announcement that he was prepared [to agree] to a cease fire and, accordingly, that he was prepared to engage in negotiations with the enemy and recognize him. Numerous serious questions could have followed these problems.

"Just as the October war of liberation was tantamount to a fundamental milestone as well as an indicator of the extent to which the Arab nationalist and progressive forces are capable of formulating their attitudes and their positions as well as their willingness to engage in fundamental battles against imperialism and the racist Zionist entity, al-Sadat's conduct was another indicator of the extent to which imperialism can, in return, place and set up its agents in the Arab region so they can strip the fundamental questions of their content at the appropriate moment and mold them into defeats and setbacks on the general Arab scene.

"After the October war we pondered many prominent points so we can evaluate and study them and thereby dot the i's and cross the t's of many imperialist practices and attempts to bring the area under its control again. Imperialism has pursued numerous courses within this framework.

"The principal and primary course is that of insinuating that force would be used in many areas. This is carried out through the racist Zionist entity and through a group of daily U.S. demonstrations by means of which the United States tries to frighten the forces of progress and liberation in the Arab homeland.

"The other method [consists of] imperialism's serious attempts to restore the organization of its alliance in the Arab region and, accordingly, rely in a fundamental way on the Arab regimes and their symbols to create expedients and alliances that would be directly subject to world imperialism. The principal symbol of these alliances was in fact al-Badat's regime. This became clearer in the equation after the October War; later, it became basically distinct with the signing of the Camp David Accords, of their appendices and of the separate peace treaty that was sponsored by the United States.

"The fact of the matter is that the attempt to develop and to create alliances and objectives that support the United States was actually not confined to the scene of independent Arab reactionary alliances and leagues. The U.S. regime rather sought to build Arab reactionary leagues and alliances that would have direct relations with racist Zionism. At the same time the United States also sought to guarantee a basic force for its practices on the Arab scene in the next stage.

"It is on this scene too that the Americans, through local Arab reactionaries and Arab reactionary symbols in various Arab countries, began launching a broad campaign of internal sabotage against the nationalist and progressive regimes and against the Arab revolutionary movement. This campaign was in fact conspicuous and evident in Syria when the deployment of agents, reactionaries and the extreme right actually began for the purpose of undermining the steadfastness, the sternness and the positions of the Syrian state."

"Mr Abu al-'Abbas, the assistant secretary general of the Palestine Liberation Front spoke to AL-QABAS about the agents that may be used to stop the imperialist expansion especially after a clear separation is achieved between the forces of liberation and progress on the one hand and those that in one way or another follow the Camp David course.

"We must refer again to the fact that imperialism becomes more vicious in confronting the progressive and nationalist forces whenever these forces achieve advanced accomplishments.

"This means that we must not think at all that our struggle with imperialism will only produce victories, even though it is historically

inevitable that we will ultimately be victorious against imperialism, that we will achieve our independence and our unity and that we will establish the united socialist Arab society. We must bear in mind that imperialism has for a long period of time relied directly on local reactionaries.

"Within this context, we, as the Palestine Liberation Front and as a group within the body of the same Palestinian revolution, have declared an old position. This is not a new position; it states that it is necessary to make a clear Arab distinction between the Arabs [who favor] a political settlement--the Arabs of America--and the Arabs [who favor] steadfastness and confrontation--the Arabs of liberation.

"We have never believed it possible that a reactionary Arab and a progressive Arab could stand on the same ground to confront the basic enemy: U.S. imperialism. Completing the Arab classification is a very fundamental task. So far we do not think that the classification of Arabs into nationalist, progressive and revolutionary Arabs and Arabs who are the opposite of that has been completed.

"The classification of Arabs must also be completed on the popular level since the classification of different regimes and countries is not sufficient. What is also being called for is that this classification be carried out on the layman's level. We should actually organize a broad, popular, Arab, progressive national front that would make an effective and a serious contribution towards supporting the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation and the Arab forces of progress on whose shoulders falls the basic role of opposing imperialism, Zionism and reactionaries.

"We believe that classification is a basic and an extremely important step in setting up our conditions in the area for a decisive confrontation with world imperialism, racist Zionism and reactionaries.

"Continuing the classification and furthering it is a fundamental and an urgent task as is that of developing this classification into a unified, progressive Arab action. However, all indicators point to the fact that a reactionary unity does exist and that a reactionary Arab coordination [effort] does exist.

"The facts state that there is a reactionary Arab front that is guided by the United States. The only response to that would be a united Arab front that is guided by progressive and nationalist Arab forces to confront the front that is guided by the United States: a front supported by the broadest popular base throughout the Arab homeland.

"This is naturally a fundamental milestone. The other milestone is that as long as there is on the reactionary Arab scene an alliance that is supported by the United States and by world imperialism, we must give serious thought to developing our relations with the strategic friend of

the Arab revolution and the world revolution. [We are referring to] the countries of the socialist organization and specifically the Soviet Union.

"We must also foster the progressive Arab nature; we must develop internal accomplishments on the popular scene; and we must accordingly develop the progressive and democratic accomplishments that have actually taken place in the countries of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. This would raise the question of the extent of our capability to guarantee that the broadest popular base will rally around us and fight with us in the same front against imperialism.

"On the other scene we must actually change the framework of the general course of the steadfastness and confrontation process to that of an effective framework that would be capable of opposing the conspiracies of local reactionaries and imperialism. This means that we are to shift from the stage of steadfastness to that of serious attack against the Arab reactionary forces. We cannot possibly be satisfied with statements and speeches about the existence of a reactionary alliance. We must rather counter that with a progressive Arab alliance that would shift to confrontation."

Mr Tal'at Ya'qub, the secretary general of the Palestine Liberation Front spoke to AL-QARAS about Syria's role in the proposal that was presented by Abu al-'Abbas to prevent the reactionary forces from taking advantage of Syria's role under the slogan of Arab solidarity.

"There is no doubt that Syria had its objective justifications when it coined the term, 'Arab solidarity.' There are objective circumstances that supported this term.

"We define Arab solidarity in terms of the solidarity of the Arab people's forces and not in terms of official Arab solidarity. It is not possible for us to find in official Arab solidarity a way out of our crisis. In fact, we find that official Arab solidarity augments our crises.

"An agent of imperialism cannot possibly be its adversary. This is what has been established by daily occurrences. While Syria was extending its hand in all sincerity to establish a broader Arab front to oppose imperialism and to defend the existence of the Arab nation, the regimes that are included in the official Arab solidarity were conspiring against Syria in an extraordinary fashion.

"What is actually being called for is a solidarity of the Arab people that would be capable of diagnosing the crises and the events and actually establishing a broad Arab front that would respond to the demands and the challenges that are being experienced by the Arab nation.

"We must engage in broad action in the ranks of our masses to explain the meaning of Arab solidarity; [we must explain] which solidarity we



have in mind; and [we must explain] the objective of that solidarity: is its objective to fight against imperialism and Zionism?

"If solidarity lies in telling people we are united in solidarity, the facts would make this term redundant because Arab reactionaries can only carry out imperialist plans.

"Developing popular Arab action, developing the action of the masses and insisting upon progressive and national principles are extremely important matters in opposing Arab reactionaries and foiling their programs.

"The National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation must be developed so it can play the historical role that has been assigned to it and so that there would be a basic Arab arsenal that would be capable of defining clearly the missions for which it is struggling.

"We must expose and reveal the role of Arab reactionaries. What is being called for is a broad and comprehensive exposition of all hostile, reactionary policies.

"What is being called for is the participation of Arab popular forces in exposing and revealing these practices.

"Clouding the issue for people and for the Arab progressive and democratic forces to cover for the reactionaries under the slogan of Arab solidarity is absolutely impermissible.

"The nationalist and progressive forces on the popular scene or on the official scene are being called upon to stand up at this decisive and critical stage and to align themselves clearly with the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. There is no longer any justification for maintaining ambivalent positions or for setting forth unclear positions in front of our people and our masses.

"Through all the attempts that were made to establish official Arab solidarity, and specifically, at the summit conferences--this is in addition to the question of Arab solidarity--we have always found Arab reactionaries trying to appear patriotic in front of our Arab masses and striving to obstruct any national resolution that could measure up to an actual confrontation with U.S. interests."

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## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### PLO'S ACCEPTANCE OF UN RESOLUTION 181 CRITICIZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DIWALI in Arabic 21 Dec 80 p 21

[Article by R.D.: "The Liberation Organization: Reviving the Partitioned State To Establish the *De Facto* State"]

[Text] The Palestine Liberation Organization has accepted the resolution that partitioned Palestine, which is known as Resolution 181. This is the resolution that the General Assembly adopted on 29 November 1947; it was the first time in its history for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution that pertained to the Palestinian question.

The assembly has re-confirmed Resolution 181 in particular in a clear and detailed reference that was made to it in a resolution it adopted last week. The PLO has thereby for the first time accepted the resolution internationally. This means that the PLO has recognized Israel's right to a state within the 1947 borders, as the resolution that partitioned Palestine stipulated.

The reference to Resolution 181 was made by the Palestine Committee at the suggestion of the PLO. As usual the Arab bloc in the United Nations had met to discuss a working paper; this was almost 2 weeks ago. During the meeting Libya, Iraq and Democratic Yemen objected to the reference. To avoid allowing these countries to explain their opposition [to the reference] in the course of the voting process, the Arab bloc issued the working paper without making a reference to Resolution 181.

After the Arab bloc approves a working paper, it is usually taken to the bloc of the non-aligned countries to ensure their support. However, the bilateral and regional consultations became intense and took a long time. This caused the paper to be returned to the Arab bloc for further discussion. It was then that PLO Representative Mr 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar undertook to explain the need to introduce a reference to Resolution 181 on the basis of the fact that such a reference would be a legitimate preface to reviving the General Assembly's resolution on the Palestinian people's right to determine their own destiny and to establish their state in Palestine. The explanation affirmed that many years

had gone by without acceptance of the resolution. This did not mean, however, that the General Assembly's resolution on partitioning Palestine was forgotten.

The Partition Resolution discussed Israel's right to determine its own destiny and to establish the Israeli state; the Palestinian people, however, did not practice these two rights. Because the superpowers, including the United States, are committed to the Partition Resolution, the idea here is to set forth the Palestinian right without opposing the existence of Israel. In this [course] two matters are realized: first, mutual recognition is realistic; and second, the attempt to embarrass the western nations, especially the United States, [would succeed] by challenging the most significant objection they have to the organization's policy: that is, not recognizing the existence of Israel.

The vast majority in the General Assembly supports the right of the Palestinian people to determine their destiny and to establish their state on the West Bank and in Gaza. This means that there would be two states in Palestine. The reference to Resolution 181 is consistent with the position of the vast majority, and the organization has gone along with that position. It disagrees [with the resolution] on the borders but not on the meaning.

At the second meeting of the Arab bloc Iraq, Libya and South Yemen accepted this position after the PLO's explanation of its positive details.

The Arab countries that are members of the United Nations had refrained from recognizing Resolution 181 in 1948. But the reference to the resolution and its reconfirmation signify that these countries were tacitly accepting it to avoid direct embarrassment. This does not mean that Europe and the United States will accept the new Arab position, and especially the Palestinian position, without objecting to it. This is because the problem here is the result of the fact that Europe and the United States are adhering to Resolution 242 that was adopted in 1967. This resolution had called for the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied land, but it had dealt with the problem of the Palestinian people as a problem of refugees and not that of a nation that had the right to determine its own destiny and to have an independent state.

The most important components of the criticism [that was directed] against the new Arab position and the PLO's acceptance of Resolution 181 include the following:

First, the Arabs' timing problem in accepting international positions: This means that the Arabs rejected Resolution 181 in 1947. Then in 1967 they rejected the Israeli occupation and called indirectly for the 1947 borders. Now in 1980 they come up with a suggestion to accept the 1947 resolution. They are thus 30 years too late.

Second, Europe and the United States in particular, are focusing their

efforts now on Resolution 242. This means that in their view touching upon Resolution 181 would be an unrealistic maneuver.

Third, the PLO's acceptance of the Partition Resolution through the General Assembly's confirmation--where the organization does not have an official vote and, accordingly, no obligation--raises questions internationally about the intentions of the organization.

If the PLO actually wants to accept Resolution 181 and, accordingly, recognize the state of Israel, it must make a direct declaration to that effect. The international community has usually regarded the resolutions of the General Assembly as political statements and not as official positions on pending questions. This fact has created some reluctance throughout the United Nations, among the countries of the west and the east and among the non-aligned countries about the real meaning of the PLO's positions. The more important question was this: why has the PLO decided now that the time has come to accept Resolution 181?

#### Weakness from the Top

The fact of the matter is that Arab divisiveness has had a considerable effect on the organization whose representatives came to the United Nations after the Amman conference more fearful of Amman than they were of Egypt. It is for this reason that the organization has insisted on emphasizing to the General Assembly for the first time that no country had the right to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. On the other hand, Egypt came with a strong position, threatening to proceed ruthlessly against any Arab or Palestinian attempt whose objective was to attack Egypt. As a result of these two positions--the Palestinian and the Egyptian--a new idea was formulated and a new method [was adopted] for dealing with the Camp David agreement; the new idea and the new method stood out by being less vehement [than others].

But regarding the aspect that is directly related to Resolution 181, the organization's insistence on the reference was due to its realization that reaffirming the General Assembly's resolution at this time would legitimize the organization's demand for self-determination and the establishment of a state. In [pursuing] this diplomatic action the organization is after a legitimacy that is based on the resolution of the General Assembly.

What has been accomplished by the debate on the question of Palestine in the General Assembly?

There are five resolutions: one of them is related to the question of Jerusalem. The General Assembly is refusing to recognize the Israeli measures that would change the status of Jerusalem. It also considers the declaration of Jerusalem the capital of Israel to be invalid and the repeal of that declaration necessary.

The second resolution which pertains to Camp David spares [the accords] from direct condemnation and approaches its criticism of Camp David in another style. This is because the General Assembly considers the Camp David Accords invalid with regard to the Palestinian question.

Furthermore, the resolution, which consists of three parts, emphasizes that there would be no peace in the area without [acknowledging] the Palestinian right for self-determination and for a state. It also does not regard Resolution 242 [to be a document that] ensures the proper foundations for a comprehensive and a just solution to the question of Palestine. It affirms that the future of the Palestinian people is a basic demand for a just solution. This idea emerged at first from the resolutions of the Amman summit which stated that Resolution 242 was not suitable as a basis for solving the Palestinian question. This paragraph also serves the interests of the superpowers that support the organization, such as the Soviet Union, and are committed to Resolution 242. In this reference there is the clarification that Resolution 242 is incomplete as far as the Palestinians are concerned, and this allows the Soviets the opportunity to abide by the resolution [and hold on] to the justifications for the Soviet explanation [as well].

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## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION OPENS ACTIVE OFFICE IN GREECE

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 22 Dec 80 p 18

[Article by Muhammad Mustafa Mahmud: "AL-QABAS Talks to the First Official Liberation Organization Representative in Athens: al-Armali: We Will Strive To Create a United Front"]

[Text] Mr Shawqi al-Armali, the Palestine Liberation Organization representative in Greece, told AL-QABAS that the organization's office, which was recently opened in Athens, would try to establish a united front embracing all parties and political organizations supporting the Palestinian cause on the Greek stage.

In the first press interview he held since reaching the Greek capital and opening the Palestinian office, he added that this office would enjoy immunities and privileges, perhaps not at the level which diplomatic missions enjoy, but better, without a doubt, than those which are generally given to information offices.

Herewith is the complete text of the conversation which took place between Mr al-Armali and AL-QABAS' correspondent:

[Question] I would like you to speak to us about the nature of the activity of the new office.

[Answer] The office has been designated a "relations and information office" and it enjoys immunities and privileges, perhaps not at the level of a diplomatic mission, but better, without a doubt, than those of an ordinary information bureau. The immunities it enjoys include immunity for the headquarters, immunity for the home of the representative and those working in the headquarters, postal immunity, and the right to fly the Palestinian flag and put up a sign giving the name of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Everything indicates that we will obtain further facilities and treatment in daily transactions in view of the sentiments of friendship which are being shown by Greek officials and most political forces and parties present on the Greek stage.

[Question] The nature of Palestinian-Greek relations, and how they are proceeding.

[Answer] Palestinian-Greek relations on the popular level and also on the government level have always been good with minor reservations. Up to today, Greece



has not recognized Israel. Intense pressures are being exerted upon it, especially by the United States and some western countries, to do so, but the official position still remains as it has been, and traditional historic relations between Greece and the Arabs have created a natural closeness and comingling which individual Greeks feel for all the Arab issues in general and for the central cause, the cause of Palestine, in particular.

Question It is well known that public opinion in Greece is very sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and that all parties, even the ruling one, support the cause openly, although without official recognition. Do you expect that the office will exert direct pressure to obtain official recognition of the organization from the Greek government? What will the nature of the office's activity be?

Answer The fact is that the Greek stage constitutes fertile ground for Palestinian political and media action. There is a large number of Greek politicians, media people and economists who in recent years have made visits to Palestine Liberation Organization centers and headquarters and have become informed about their social, economic and military activities. They are very sympathetic with the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle.

Thus coordination with all our friends in Greece enables us to do a great deal, on the media level, for example newspaper publications, political symposia, popular conferences and so forth, or on the political and legal level, such as holding symposia on various aspects of the Palestinian cause from the angle of international law and Israel's continuous violation of its principles. We will always try to develop and consolidate the good relations which exist now. To this end we must obtain the support and cooperation of all Arab brothers present here, in the form of ambassadors and persons accredited to Athens and persons working in the private sector.

#### Coordination with Ambassadors

Question How do you view coordination with Arab ambassadors and accredited persons in Athens, especially since they have exerted unremitting efforts with the Greek government to obtain Greek recognition of the organization and permission for the organization to open an office in Athens?

Answer The Palestinian cause is a national one. It will be possible for us to strive to get the desired results only through joint Arab activity in Greece. I am confident that all our brother ambassadors who have continuously striven for the opening of this office will offer every possible effort to provide all the conditions which will qualify it to perform its mission.

Question In a previous meeting with Greek journalists, Mr Yasir 'Arafat pointed out that Zionist elements, and those supporting them, were working with total freedom on the Greek stage; how will the new office cope with these organized, materially capable Zionist activities, bearing in mind that the Israeli mission in Athens issues four daily and weekly publications and a monthly one in Greek and English which are distributed through all areas of Greece?

Answer: We know the devious manner in which Zionism acts in Greece. We know that Israel is exerting ferocious efforts with the United States of America and some Western European countries to put pressure on the Greek government to change its position in principle and to establish greater diplomatic, cultural and economic relations with the Zionist entity. We must be wary of this situation and always concentrate our contacts with all political forces in Greece so they will not fall prey to this pressure.

In another area, there are large numbers of Palestinian and Arab students studying in Greek universities, and they have always been the best example of the Palestinian character.

After Egypt departed from Arab ranks by signing the peace treaty, Arab students expressed their feelings by demonstrating in front of the Egyptian Embassy in Athens. A Palestinian student was martyred and 16 students were wounded in this demonstration.

What is to be considered unfortunate is that the Greek government's reaction was severe, since it took drastic measures against the students, expelled a number of them, and stiffened measures for admitting new students to the universities.

The first task of our office will be to eliminate these measures so that it will be feasible for our students to enroll again in Greek universities.

#### The Nature of the Office's Activities

Question: Greece is considered a popular and media stage which is ready for Palestinian action; what is the nature of the expected activities in your work?

Answer: We are still in the stage of studying the situation now. We will try to unify all the forces supporting us in a common format which will be crystallized once our contacts are made with all of them. If unification is not possible, great coordination among us will be desirable. I am confident that coming political events will determine the nature of the activities we can engage in to confront every possibility. For example, recently there has been news that Britain is making attempts with some European countries with the goal of diluting any European initiative vis-a-vis the Middle East. This had been expected following the presidential elections in the United States. The purpose in that is to persuade and address the new American president in a friendly manner. Since Greece will become a member of the European Common Market in a few days, it is hoped that it will resist this attempt, resist these schemes and play a positive role within the European group with the purpose of taking an explicit, positive stand on the Palestinian national movement and the liberation organization.

#### Greece and the Desired Role

Question: So what is the role desired of the Greek government following the opening of the office?

Answer: In addition to the role it can play within the European group, the Greek government can play a role in influencing the Greek lobby, which has a strong effect



and influence within the United States of America itself. Since this Greek opening to the Arabs is in agreement with and coincides with the principles and interests of the Greek people, the government here realizes that by playing this role it will be consolidating Arab-Greek relations on behalf of mutual interests.

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## ARAB BANKS MOVE UP TO LEADING ROLE

London 8 DAYS in English 10 Jan 81 pp 38-39

## [TEXT]

FOR ARAB banks 1980 has been the most active year to date in the euromarkets, with several newcomers such as Arab Banking Corporation establishing themselves not just as active participants but as lead managers. The sheer number of deals by Arab and Arab consortium banks in the syndicated loan market is worthy of note, but undoubtedly the deal of the year was the \$300m loan to the Bank of China completed in February. At the time it generated considerable controversy: initially the Chinese threatened to cancel the borrowing. The amount started at \$500m but was reduced to \$300m; the terms were  $\frac{1}{8}$  per cent above London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) for five years. Union des Banques Arabes et Françaises (UBAF) acted as lead manager.

The all Arab bank loan to Banco Central do Brasil enjoyed a more successful syndication. The \$200m loan was arranged at a split margin of  $\frac{1}{8}$  per cent above Libor for the first four years reducing to  $\frac{1}{16}$  per cent for the final four years. Arab Banking Corporation and Arab Latin American Bank were the lead managers. The margins and front end fees were arranged at terms favourable to the borrower: management fee  $\frac{1}{16}$  per cent, commitment fee  $\frac{1}{16}$  per cent, and participation fees of  $\frac{1}{16}$  per cent for \$3m-\$5m and  $\frac{1}{32}$  per cent for \$10m. In today's market, Brazil usually has to pay 1½ per cent to 2 per cent over Libor.

**Bahrain** 'The billion dollar bank' was how one senior London merchant banker described Arab Banking Corporation. 'If you want to syndicate a large loan you have to invite ABC,' he said. Between January and November this year, ABC has been a lead or co-lead manager in loans totalling over \$1.5bn.

One of ABC's largest participations was in the \$500m loan to Ente Nazionale

Idrocarburi of Italy, signed on 16 December. There were 12 lead managers all participating for between \$16m and \$25m, with only Barclays Bank International, Manufacturers Hanover Ltd and ABC providing the top sum of \$25m.

Other major deals in which ABC has acted as lead manager include state of Bahrain (\$300m), Banco Central do Brasil (\$200m) and the National Bank of Yugoslavia (\$250m). Owned by several Arab governments and with assets of \$1bn, ABC has become the major Arab bank in the euromarkets.

Gulf International Bank, with fewer funds to lend than ABC, is nevertheless still regarded as the most professional of all the Arab banks. GIB was a lead or co-lead manager in several of the loans arranged for the market's most prestigious borrowers. It was a co-lead manager in the \$600m loan to Electricite de France, generally regarded as the best risk in the syndicated loan market.

GIB's lending was widely spread: it was a co-lead manager in loans to Denmark, Republic of Ecuador, Republic of the Ivory Coast, National Bank of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Nigeria. Furthermore, GIB was the sole lead manager in the Saudi Riyal 940m (\$162.5m) loan, completed in December, for the Binladin Organisation.

Al Bahrain Arab African Bank (Al Baab), 80 per cent owned by Arab African International Bank, Cairo, has had an active first full year of syndicated lending. Its major role was as co-lead manager in the Kingdom of Morocco \$250m loan arranged at 1 per cent above Libor for the first five years, rising to 1½ per cent for the final three years.

**United Arab Emirates** Abu Dhabi Investment Company (ADIC) has lost its initial impetus in the syndicated loan

market. In its first full year in 1977, ADIC was a lead or co-lead manager in four loans totalling \$1.5bn, and a manager in six others totalling \$940m. In 1978 it led eight loans and was a manager in 16 others, but stayed out of all the main deals in 1979 with the exception of a \$500m loan to Sonatrach.

In 1980, ADIC was a lead or co-lead in four major loans: Foreign Trade Bank of Romania (\$100m), Bank of China (\$300m), Kingdom of Morocco (\$250m) and Union Electrica SA of Spain (\$25m). It has been a manager or co-manager in four loans totalling \$350m.

The National Bank of Abu Dhabi has had a quiet year: most of its lending has been to the National Marine Services of Abu Dhabi. It was, however, a co-lead manager in the \$55m loan to the emirate of Sharjah and the \$20m loan to the state of Mato Grosso. National Bank of Abu Dhabi was sole lead manager of the \$25m loan to Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, arranged at ½ per cent above Libor for five years. The commitment fee was ¼ per cent.

**Kuwait** All the main Kuwaiti investment houses participated in the Bank of China loan. Apart from China, Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment Company led managed the \$250m loan to the National Bank of Yugoslavia. The loan was an all-Arab deal. ABC and GIB were among the other lead managers. Alahli Bank, apart from being one of the major providers to China, was also a lead manager in the \$20m loan to Banco Real of Brazil and the \$50m loan to Landoil Resources.

**Saudi Arabia** Despite being one of the biggest banks in the Middle East in terms of

assets, the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia remains one of the more conservative Arab banks active in the euromarkets. It was a lead manager in both the Republic of Ecuador and state of Bahrain loans but in the main specialised in arranging Saudi riyal loans, for example to Nigata Engineering of Japan for construction contracts in Saudi Arabia.

**Paris** UBAF and BAIL, both based in Paris, continue to be the most active of the Arab consortium banks — not just in the euromarkets, but also in foreign exchange and investment. UBAF now embraces an Arab consortium that includes branches in West Germany, the UK, Italy and Japan. Its Paris branch won the mandate to arrange the Bank of China loan; with its financial muscle, it was the only bank capable of handling a deal of this size.

UBAF has also been active this year in lending to East Germany: it was sole lead manager of the \$100m to Deutsche Aussenhandelsbank, East Germany's central bank. BAIL, while not as active as UBAF, led managed four loans totalling \$400m.

**London** The London-based Saudi International Bank has been a lead manager in several of the major syndicated loans arranged in 1980. Two were to Argentina: Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (\$250m) and Banco de la Nacion Argentina (\$350m). It was also a lead manager in loans to Denmark, Brazil, France, Chile, Italy and Venezuela. Arab Bank Investment Company was also active in 1980: it was a lead manager to loans to Kingdom of Jordan, Kingdom of Morocco and the Foreign Trade Bank of Romania.

## REVIVAL OF HIJAZ RAILROAD STUDIED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Nov 80 p 15

[Article by Anton Bara]

[Text] "The Hijaz Railroad" is an eternal name which we of the post-war generation have heard countless times since we became aware of the world. The generation which preceded ours saw the decline of the glory of the railroad, which reached its golden age before World War I. During this golden age, the trains thundered from Damascus to Haifa in Palestine and Medina in Hijaz, passing through Jordan and crossing the Yarmuk valley with its enchanting views.

This was prior to the destruction of the line by Lawrence of Arabia in 1917 during the allies' campaign against Turkey. Shortly afterward, Lawrence was captured by the Turks at the train station in Dar'a. Subsequently, the Hijaz Railroad became the object of an Arab political dispute. It became a perfect example of the conflicting viewpoints among the Arab states and a silent symbol of the Arab propensity to turn all possibilities into impossible dreams.

Some 72 years have passed since the construction of the railroad in 1908 and some 63 years since its destruction. What has been the result?

The result has been additional disagreement over the economic benefits of rebuilding the line--benefits which have thus far cost \$10 million when it would have been possible to rebuild the line for less than the cost of the cost-benefit study.

Engineer Dr Muhammad al-Bazam, deputy general director of the Hijaz Railroad in Damascus, talked to AL-QABAS about the facts and problems surrounding the railroad. He described the economic benefits of the railroad as tremendous and very necessary in order to unlock the awesome resources which exist in the different areas of our Arab homeland and facilitate human and commercial contact.

"How?" we asked Dr al-Bazam, to which he replied: "By linking the Arabian Peninsula with Europe and reaching remote deserts in regions far away from the Arabian Peninsula with the penetration of railroad lines into the north, south, east and west. In this way the railroad will help facilitate the spread of civilization and increase commercial traffic, thus achieving the first steps toward Arab unity."

Engineer al-Bazam seems optimistic that the economic cost-benefit study can be completed within a short time. This study will help determine the benefits of

the project as well as the advantages which would be gained by each of the three countries involved--Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia--by putting the railroad back into operation.

[Question] Leaving the study aside, how do you as a railroad engineer assess the economic benefits of putting the Hijaz Railroad back into operation?

[Answer] As an engineer, I view the revival of the railroad with a great deal of optimism and hope. My optimism rests on the experiences which other states of the world have had in the past. By some simple calculations we see that railroad lines have a useful lifespan of 20 years, and even as much as 30 years with good maintenance. On the other hand, the highways in our area, in particular, provide service for only five years at a maximum because of the harsh climatic conditions. This requires that the highways be repaved on a five-year basis. From another standpoint, one locomotive driven by a single operator can pull ten cars capable of carrying thousands of tons. This saves the amount of energy which would be consumed by thousands of trucks, decreases air pollution in the cities and reduces the number of accidents caused by freight vehicles in the cities and towns. Trains are faster, cheaper and safer.

#### World Interest

[Question] You have the option of awarding the project to any company which demonstrates the greatest readiness and submits the best bids. To what extent are the European and Western states showing an interest in this project?

[Answer] Contrary to our expectations, many of the European states as well as the United States have shown an increasing interest in this project. The biggest industrial and engineering groups are going to join with their governments in submitting bids for the extension of the line either in its entirety or in parts, as the governments wish. In addition, financing incentives are being offered by the East and the West.

[Question] Technological advancements have allowed modern trains to achieve speeds as high as 300 kilometers per hour. Are there any particular technical conditions which would prevent the use of the latest advances in the railroad industry?

[Answer] In our country, it is impossible to operate fast trains. We expect that the speed of the prospective type of train will be around 200 kilometers per hour.

[Question] What will the Hijaz Railroad be like after it has been fully implemented?


[Answer] The line will be 1,300 kilometers long, with 140 kilometers in Syria, 500 kilometers in Jordan and the remainder in Saudi Arabia. The new project will be linked with Syrian railroads and ports as well as the railroads of Turkey, thus connecting the Arabian Peninsula with Europe.

In Saudi Arabia the project will be connected with the al-Dammam-Riyadh-Medina-Jiddah railroad, which is the project called "East-West Saudi Arabia." As a result, the Arabian Peninsula will be linked with all the countries of the Middle East and Europe.

During the next three years, the capitals of Damascus and Amman will be linked by a fast line superior to the Orient Express train which goes into Europe.

[Question] What about the cost?

[Answer] Each kilometer will cost \$1 million on the average. This cost varies according to the topography of the various areas. It is higher in mountainous areas and lower in flat areas. The total cost will be \$1.3 billion, of which Syria's share is \$100 million, Jordan's share is \$120 million, and Saudi Arabia's share is the remainder.



● خارطة تبين مسار الخط الحجازي من معان الى المدينة المنورة

Map showing the route of the Hijaz Railroad from Ma'an to Medina.

8591

CSO: 4802



## CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC MILITARY ALLIANCE REBUFFED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 27 Jan 81 p 2

[Text]

TAIF, Jan. 26 (SPA) — Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal said that Islamic countries do not intend to form a military pact like the NATO or Warsaw blocs.

Asked if Islamic countries intend to form a pact or force that would match the present nuclear era, Prince Saud said, "To the contrary. We seek disarmament, halt to arms race and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all countries of the world, minimize it until non-existence."

The foreign minister was speaking at a seminar on Saudi Arabian Television Sunday night. He said that preserving the independence and welfare of Islamic countries could only be achieved through collective work, protection against occupation and unifying policies on the international level.

The foreign minister described what the Western media calls the "Islamic bomb" as a fabricated Zionist campaign designed to incite imaginations and terrorize the international society from Islam.

He reiterated the necessity to confront the Zionist and Communist campaigns aimed at defacing Islam and Muslims. A regular and effective Islamic information plan is capable of showing Islam in its true picture. He expressed the hope about the future of Islamic solidarity which is based on sound principles and serves mankind.

Habib Chatti, secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, who took part in the seminar also said the Jerusalem issue will top the agenda of the Mecca summit. Muslims had been in charge of the holy city's affairs for more than 1,300 years and they are the only ones who should be the guardians of Jerusalem, he said.

Islamic countries unanimously demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, he added. The OIC's efforts to

resolve the Afghan problem were met by a stubborn Soviet stand, he added.

In addition, he said the third Islamic Summit conference, held at an important stage of the Islamic and Arab community's history, will draw the guidelines, principles and conditions for a new start in joint Islamic action.

Prince Saud stressed Sunday night that there are some parts of the Muslim world like Palestine and Afghanistan still under occupation and he urged the need for joint Islamic action to confront and dangers and challenges.

The foreign minister reiterated his confidence that the document of liberating Jerusalem if approved by the conference, will state the objectives of the Islamic community in liberating the holy city and returning it to Arab sovereignty. The document was prepared by the Jerusalem Committee headed by the Moroccan monarch King Hassan, he said.

He called on the international society to be sympathetic with the Islamic community in solving the problem of the holy city.

Prince Saud urged freeing Afghanistan from occupation and foreign influence, especially from superpowers. Being superpowers does not give them the right to interfere in the affairs of smaller countries, rather than carrying out their duties toward these countries, he said.

How can Afghanistan jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union as Moscow claims that it would not accept any government in Kabul that threatens its security, Prince Saud wondered. The logic of security based on geographic borders will bring colonialization to all countries of the world. This logic has no limits taking into consideration the space weapons threatening the security and stability of the world including the superpowers, he said.

CSO: 4820

# IMPRESSIONS OF AFGHAN WAR SCENE DESCRIBED

Milan IL GIORNO in Italian 13 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Graziano Sarchielli: "Beyond the Snow -- Blood"]

[Text] Bloody battles beyond the snow-covered mountains. Horrifying reports of bombs, napalm, and bulldozers razing villages. One year after the invasion, the Russians are worse off than ever; a bridge, a road or a mountain pass taken by day is lost by night—No liberation front exists, but numerous tribes are armed with knives or home-made guns. For Breshnev this will never be another Vietnam, if only because the world knows nothing about what is happening in the valleys of Afghanistan.

Peshawar, Pakistan, 13 January -- Is Afghanistan the Soviets' Vietnam? It seems not, neither in the military nor the political sense. One year after the Russian invasion, this is a "forgotten war," waged beyond the mountains covered with snow and ice and far from the lurid, wretched encampments inhabited by over 1 million vegetating refugees. Wrapped in soiled blankets, they carry rusted swords, sharp daggers and a few guns, which bear the inscription "Queen Victoria, 1896". --war booty buried under a century of dust. With these arms and other home-made weapons, a band of men, indeed many separate tribes and family clans, attack Soviet missiles, helicopters, MiGs, tanks and the spewers of poison gas.

After breathing a "black gas" for 3 months in a village over the far side of the mountains, a whole family of seven persons living in a tiny tent still continues to spit out bits of their lungs. But the aged chief of the clan brandishes his razor-sharp dagger and vows that he will go back over the mountain to "cut off the balls" of the communists. He obliges his first-born son to promise, in the name of Allah, that he will do likewise, then his second, third and fourth sons and a dozen relatives. All of them swear revenge.

The Afghan war against the Russian invader is not collective effort but rather so many private vendettas fought by clans, families and tribes. This is their strength but also their weakness, a strategy that will never bring an end to the bloodshed unless the Soviets withdraw from the fray which, at this point, seems highly improbable.



Despite thousands of Afghan dead and other tens of thousands imprisoned for opposing the Soviets, these clans and family units still resist and fight. Perhaps the boasts you hear in the refugee camps about the killing of hundreds of Russians in ambushes and swift, ferocious raids on garrisons down in the valleys, manned by reduced Afghan government troops and numerous Soviet troops, are not true; nevertheless, the enemy's losses are certainly enormous. Rivers of blood are the retribution paid by the invaders for overrunning a country difficult to subdue.

On the other side of the mountains they fight and resist. You can see piles of identity cards taken from the corpses of Russian soldiers, blonds, Mongols and Muslims, a sample of the multiple races that comprise the immense Soviet ethnical and cultural mosaic. "They don't send any more Muslims, our brothers," the Afghans say. "They have withdrawn practically all of them. Too many were fraternizing with us."

How many Russians are there in Afghanistan? The Americans estimate some 100,000 men, with another 30,000 poised on the frontier, equipped with missiles and tanks and at least 240 armored helicopters, any number of MiGs and other bomber planes arriving every day from Tashkent. They control the low-lying valleys, access to the country's more important cities, the main bridges over rivers and some stretches of road, but nothing more.

The resistance strikes out everywhere. In the isolated region of the Hazara, 3,000 Afghans assaulted and captured a garrison of 300 Soviets; those few taken alive were then decapitated. But abandoning all caution after their victory, the Afghans were massacred in a helicopter counterattack. "Almost one for one," said a survivor. "The helicopters paid us back, they shot at everyone. Then the troops came and burned the villages with all the people in them. I can still smell the odor of roasted flesh." In every part of Afghanistan the war goes on, with the Pushtuni, the Kushji and the Afridi pitted against the enemy. In practice, Babrak Karmal's regime rests solely on Soviet bayonets.

No road is safe. Not a single province has been defeated. Every city observes the curfew because the night--and sometimes the day--belongs to the guerrillas. Even in Kabul, Russian families are obliged to do their shopping in convoys protected by the military.

This is a strange war, somewhat incomprehensible to Westerners, who customarily think guerrilla warfare as a well-knit mass movement. The Afghan movement, however, has no outstanding commander, only dozens of family heads or, at best, tribal chiefs. There is no evidence to indicate that at some future time the Afghans will join forces in a single military command: in spite of the Russians, time-honored feuds and blood vendettas still persist, bearing out the axiom that if you spill blood, you must pay for it in blood.

If one wanted to make a distinction among the combatants, this could be done by separating the Islamic fundamentalists of the Hisbi in Islam group from all the rest. This "individual" approach naturally offers advantages in the fierce fight against an enemy so much more powerful in arms and material. The mujahedin attack in small groups; after an incursion, they vanish in the mountains.

After 1 year of occupation the Soviets probably control less territory today than they did immediately after the invasion. They have lost thousands of men, of this there is no doubt. They have taken villages and valleys dozens of times, each time in the certainty that they have captured a target once and for all, only to find themselves again under mujahedin fire. Whole areas have been depopulated by napalm and fire. The innumerable eye-witness reports one hears are hair-raising. The most telling testimony lies with the million and more refugees who live precariously in 5,000 camps in Pakistan.

Each one will tell you that "my village has been completely destroyed." You hear the same story repeatedly: "They killed everyone. Then came the bulldozers to raze my village to the ground and hide every last trace of the houses, the mosque and the school."

You may not believe everything you hear, but many accounts, related in detail, are so horrifying that you are left appalled by the indifference with which the world beyond those snow-covered mountain chains looks on and makes its judgments. Compared with the conflict in Vietnam, this is a "forgotten war."

9653

CSO: 4404

## AFGHANISTAN

### REBEL LEADER ZARIN KHAN INTERVIEWED ON PROSPECTS FOR 1981

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 3-4 Jan 81 p 2

[Report on an interview with Zarin Khan, a partisan leader in eastern Afghanistan by Lars Moller-Rasmussen: "Afghan Partisan Leader Says, 'We Are Stronger Than Before the Invasion'"--date and place of interview unknown]

[Text] A year after their invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Russians have gotten into what one might call a classic antiguerrilla warfare situation. It is a situation in which almost the entire population is against them and their domination of the air can only keep the Afghan partisans at a distance but cannot force a decision. That is the picture which was drawn by the Afghan guerrilla leader Zarin Khan during a trip to Denmark.

Zarin Khan, who commands 6,000 partisans in eastern Afghanistan, left the battle area only 3 weeks ago and set out on a trip to western Europe, where he is trying to attract the public's attention to the war in his homeland. In an interview with INFORMATION, he describes the pattern of the fighting as follows:

#### Became More Careful

"Since the invasion," says Zarin Khan, "we have had 18 encounters with the Russians, and we won all of them. Most of those encounters took place when the Russian armored forces left their fortified bases to hunt for us. Most of the time they meet us in their armored vehicles. They seldom go into battle against us as infantry. Once, when they went against us on foot in the Shigal district, not one of them survived. In the middle of the battle, the entire battlefield, with both our partisans and the Russians on it, was bombed from the air by Russian aircraft, and when it was all over the only survivors were among our people."

Since then, the Soviet soldiers have become more careful. "Now they attack us less frequently," says Khan. "They only emerge from their bases with their air force above, over their heads, and the Afghan Government forces' infantry in front of them."

"We have begun to direct a number of attacks against their fortified areas," he adds, "but it has become more difficult because the Russians are protecting their bases with minefields more and more."

The Soviet Russians' laying of mines "is a problem," and the same can be said of their constant attacks from the air. Khan denies that the Soviet troops shifted their tactics in the summer and switched over to the use of lighter weapons than previously:

"During the entire period, we have been bombarded by gun-carrying helicopters of the MI-21 type and with guns of the 8-barrel No 13 type. If the world wants to call those weapons too light, it's all right with us. Both the helicopters and those guns bother us a lot."

#### A Soviet Victory or Another Vietnam?

On his trip to Europe, Zarin Khan, who only speaks the main Afghan language, Pushtu, is accompanied by Dr Zabihullah Modjadidy, who functions as his interpreter. Dr Modjadidy represents Afghanistan's National Liberation Front--a movement which is Islamic in its ideology and which is led by his father, Professor Sibghatullah Modjadidy. The professor, who now has an office in Peshawar in Pakistan, was the head of the Islamic Cultural Center in Copenhagen a few years ago. That front organization provides a certain amount of assistance--small shipments of weapons, among other things--to Khan's partisans, but they are not directly subordinate to it. Instead, cooperation between exiled members of the front organization and Khan's group is said to exist. That cooperation came into being spontaneously in reaction to an anti-Muslim and foreign domination of Afghanistan.

Since the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 and overthrew Hafizullah Amin's regime, Western experts' predictions regarding future developments have fallen into two main categories: some said that the Soviet Union, in contrast with the Americans in Vietnam, would be able to win the war quickly, either by starving out the Afghan partisans in their mountains or by conducting a tactically more effective antiguerrilla campaign. Others thought that the Soviet Russians would end up in precisely the same sort of blind alley as the Americans did in Vietnam.

In response to a question as to which of the two predictions comes closest to the truth, Khan replied:

"For the most part, I am in agreement with the last-mentioned view, although I do not wish to compare Afghanistan with Vietnam. When Nur Mohammed Taraki came to power (Editor's Note: in April 1978), he could have made use of the Afghan army to a certain extent. When Amin came to power, many people began to see what was wrong with communism. And when the Russians came, the entire population sided with us. Before the invasion, we only fought out in the country and in out-of-the-way districts. Now we even fight in the big cities, which usually are the enemy's most powerful strongholds."

#### Government's Army Demoralized

The most important card in the Afghan partisans' hand in their fight against the Soviet Russians is their mountainous terrain. "More than anything else, it is the terrain that helps us," says Khan. Added to that is the fact that "fighting morale is very high among our people, while it is very low among the Russians." The soldiers in the Afghan Government's Army are also characterized by a poor fighting spirit, and many of them--according to statements to the same effect by Afghan refugees and exiles in Denmark--are recruited forcibly in house-to-house raids in the capital city of Kabul. "The soldiers in the Afghan Army are kept entirely isolated from the population," says Khan. "When they desert to us, or when we take them prisoner, they tell us: 'Our superiors told us that we must fight well because

we would be fighting against British, Chinese and American soldiers who had come to Afghanistan.' And when they see that their adversaries are not foreigners but their Afghan fellow-countrymen, they come over to us. These government soldiers who have deserted often fight even more eagerly than we ourselves."

The various Afghan partisan groups are often criticized in the West for exaggerating the losses they cause among their adversaries and the sufferings the latter cause among the civilian population. Doubtless there is much to that criticism. The pro-Soviet Afghan Government's own propaganda, which is far removed from the truth, and its shutting off of the country from most of the foreign press make it difficult to check up on the partisans' statements. Another difficulty is created by the war situation itself.

#### They Have Escaped Famine

However, it is interesting that, precisely against this background, Zarin Khan fails to paint a picture of total catastrophe where the situation of the civilian population is concerned. Immediately after the invasion, some Western experts--including the American Mike Barry, in an article in this newspaper--predicted that the flight of the civilian population up into the mountains from the villages which had been bombed into fragments would end in famine of catastrophic proportions. According to Khan, these predictions were not fulfilled, even though the situation was far from a pleasant one for the civilians.

In response to a question as to how much the Soviet Russians try to prevent civilian losses, he answered quite laconically:

"In my province, the province of Konar, there is no civilian population there any longer, as far as I know. All the villages have been abandoned by their inhabitants because they have been wrecked, chiefly from the air. It is possible that the Russians in the large cities like Kabul and Jalalabad are doing something to win over the population, but they did not do it in my district."

The population of Konar either fled to Pakistan or farther up into the mountains. "Up in the narrow valleys, they have succeeded in carrying on agriculture, although on a modest scale," Khan says. "They also took along domestic animals on which they can live," he says. Catastrophic hunger was prevented thanks to the population's own efforts, although those local refugees "have certain problems--especially with obtaining supplies of medicine."

9286

CSO: 3106



# IRAN-IRAQ WAR ANALYZED BY IRANIAN COMMANDER

Tehran ENQELAB-E ESLAMI in Persian 22 Dec 80 pp 2, 12

[Interview with General Fallahi, deputy chief of staff of the army of the Islamic Republic]

[Text] In this exclusive interview with the special reporter of the newspaper ENQELAB-E ESLAMI, General Fallahi talks about conditions at the fronts, vicious attacks by Saddam Hosseyn forces on the open cities of Iran, especially Dezful, and the high morale of the Iranian fighting men. He also discusses factors that are harmful to unity and advances made by our forces at the fronts. He also refers to the psychological warfare waged against Iran by the Iraqi and Zionist propaganda apparatus. Following is the complete text of the inclusive interview with General Fallahi.

Question: What latest information can you give us about conditions at the front and the advances of the Islamic forces?

Answer: Compared to the early days of the conflict, our situation, as far as weapons, training and equipment is concerned, has improved five to ten times. As far as morale and discipline is concerned, we have had no problems and there was never any weakening in our Islamic faith. We never tried to artificially raise the morale of our men because we never needed to do that. We had naval and air superiority ever since the beginning of the conflict, which has been preserved and improved as a result of the experience we have gained. Our war with Iraq is a war between right and wrong. It is not a war between Arabism and Iranism. It is a war of "iron and faith" on one side and iron on the other side.

The art of war has proved that, in the long run, the final victor is not iron alone but the combination of faith and iron. In the Zahab plain, the enemy has been stalled. In the Sar-e Pol-e Zahab region, we have been able to not only stall the enemy but to push them back and recapture certain areas vital for future operations. In the Gilan-e Gharb area, the threat to the town has diminished and our forces are continuing to advance. Our advances were made possible by avoiding direct contact with the enemy, reducing its fighting ability by employing the air force, paratroopers, artillery and irregular operations. Coordination and cooperation between the army and the Guards and other popular forces in these areas have been admirable. Noticeable advances have been made in the Sumar area, but operations

for the recapture of Sumar have been slow due to the nature of the land. In the province of Ilam, because of the mountainous nature of the region and limited roads, we are not facing a large enemy force, and fighting is limited to border skirmishes. In Mehran region, the land is flat and we are confronted with a large number of Iraqi forces and military operations have been continuous. Here, too, cooperation between the people and the army and gendarmes has been excellent. I should have expressed my appreciation earlier for the support given by the people by providing medicine, transportation, supplies and even intelligence. Their support has been a main factor in keeping the morale of our fighting men very high. In the Karkheh region we are faced with large enemy force but have been able to stall them. The danger of an armored attack on Dezful and Andimeshk has been eliminated and we have been able to reduce the artillery pounding of Dezful by the Iraqis but we have not stopped it completely. The Iraqis are using a limited number of new artillery pieces with a firing range of about 40 kilometers. These are used for bombarding Dezful once in a while. The strong resistance shown by the people of Dezful in the face of the Iraqi attacks has been the main reason for the artillery attack on that city. The wholehearted support of our fighting men by the people of Dezful has been a major factor in preventing the fall of the city to Iraqi forces. That is why the main Iraqi forces were sent to the Dezful front and the artillery attack on the city by Iraq was a sort of retaliation against the people of that city. We devised methods in order to divert the artillery bombardment of Dezful and, to some extent, we did succeed. But we have not yet paid our debts to those people. In Susangerd area, the enemy forces have been driven to the west and northwest of Susangerd, which is a short distance from the border line, but the enemy artillery firing at the town still continues. The firing is not intense and has been reduced, thanks to sacrifices made by our air force pilots, the paratroopers, the Guards, the fighting men of Dr Chamran, members of the Jihad mobilization forces and the army. Yet, the threat to Susangerd remains to be serious. By staying alert and by special arrangements, Susangerd has been made temporarily secure, and along the Hamidieh-Susangerd road, enemy forces were pushed back to the extent that the road was opened for regular travellers. In this area, the only point in the hands of the Iraqis was the small border town of Bostan. In the Ahvas area, the enemy forces are pushed back to a point from where they no longer can attack it by artillery. There are only scattered artillery and mortar firing in the area by antirevolutionaries. The slow offensive against Iraqis by the Iranian army was launched sometime ago. It is slow because of the nature of the land and the fact that Iraqi forces had been able to build vast fortifications in the area. Irregular operations by Dr Chamran forces, the Corps and the army have inflicted the most casualties to the enemy forces. To avoid further heavy casualties, the enemy withdrew in a hit-and-run operation. The casualties suffered by the Iraqi forces in the past three months have been staggering. The number of tanks in each Iraqi battalion in the area was reduced from 48 to 30 units. The number of men in an infantry battalion was also reduced from 600 to between 350 to 250 men. Their losses in armored battalion was 40 percent and in the infantry battalion reached to a 50 percent level. This is aside from the psychological defeat which they suffered. In the Abadan area, where the Iraqis had succeeded to enter the Abadan island and penetrate the Zolfagari section of the city, they were first driven out of Abadan and the bridge they had built over the Bahmanshir River was demolished. They were then driven out of the Bahmanshir palm groves. Our forces have been able to push the enemy back some 5 kilometers in certain areas north of the palm groves. In these operations, the Iraqis left 100 killed. At the present time, the Iraqi

forces are surrounded north of Abadan and are connected with western bank of the Karun with only a single bridge. Military operations by irregulars on the western part of Khuninshahr, backed by artillery and paratroopers, continues.

**Question:** As you know, in any given war, high morale, discipline, tactic and organization count as 50 percent of the operation. In that respect, how do you compare the present conditions in our armed forces with the first days of the conflict?

**Answer:** Morale has various bases. The most important factor is belief in God and the life after. The next important factor is the popular support and the reaffirmation and recognition of the sacrifices made by the armed forces. There are other factors too, but the belief in God and the support of the people are the two most important elements and are considered as constituting three-fourths of the requirement of high morale. Before the war, because of the revolutionary culture of the Guardian Corps and traditional culture of the army, problems of cooperation and coordination were present. Pre-war distrust has given way to trust and faith. Members of the Guardian Corps and popular forces have become accustomed with regular operations and specialized training. We have achieved excellent results from the combination of these two forces and are depending on them very much. In the matter of coordination between various fighting elements such as the army, gendarmerie, the Guardian Corps and...no problems exist. There are opponents and dissidents beyond the actual fighting zones who try to cause division and prevent unity among the fighting units. As a soldier, serving his country, I recommend that these plots be dealt with through Islamic principles and justice based on fair judgment. The army has accepted the important principle that must follow in the direction of the President, who is the commander in chief of the armed forces, and also follow the line of the Imam of the nation, Islam, God and country. It does not tolerate any diversion, either to the right or left. This is the shortest line that connects creatures to the Creator. In other words, it is reliance on God. This direction originates from the hearts of every individual serving in the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

**Question:** What factors could be more of a blow to advances by the fighting men?

**Answer:** Ordinarily, every army fights its own way and psychological threats against armies are directed from the inside. A soldier at the front must first be secure from what is behind him and be reinforced from behind the front line. The army watches over and protects the nation and, therefore, is part of the nation and there must be a spiritual link between the small unit (army) and the big one (nation). The big unit should be unified for the small one to preserve its form. In military operations, the goals are fluid and changing. Problems of war are not all the same and alike. All wars are not alike and for each problem a special solution is needed. As problems are many, mistakes are naturally made. Nothing is more dangerous for an army than making something big from small mistakes. Normally wars are judged after they are over not at their beginning or in the middle. During a day a target could change hands several times. In military operations there are offensives, defense, withdrawal and so on, each one aimed at avoiding casualties or carrying out an urgent mission. Therefore, the passing of quick judgements are of great concern for an army. This is more dangerous when this is

done by those who do not know much about warfare rules and principles. This is disappointing for the military and prevents them from carrying out their missions. Other matters for concern are enemy superiority and the uncertainty about the future of the conflict which, fortunately, is not bothering our fighting men at this time. Our fighting men believe that in case of victory they will be hailed by the nation, and in martyrdom, they will be in God's hand. After martyrdom, they will not have to worry for their families because the nation has shown that it holds families of the martyrs in high esteem and is going to take care of them. As long as the fighting man believes in God, and his ties with the nation remain unchanged, he will no longer worry for himself, his family and his life after. This alone could be the secret for the existence of the army and the nation, and in fact, the secret of our victory.

Question: The armies that have come into being by force usually disintegrate from within and collapse. The Iraqi army which was formed by force and dictatorship, is also collapsing. In your opinion, how imminent is that collapse?

Answer: Based on interviews we have had with war prisoners, we have learned that the Iraqi army entered parts of our country influenced by three different factors. First, availability of large scale modern weapons and equipment, which is now reduced from 40 to 50 percent. Secondly, the factor of material gain and privileges. Violence and compulsion has been the third factor. Throughout history, none of these factors have proved to be an element of survival. These are temporal and fast-fading, and therefore, whatever success that they might bring will not be permanent. For example, an Iraqi soldier who could knock out one of our carriers, will receive two ranks promotion, and if he failed, could be court martialed and shot on the spot. An Iraqi soldier has no alternative but to continue to fight. Sometimes Iraqis mine areas behind their lines in order to prevent their men from pulling back. This is the same method used by the Amavis [Reference is to the first century Umayyad Caliphs who fought against Hosseyn, the prophet's grandson. Amavis are considered by the Shi'ites as usurpers and heretics] in the early days of Islam. We have come to realize the meaning of the declaration by Imam Hosseyn [Imam Hosseyn, the third Imam of the Shi'ites sect, was killed fighting the Amavi Caliph Yazid, and is the symbol of martyrdom for the Shi'ites in Iran and elsewhere], the son of Ali, who had said: "Bear witness, the innocent souls, that the victorious enemy will in the end face defeat." The Iraqi leadership could be compared with the leadership system of the Amavis. We know now that their (Amavis') rule was a shaky one and that in the end Hosseyn, who appeared to have been defeated, became immortal. We have asked servicemen, whose conscription terms had expired in 56 [21 Mar 77 - 20 Mar 78] to rejoin the army, which is 100 percent more than we actually need. A great number of these men have not taken part in the actual fighting. In view of the fact that we also have a big reserve on hand that are trained and prepared to join action, I do not believe we have any personnel problems.

Question: Psychological warfare was one of the tactics the Iraqis were employing at the early stage of the conflict. Before the war, and also now, Iraqis have resorted to psychological warfare. What are your views in this respect?

Answer: Psychological warfare moves in two directions, tactical and strategic. Tactical psychological warfare is directed at fighting men. The aim of the



strategic psychological warfare is the nation and its relation with the armed forces. In general, Iraq has not achieved its goals. The reason is twofold. First, is that Iraqis lack the required experience. Secondly, it is for the strong and binding spiritual ties that bind the nation and the army. Psychological warfare could be effective only if these ties were fragile and the nation and the army could be influenced. This is not true in our case. In connection with the Iraqi aggression against Iran, the army and the nation believed that it was directed by political circles in the United States in an effort to topple the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The army and the nation knew, as a result of the Iranian experience, of the launching of the internal war by the superpowers. In my opinion, and contrary to what international strategists had expected, instead of the Iraqi aggression causing the collapse of the Islamic Republic, it created national unity and solidarity. I believe this was an act of the Almighty God and a miracle. The psychological warfare waged by the Iraqi army against Iran has been so childish and crude that people in Iran consider it a joke and listen to Iraqi radio broadcasts as a pasttime, considering it entertaining. Iraq radio has never been and is not now popular with Iranian listeners. I see no considerable effects of the Iraqi psychological warfare on the army and the nation as a whole. But the psychological warfare waged by Zionists and the superpowers is cause for concern as it has created clouds of doubt in the country's political atmosphere. But I believe this will not have any lasting effect and will wither away. At the same time, we bear in mind that if in these efforts the superpowers fail, they will turn to other means in order to achieve their goals. Iranian nation must remain alert and ready to detect and resist any further aggression, be it military, economic or political. There is no doubt that this war is not going to be the last one waged to topple the Islamic Republic system of Iran.

9561

CSO: 4906



## ARRIVAL IN IRAN OF DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADERS REPORTED

Tehran NABARD-E MELLAT in Persian 6 Dec 80 p 8

[Text] A respected and authoritative Azarbaijani figure reports that Gholam Yahya, Dr Jowdat and Ebrahimi have entered Iranian Azarbaijan and are busy plotting.

Those citizens who, due to their young age at the time, were not acquainted with the separation of Azarbaijan at the hands of the Democrat Party led by Pishevari and Gholam Yahya still definitely know from the study of history that in 1324 [21 March 1945-20 March 1946] this gang of xenophiles, under the direct protection of the machine guns and bayonets of the Soviet army, separated Azarbaijan from Iran by announcing an "autonomous government!" In a period of 1 year the Democrat Party government raised such a conflagration and brought about such tragedy that for years afterward the zealous people of Azarbaijan were branded with their crimes. Now a respected and authoritative Azarbaijani figure informs us that this same famous Gholam Yahya who was raised to the rank of general!! by the Soviet army, and fugitive Dr Jowdat, the intellectual brain of the communist xenophile groups, and Ebrahimi, brother of the Democrat Party Prosecutor who was executed for numerous crimes, have all descended upon Azarbaijan. They have come with their friends and aides, with the same fantasies and antireligious, anti-independence plans, and are now busy forming factions, plotting and organizing rogues against Islam and Iran.

Last week we warned the government about the daily increasing activity of foreign elements through the north. This week we warn the government about Azarbaijan and the shameful, anti-independence activities of the traitorous sell-out dregs of the separatist Democrat Party of Azarbaijan. We also warn the government of the arrival and activities of the leaders of this criminal, traitorous party.

Mr Raja'i, the prime minister, who is responsible to the nation and the history of Islam for the protection of the country and the survival of Islam, and who feels this responsibility more than other officials, as he has a right to: we tell him, smash the network of treason, espionage and betrayal throughout the north and in the territory of Azarbaijan at once. Act forcefully, which will be nothing other than exercising the will of the revolutionary Moslem nation, to make the enemies of religion, honor and the nation really understand that in revolutionary Iran there is no place for their wickedness and crimes, and that the Islamic Republic of Iran would never in any way tolerate their treacherous plots and wicked attacks against the foundation of the Islamic nation's existence. In accordance with our duty we inform you of the extremely dangerous facts. As always we are fully prepared to make any sacrifice in order to crush the enemies of religion, homeland and national honor. We will not rest until the government has taken action to obliterate the last vestiges of xenophilia, plot and intrigue against the sacred interests of the Islamic nation.

**TUDEH TERMED 'MOST SOLID POLITICAL PARTY'**

Brussels SPECIAL L'EVENAIL in French 1 Jan 81 p 12

[Article by A. Danoly: "Party Politics"]

[Text] Is the present Iranian situation the result of past Great Britain and United States policies?

At any rate it can be underlined that the British, when they withdrew from their territories, east of Suez, had advised the Shah to fill the gap if he wanted to survive which actuated the latter to carry out a vast armament program and resulted in disproportioning the Iranian economy. As regards the United States they probably refused, through Jimmy Carter's voice, to help the Shah as they did not understand the true nature of Moscow's global policy.

Therefore, what has become of Iran today as it is now entering into the third year of "Khomeynism"?

At present the Tudeh party (with communistic propensities) is the strongest political force in the country due to its organizational structures and discipline. Its leader, Nureddin Kianuri, who received his training in East Germany during his years in exile, after the overthrow of the Shah, entered into an ostensible policy of cooperation with the Khomeyni regime, by exploiting the economic malaise and chronic under employment due to the recruitment of the industrial proletariat.

**The Left Awakens**

This did not stop Kianuri from playing an active role on the level of the national minorities such as the Azerbaijanis, the Kurds, the Baluchis, the Azeri Turks and the Arabs to whom he promised their own government and autonomy. These minorities number 14 million inhabitants out of a total population of 35 million Iranians, which makes Kianuri feel that he is on solid ground. But to assure himself of a more secure seating, he infiltrated the lower echelons of the armed forces. It is needless to say that the Tudeh party received Moscow's help in order to carry these operations through successfully.

All the more so, since the 1,400 km of Soviet-Iranian border facilitated the infiltrations of a possible "fifth column."

As to the "Feda'iyin", it finds its support among the middle classes, the students and intellectuals, which no doubt led Ayatollah Khomeyni to accuse it of being a paid agent of the United States, an attitude which certainly did not displease Moscow. At any rate, since last July, this organization has gone underground and has obtained the support of the Western European marxist intelligentsia and even of the United States. The most recent estimates show the number of Iranian sympathizers of the Feda'iyin to number about 8 million, which represents a nonnegligible force which could be induced to follow the political conduct of the Tudeh party. Actually, this would be the approach Libya and South Yemen would favor.

#### Arafat's Assistance

The Mojahedin is on the whole an Islamic militant group similar to Khomeyni's which would like to maintain Islam and Marxism in a very close relation. Does it not compare western imperialism to the devil, a fantastic notion dear to Yasser Arafat? Unquestionably it has no valid political basis whatever but it cultivates an armed force and trains 5,000 men with a reserve estimated to number 50,000 men which could be regrouped on the same basis as the Fatah. It is substantiated that these "troops" could be capable of overthrowing Khomeyni, that is if Moscow really wished it and if Arafat could assure the liaison.

However, events have probably taken too rapid a turn for Moscow. The Iraqi attack seems to have taken place too soon and the program which Moscow would have liked to stretch out over a period of 2 or 3 years, took on the appearance of a cavalry charge.

Whatever Moscow's support of Iraq may be for the purpose of accelerating Iran's disintegration it is more than certain that the plans made by the eastern block in this region of the globe can only place the westerners in a very uncomfortable position.

7993

CSO: 4900

## WESTERN RADIO BROADCASTS CONDEMNED

Tehran NAHIB-E AZADI in Persian 10 Dec 80 p 3

[Article: "Foreign Radios Spread Poison Under the Mantle of Democracy!"]

[Text] In analyses now being broadcast by the Voice of Germany, the BBC, and the Voice of America, fascists hiding behind a democratic facade, ostensibly with a compassionate attitude, are spreading insidious propaganda. The Federal Government of West Germany (FRG) has viewed the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the just and heroic resistance of the Iranian nation against the American-imposed war as a serious danger to the colonialist Western governments, and, as a result, those of West Germany, in the Middle East. In their confusion, they now broadcast sweet talk over the radio at night!

Radio Cologne of West Germany recently shed crocodile tears in one of its commentaries for the people of Iran. While expressing regret at the "atmosphere of censorship and suffocation," the "clerics" drive for power, and government by "mollahs(!)," it characterized this situation as unpleasant for the "Iranian warriors who bravely resist on all fronts."

Let's forget about this question, how can the "Iranian warriors" drive the enemy back on all fronts in an atmosphere of censorship and suffocation, and in a space controlled by religious people (!) and mollahs (!). It would have been better if the confused and forgetful commentator of Radio Cologne had added that the Iranian warriors had been forced under pressure of censorship (!) and by force of the club to resist bravely and progressively on all fronts. A friend came to me after hearing this hilarious, completely uninformed commentary and said: I think if Radio Cologne had added an analysis of this type of the marches by millions of people on the 9th and 10th of Moharram, they would undoubtedly have said that the Iranian nation, young and old, big and small, is under the clubs of the religious people, and that they pour into the streets to demonstrate on the 9th and 10th of Moharram under threats from the mollahs!

The Voice of America in West Germany has never relented at taking every opportunity to spread rumours, sow political discord and dissent, create an atmosphere of no confidence among listeners and in Iran, without studying a nation that has made a revolution in the name of Islam and on the basis of Islamic laws and economic and political principles and has transformed religion to a revolutionary ideology for the first time in modern times and gives its slogans in all marches.

9310

CSO: 4906

EAST AZARBAYJAN GOVERNOR-GENERAL COMMENTS ON SECURITY MATTERS

Soviet Military Shipments

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Jan 81 p 12

[Article: "East Azarbayjan Governor-General Denies Voice of America News Reports: There Are No Alarming Military Movements on the Iran-Soviet Border"]

[Text] Tabriz--KEYHAN Correspondent--Dr Sarukhani, governor-general of East Azarbayjan, firmly denied reports by Voice of America Radio broadcasts on military movements on the Iran-Soviet border and the erection of a bridge spanning the Aras River. He added: With this meddling, self-interested America wants to create dissatisfaction for us in this country. The governor also said: East Azarbayjan is the most peaceful province in the country, and the borders in this area enjoy complete tranquility.

The governor-general of East Azarbayjan also said in this interview: I told KEYHAN that some barbed wire had been removed along the Iran-Soviet border and that several steel bridges could be seen in the area. After the necessary investigations, as was said in KEYHAN, it became apparent that the barbed wire removal and the presence of bridges had taken place several years ago, was an ordinary sight, and that there was no danger to us from this. He added: Self-interested America, which is our primary enemy, and is at war with us, wishes to create dissatisfaction for us in the country with this meddling, oblivious of the fact that this meddling has no effect on us. Referring to the political atmosphere in the area, Dr Sarukhani said: East Azarbayjan and Tabriz is the most peaceful province in the country, and while American agents seek to disrupt the present political atmosphere of the land by spreading rumors, the people have been going about their daily activities and there are no apparent dissatisfactions in the province. Concerning the area's borders, the governor-general of East Azarbayjan said: The area's borders also enjoy complete tranquility and there are no problems of any kind concerning province borders. Concerning military movements on the other side of the Soviet border, he said: Assuming there should be movement on that side of the border, it would concern that country, just as if we were to stage movements on the borders of our own country.

Concerning friendly relations between Iran and the Soviets, Dr Sarukhani said: At the moment our relations with our neighbor to the north are entirely positive. We have obtained transit privileges from the Soviets so that we import many of the goods we need by way of that country. He also said concerning the Turkish government:



Our relations with Turkey are also good and merchants import some of the goods needed by the province and the country through its borders.

#### Kurdish Counterrevolutionary Plans

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 1 Jan 81 p 9

[Interview with Governor-General of East Azarbayjan Dr Sarukhani: "Evidence of the Influence of Counterrevolutionary Groups in Azerbayjan Has Been Given to Officials of the Central Government"]

[Text] Tabriz--KEYHAN Correspondent--In an exclusive interview with KEYHAN, Dr Sarukhani, governor-general of East Azarbayjan, gave his views on current issues facing the country, the area, and also the country's borders.

At the outset, referring to his last three trips to Tehran, his meeting with the Imam and national officials, and his participation in the governor-general's seminar, he said: On one of the trips I gave a full report on the province and its northern and Western borders, saying that while we have problems on our foreign frontiers which also existed previously and which vary from time to time, on the domestic side, relative to the other provinces there is infiltration in our province by counterrevolutionary groups and/or groups that are not entirely in accord with the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Clearly, this infiltration will take place in areas that are more sensitive and receptive. For example, when a microbe attacks a body, it usually occupies a spot where it can do the most damage. I had complete documentation and evidence in this connection which I gave to Mr Montazeri and the other officials of the nation, including the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Majles, the Minister of the Interior, the Revolutionary Court, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

In answer to the question of whether there was a threat of danger to the country from the area's borders, the governor-general of East Azarbayjan answered: Of course we have more common borders with our northern neighbor and we must say that there are no dangers to us from that side, but in any case, several times their aircraft have crossed into our territory. This may have been for reconnaissance purposes. At the same time reports have indicated that movements take place at times on that side of the border and that in some areas they have cut the barbed wire and that a steel bridge spanning the Aras River has been built. Of course they later said that those things have been there for several years. An important matter, however, that could cause a problem for us is infiltration by some groups. This is related to our same northern neighbor, so that in the region of Astara and the surrounding area, at times traffic has moved between Russia and Iran. The Russian government puts most of its efforts into organizing that handful of parties, organizations and groups that are Moscow clients so they can penetrate the revolutionary organs. As for Turkey on the West, there have been reports they do this in Turkey, but it became clear later that Turkey does things for itself, and what goes on between us and the Turkish

government is very good, but there is also the possibility that the allied Turkish and Iraqi Kurds may help the Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Iran.

The governor-general of East Azarbayjan was asked, how do you look at the problems of Azarbayjan, in your view, in this province which problems and concerns are important overall and provincewide, in other words do you have them under control? He said: Currently we are primarily concerned with political problems. Just as you have observed yourself, in the last few days a wave has come over the nation. This wave, which has reached all provinces and villages, cannot be without backing from the counterrevolution. The plan was recently set in motion in various places simultaneously, and there are also problems that resemble one another. The important thing is that these things are being done by these same infiltrators. Dr Sarukhani added: This is the greatest problem for the provinces overall. It is also active in our province and ranks as our most important problem, but with the warnings our people have, and, God willing, will have in the future, these plots will be frustrated in any case, and there will be no problem as such. Of course, the provincial government, the revolutionary bodies and police officials are following the subject closely and are trying to stop every plot. Dr Sarukhani said: Just as I have also said previously, this infiltration movement has tried very hard to get a foothold within the revolutionary bodies and to have its work done by those who are dearest to us. This is also a problem for us, which is perhaps the most difficult of them. They are perhaps successful in this to a certain extent. The reason for this is that at the same time that this counterrevolutionary wave has taken shape throughout the country we see that the military takes the Superintendent of Education in Hashtrud and imprisons him and exactly the same thing has happened in Moghan.

The governor-general said: If we think that all of this happens out of compassion, why didn't it happen before and why is it taking place simultaneously with this wave. This therefore shows that there is something behind them of which they themselves are unaware and which guides them, and the problems which created the eight-person group for us here has created problems and this complaint must be carefully investigated, and things must be done that are legal and according to law approved by the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran. If illegal things have been done they must be corrected and if the law has not been implemented the law must be put into effect again.

In discussing other difficulties in the area Dr Sarukhani referred to the issue of purging undesirable personnel, saying: Purges in our province, as in other places have created problems, which are due to be studied again.

While proclaiming his satisfaction with the government, Dr Sarukhani said he had no complaints against the government.

In answer to the question, what is the main stimulus for political outbreaks in the country, Dr Sarukhani answered: The main reason for confrontation in the country is that imperialism, not having gotten results from the war with Iraq, is now employing another of its tricks by sowing discord among the revolutionary bodies, the various organs, and the people. If we think this is not the case it is a complete mistake. We know very well that the war and the Iraqi attack have come to a standstill and that supremacy on the war fronts has fallen into Iranian hands. The same thing has happened from the economic point of view. Though all

the reactionary countries in the area are backing Iraq, it is clear that Iraq is dallying around with its war effort, and that it can see its own demise in the face of the active power that our nation has mobilized against the enemy.

In answer to a question on whether he was satisfied with the accomplishments of revolutionary bodies such as the revolutionary courts, the revolutionary guards, the reconstruction effort and other such things in Azarbayjan, the governor-general of East Azarbayjan said: The revolutionary courts have rendered valuable services so far, and our reconstruction effort was the best in the whole country. The services of the revolutionary guard are also meritorious.

He added: The reconstruction efforts made last year were extraordinary. This year, however, because of the loss of a number of our active forces and engineers, activities have been reduced.

Referring to anticipated problems with the revolutionary guards, the governor-general said: These problems, whether internal or external, must be solved, so that the guard can grow, for it is the protector of the revolution and the keeper of the country.

Dr Sarukhani was asked, what is the overall situation of the independent producing factories in Azarbayjan, and what manner of life-sustaining activity can be hoped for from these factories, whether from the standpoint of management, production, or profits, and, in principle, do you have any recommendations on this? He answered: Existing factories in the area must be divided into two groups, the ones owned privately and the ones that are state-owned or that have been nationalized. Nationalized and state-owned factories have been assigned management by the government, and they are also administered by the government. I think the work of this type of factory at the province level is better than that of other factories in the country, in such a way that the work situation of these factories on a day to day basis is good compared to the past. If they do not show a profit, their losses are small. Of course, some factories have reached a profit-making stage, for example the Derman Diesel shop, which lost about 24 million tumans last year, has made a 7 or 8 million tuman profit so far this year.

The governor-general added: In general, I am satisfied with the work of our factories at the province level. Some of them are doing better than in 1356 [21 Mar 77 - 20 Mar 78]. Some, however, are still at the levels of that year, and there are others which have not yet reached those levels. These factories are receiving much attention so they will improve both from the standpoint of production and profit. I do not have as much information, however, about the privately owned factories. Since they are in the private sector they do their work themselves. Most of them are making a profit, but so far as I know, because of problems that have arisen, some of them are not showing a profit now, due to high prices and non-availability of raw materials. This is a temporary condition.

Dr Sarukhani was asked: Are there obstacles facing you in the full execution of the responsibilities of your office? He answered: The obstacles that exist

preventing execution of the responsibilities of the governor-general are ultimately attributable to the methods of imperialism. What has been clear to us from the beginning of the revolution is that the counterrevolution has created a state of affairs for us in which people in positions of responsibility cannot get anything done. Of course, they have had some cooperation in this. For example, in the first days of the revolution they instigated strikes and closures in the factories, and part of our forces were taken up with quelling strikes. Then the instigations of war in Kordestan, Azarbayjan, and the war with Iraq are complete obstructions in the path of officials and the revolutionary organs, who cannot get on with their responsibilities. It would have been different if they had left us alone during these past 2 years. We can show that more has been accomplished during the last 2 years than in the previous 50 years. God willing, those statistics will be published in the months of Farvardin [21 March - 20 April] and Esfand [20 Feb - 20 March].

Dr Sarukhani was asked: A rumor has been going around lately that you were thinking of resigning. Was there any truth to this or was it no more than a rumor? He answered: I had considered it. The first time I went to Tehran I did not exactly resign nor insist upon it, but I told them what the situation was and explained the difficulties. I added that I did not want to work with those problems, but they told me that there are problems everywhere and that I could solve my problems with the responsibility I have.

The governor-general of East Azarbayjan, concerning the matter of torture in the country's prisons, said: As far as I know there is no torture in the prisons. I do not know if it existed previously. The matter you refer to happened in the courts. If they give a drunk lashes in the court, rumors circulate on the outside that they torture people in the courts. In any case, however, if it does exist a group will investigate inside the prison and everything will become clear.

Dr Sarukhani was asked: Tell us how successful you have been so far in implementing the constitution in the province, and tell us also how successful has the government been in this to date? He answered: I think that in some instances the constitution cannot be implemented properly. This is true both nationally and at the provincial level. This is not the fault of the government, of course. The government has a great desire to enforce the law. I have said repeatedly in my speeches that I want to see the law enforced, because if the law is not enforced there will continue to be improper interference of one office in the affairs of another, and if the judicial powers continue to interfere with the executive powers and the legislative powers it will lead to the perpetuation of this disorder and rebellion. The counterrevolution will also make maximum use of it. The reason these problems exist now, with a certain amount of interference being visibly going on between various offices is that we have not yet acquired the habit of adhering to the law. We mostly go on the feeling that we have ourselves and we know we are revolutionary. The best revolutionary, however, under current conditions in our country is the person who adheres strictly to the law and who holds himself responsible for enforcing the law. If someone does not enforce the law and sets himself up as the Imam of the age, he is lying [sic].



In conclusion, concerning recent events in the city of Mashhad, Qom, Tehran, and Rafahan, the governor-general of East Azarbayjan said: After the counter-revolution was disappointed with the Iraqi war this calamity has been created in the country. We know that the imperialist countries have spies, in our country and our cities, who are very active. Furthermore they make maximum use of the state of disorder in the country and they exploit the feelings of the people.

He added: A few days ago some people came here and said that in the Tabriz bazaar a group of people put up Mr Bani-Sadr's picture and another group tore it up. The problem is not that one group supports him and another does not. They themselves arranged things in such a way that one group would put it up and another would tear it apart in order to turn the people against each other. I am not blaming this one or that one. I think they are unaware of the enemy's intent.

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CSO: 4906



## COUNCILS CALLED FOR TO PREVENT DISORDERS IN SCHOOLS

Tehran PEYAM in Persian 1 Dec 80 p 4

[Text] PEYAM-E MARDOM in its issue No 16 published an article entitled "Conversation with State Ministry of Education Officials," which while emphasizing the urgency of organizing genuine councils in the schools, pointed out that one of the negative and harmful consequences of official inattention to the above issue was: "...that it offers a good opportunity for counterrevolutionary elements and extremist groups of the right and left to appear and drag the educational environment into chaos in order to, as the saying goes, catch fish from muddied water..."

According to news arriving from all over the country, and particularly Tehran, the truth of this prediction has been confirmed. In recent weeks, through the continued inattention of educational officials and their procrastination in announcing "council plans" to the schools, counterrevolutionary elements and groups of Maoist and "leftist" saboteurs have used the opportunity to hold elections, shortly thereafter plunging the schools into an uproar. Until now the shining! results of these so-called councils (or to use a more correct expression, locations for these groups' assaults), have been nothing other than confusion and fights in the schools and the disappointment of the masses of students in the genuine councils.

From another angle, in some schools the unjustified and illogical reactions of the school authorities against the revolutionary enthusiasm of the students for active participation in affairs concerning them and for close cooperation with officials in removing the school disorders have intensified the fights and confusion.

The sum of these factors has brought about an undesirable situation in circumstances in which the necessity for unity and assistance among the students and reciprocal cooperation between them and educational officials is felt more than ever before.

The Iranian Students Society is confronting such dangerous events that we feel obliged to give this serious warning:

Esteemed State Education Officials!

In reality it is you who must answer to the students and their parents for the negative consequences of the above events. As quickly as possible and without delay present a plan for the organization of genuine councils in the schools, and announce that plan to schools throughout the country in a directive. This action

is not only an effective and revolutionary step towards removing educational unrest, but is also the most productive means of confronting the encroachments of counterrevolutionary and saboteur elements on the school councils.

**Student organizations and groups believing in the revolution!**

Your task is also heavy. You should meet the command to create and expand school councils in an informed, realistic and responsible manner. Expose "sham" councils and actively strive to organize genuine councils by cooperating with teachers and educational officials, by maintaining a healthy educational environment, and by avoiding all kinds of anarchism and discord-spreading. By taking an impartial or abashed position, or by forbidding the councils, not only will no positive steps be taken in this field, but the ground will be prepared for the abuse of counter-revolutionary elements or extremist "rightist" and "leftist" groups.

**Revolutionary students!**

Your vigilance and united, informed acts are the only guarantee of the survival and stability of the genuine councils in the schools. With a clear recognition of the duties of the coordinating and educational councils, assist the schools in this matter and force the counterrevolutionaries and saboteurs to take their filthy hands off the school councils.

We conclude by once again announcing that all members and supporters of the Iranian Student Society will continue their relentless and fundamental efforts for the establishment of consultative institutions in the schools. We thus strongly condemn any movement that creates confusion or spreads divisiveness.

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CSO: 4906

## WORKERS SEEK SOLUTIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT

Tehran ETTEHAD in Persian 2 Dec 80 p 1, 5

[Text] These days much news arrives about the closing of small workshops. Some of these workshops were compelled to close as a result of a shortage of raw materials or fuel, or due to the continual electrical blackout. Another group was compelled to close because of special circumstances which have come about because of the war (for example, workshops which produced luxury articles or secondary items, or workshops located in the war zones). Apart from these small workshops, some large productive units have also closed or are in danger of closing. (In past issues we published the news of the closing of "Shahrak-e Charb," and we also mentioned the temporary closing of several factories.) The closing of these units intensifies the unemployment problem which has afflicted the revolution like leprosy since the revolution's beginning.

Factory worker friends, we are living in critical circumstances. It is true that imperialism's hope to overthrow the revolutionary government with the help of the Iraqi aggressors has been brought to despair. However, imperialism led by the United States has not stopped plotting and it now plans to fan the fire of dissatisfaction and create domestic chaos. (It must be pointed out that several scattered demonstrations in past weeks were unfortunately only grist for the counterrevolutionaries' mill.)

In these circumstances it is necessary that we eliminate with revolutionary vigilance those areas from which imperialism can profit. One of these areas is the unemployment of several million workers. At a time when prices are rising every day, several million of our workers are unable to provide the bare necessities of life for themselves and their children. The number of unemployed increases every day as well. In such circumstances actions can be taken, which although will not be a final solution, can at least prevent the growth and expansion of unemployment. Among these actions are the following:

1--Obstruct the plots of capitalists who have conspired with the imperialists to close productive units. Nationalize the establishments of such plotting managers and let the government continue the establishments' functioning.

2--In some government establishments and factories, idolatrous, liberal and such-like managers, well-schooled in various excuses, are striving to close their units by firing a number of workers. (In this respect, the rumor of the firing of a number of employees of the cooperative store "Qods" on Molavi Street must

be mentioned.) These incompetent or destructive managers must be turned out of their jobs.

3--In current circumstances, a number of laid-off workers can be put to work in preparations behind the front and in reconstruction of bombed areas. For example, mechanical workers can be employed in repairing vehicles at the front, and construction workers in the reconstruction of the bombed areas.

9597

CSO: 4906

# WORKERS GIVE VIEWS ON GOODS RATIONING

Tehran ETTEHAD in Persian 9 Dec 80 p 5

[Article: "Several Points on the Rationing of Staple Commodities"]

[Text] Coming on the heels of widespread worker acceptance of sugar and sugar cube rationing, the Prime Minister announced that 65 kinds of staple commodities would be rationed.

This news caused a true wave of joy and happiness in all worker groups, because the workers have correctly perceived that in these circumstances when we are confronted with a war effort, in these circumstances when we are confronted by the imperialist economic monopoly, the procurement of staples can no longer be entrusted to the hands of a group of profit-oriented capitalists. In the several weeks that have gone by since the imposition of rationing, there are some basic points which must be observed.

1 - The rationing of basic commodities is a necessary step which must be taken, but it is not enough by itself. As long as importation of these goods is not under government control there can be no assurance that what the workers need, at least in the quantities allowed by rationing, will be available on the market. Thus the next necessary step that must be taken is to turn over all imports and exports to government control.

2 - For various reasons it is necessary that the government not only ration basic commodities, but also, in order to distribute them properly, it must utilize a network of cooperative government stores.

This is the most reliable way to implement rationing. Without a doubt, even with rationing the brokers and traders will continue to do the same destructive things they did before.

3 - In several weeks during which sugar and sugar cubes have been distributed, vexatious problems have arisen with respect to coupon procurement and the availability of distribution outlets. In our view, the government could alleviate these shortages by sending rationing departments to shops, production centers and work places to distribute coupons. Government stores and cooperative shop stores could also take on an effective share of the responsibility for distributing goods in exchange for coupons.

Another question the workers have asked here and there concerns the slowness of the rationing process. It has been almost a month since rationing has been introduced. During this period, however, only sugar and sugar cubes have actually been rationed, and the rationing of cooking oil is only now being discussed, while the current acute conditions, with shortages of foodstuffs and outrageous prices, are causing severe suffering among the workers. This matter must be taken up rapidly and with more decisiveness.



**MAYOR REVIEWS PROBLEMS OF TEHRAN'S POPULATION GROWTH**

Tehran MIZAN in Persian 8 Dec 80 pp 1, 8

[Text] Tehran's population has exceeded the alarming limit of 6 million persons while no basic program has been prepared and no fundamental action has occurred to prevent the population increase, to stem the arrival of unwanted guests from the city regions [shakrestan], or to prepare and supply welfare and public services for the defenseless city of Tehran.

The concentration of all facilities in Tehran was perhaps the largest factor in attracting migration and creating the endless problems arising from the arrival of thousands of guests from the city region. For this very reason our most immediate and essential job is to carry all facilities, meaning welfare, services, education, health, trade and banking to the city regions. We also need to have complete supervision and control over the fair distribution of those services so that we will be able, in some way, to check the flood of migration to Tehran and the large cities.

Engineer Tavassoli, mayor of Tehran, in a special interview with MIZAN concerning the unrestrained increase of Tehran's population, said: On the basis of the statistical sample which was carried out by the Statistics Unit of the Tehran Planning Office, the population of Tehran has now passed the 6 million mark.

He added: For some time the Iranian Statistics Center has striven to determine the real population of the various districts of Tehran based on the census of 1355 [21 March 1976-20 March 1977], and to announce the ratios among the 20 municipal districts of Tehran. On the basis of this accounting, the actual needs of the people in the districts can be studied and examined, and the necessary efforts be made to meet them.

The Statistics Unit of the Tehran Planning Organization obtained the ratio of persons older than 16 years of age who had the right to vote in the 14 election districts of Tehran, as well as the ratio of those younger than 16. By considering the figures for 1355 [21 March 1976-20 March 1977], the number of participants in the various election stages, and statistical sampling during the days after the revolution's victory, they arrived at a minimum figure for Tehran's population.

Doubtless in Tehran's past election all those possessing the necessary qualifications did not participate. However, the referendum on the Islamic Republic of Iran

brought the greatest number of votes, namely 3,462,449. Of course a portion of those belonged to villages surrounding the city, meaning that the totality of these votes came from the entire Tehran city region. This portion of votes was eliminated on the basis of repeated sampling of the entire city-region vote, so that a relative figure for Tehran's population was obtained. On the basis of the studies and modeling of the Planning Organization, between 6,002,253 and 6,302,365 persons now live in Tehran. These figures demonstrate that the population of our city has definitely surpassed the noteworthy mark of 6 million persons.

Engineer Tavassoli, mayor of Tehran, said: Basically the unplanned increase of the population began with the so-called Revolution of the Shah and the People, and the concentration of U.S. investment in Tehran. This concentrated all the financial, welfare and health facilities in Tehran. It also expanded the labor market in Tehran enormously, and encouraged the residents of other cities and the villages as well to take off to the capital for work and a comfortable life. The fact was ignored that the onslaught of thousands and millions of people from the city regions would not only not cure the illness but would give birth to thousands of fundamental and secondary problems arising from their unreckoned-for arrival.

The mayor of Tehran said: In the past several years government officials were apparently thinking about how to bring this perpetual migration under control and supervision. But because they did not take this problem seriously, or because there was not sufficient coordination between the responsible organs, they were in no way able to check the unplanned population increase. The control of Tehran's population will definitely not be possible without fundamental planning, and cooperation and coordination between all the responsible organizations. Now that the current war conditions have brought about the best opportunity for reversing the population movement, the government must take this issue very seriously, namely preventing the arrival of immigrants from the city regions, and then returning them to their own cities.

Engineer Tavassoli then turned to an explanation of ways to reduce the population of Tehran and other large cities, and said: Right now 70 percent of our trade is concentrated in Tehran, to such an extent that even our imported goods are initially transported from the ports to Tehran and then are distributed from Tehran to other cities. Or fresh fruits and vegetables are sent to Tehran from various Iranian cities, and then are re-transported from Tehran to cities near and far.

Therefore the national trade plan, which was foreseen in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, must be put into effect as the principal path of solution. Trade and commercial centers must be transferred from Tehran to various Iranian cities, particularly those near the trade ports.

The mayor of Tehran said: The transfer of trade and commerce to other cities will cause other service fields as well to move to the cities in a natural fashion. This will cause living facilities to expand at those points. However, in order that this program bear results, the banks must also equitably distribute all their facilities across the country, bearing in mind the economic, social and demographic circumstances of the cities. Parallel with this, education, health and all service organizations must have serious participation in this planning. Essentially they must appropriate their development budget to these cities near and far.

Engineer Tavassoli closed by emphasizing: Tehran's municipal office has submitted plans to eliminate Tehran's demographic attraction to the Revolution Council and the government. This is because we believe that in order to eliminate these attractions, we must have planning based on principles and firm foundations so that we will be able, through the complete, all-out execution of the plan, gradually alter the path of this migration in future years. Thus we shall be able to return the migrants to their origins, meaning the villages and other cities. Instead of having villagers descend on Tehran, the labor resources of Tehran will descend on other cities and villages in order to obtain higher incomes. The astronomical increase of Tehran's population must be taken as a serious warning to the government and to officials, because if we do not take decisive action to check and control it, problems, difficulties and calamities will quickly arise for the state administration as well as for Tehran's. Then it will not be possible to easily solve these problems, just as up to now it has not been possible.

9597

C50: 4906

RECONSTRUCTION CRUSADE AIDS ZABOL AGRICULTURE

Tehran KARGAR-E MOSALMAN in Persian 15 Dec 80 p 7

[Article: "Agricultural Activities of Reconstruction Crusade in Zabol"]

[Text] Zahedan--PARS NEWS SERVICE--The reconstruction crusade of the Zabol city region [shahrestan] in a statement on its agricultural activities, announced the following items. According to this statement, 16 tractors were given to Sistan farmers for use in preparing the land for cultivation, 40 million rials in cash and merchandise credit were extended in order to increase agricultural production, and five-person cooperatives were organized to receive tractors and motorized pumps, and one person from each group was introduced to the Zahedan reconstruction group of instruction in driving and maintenance. Sixteen motorized pumps were added to cooperative facilities for bringing water to ground level, seeds being used by village farmers, such as vegetable seeds and other kinds of seeds, are being improved, and the brothers of the reconstruction crusade are giving counseling and guidance in cultural matters such as the waging of the holy war. According to the same report, the agricultural research group of the reconstruction crusade of this municipality has studied and researched the lands of 60 Sistan villages and made proposals for credit extension in order to bring the lands belonging to these villagers under cultivation.

9310  
CSO: 4906

## TABRIZ MACHINE-TOOL FACTORY RESPONDS TO WAR EFFORT

Tehran OMMAT in Persian 1 Dec 80 p 4

[Article: "The Tabriz Machine Factory and the Imposed War Between Iran and Iraq"]

[Text] Human capabilities have grown and are working splendidly in the midst of conflicts and confrontations. It is during times of affliction that people are stirred up on the inside and their creative power becomes evident. The circumstances and afflictions that have recently befallen our nation, meaning the imposed war with Iraq and pressures on the Iranian revolution coming from American imperialism and the other imperialists, provide the heroic people of Iran with the best contending force, and, by putting their talents to work in all areas, to deliver a hard punch in the mouth to imperialism and those who do not think the Iranian nation capable of this work as well. The confrontation shows that if the people have even the most elementary resources, they can take effective steps to deliver themselves from the shackles of dependence. An example of these practical, self-initiated steps of the workers, technicians, and engineers in the industrial workshops is found in the Tabriz Machine Factory. Among the effective steps that have been taken in this factory is the implementation of a plan to establish a shop for making spare parts (for aircraft and...) as well as practical measures in this regard, and also the manufacture of spare parts for aircraft, tanks, various implements of war and other industries (parts for refineries, the railroad, and...).

The workers and technicians have shown that if the most meager resources are made available to them, they can be the most creative of industrial workers, and they can operate a self-sufficient industry. After the revolution, despite the absence of scores of foreign experts in the Tabriz Machine Factory, who formerly worked there, the remainder of the workers, with their own skills, turned the wheels of the shop, and once again demonstrated their ability to keep industry rolling. Officials must now encourage workers, increase their faith in the revolution a hundred times over, and mobilize them for self-sufficient production by eliminating the system of management by idolaters, bureaucratic administration, and obsession with documents in the workshops, as well as by creating Islamic councils and technical committees, and finally through the establishment of small, cooperative industrial shops in all parts of Iran for the purpose of reducing unemployment and cutting the hands of dependent capitalists.

9310

CSO: 4906



## SYRIAN PEOPLE'S SUPPORT OF SADDAM HUSAYN CLAIMED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Yusuf Ghayth: "And Tomorrow the Yarmuk"]

[Text] After today, the history of the Arabs will not be written erroneously and it will not be falsified. After today, no one will be able to play around with the pages which have been written with the blood of our martyrs and of their souls. The masses of the Arab revolution and of our united nation have demonstrated--to history and to the world--their power, depth, authenticity, and revolutionary spirit which yearns to put its principles and thoughts into practice in a way which is tangible and thus transform our age into an age of rectification. It is no longer possible to turn back the clock of history. Every Arab, in his feelings and in his conscience, will remember that 22 September is the day that a piece of occupied Arab land was torn away from the body of the Arab nation. In school, our Arab children have learned that Palestine and all other parts of our homeland which have been usurped are geographically and historically Arab lands. They have learned that it is all the same whether or not the usurper is a Zionist, a Persian, or someone else. The mentality is the same, the usurpation is the same, and the ambitious designs are the same. It is now taken for granted that the reply to such usurpation has to be made in language which the usurpers understand. Whoever is a tyrant, an aggressor, or a usurper understands only the language of the steel, fire, and cannons which hurl them back to their borders and bring them back to their senses. These days which the Arab masses are now experiencing are days which are full of the joy of victory and which recall the days of the glory of the Arab nation. The Battle of al-Qadisiyah is coming to life once more, and Saladin is returning to life and is stirring up pride and determination in the soul of every honorable Arab. The brave soldiers of Iraq's army have startled the world, not only by their unprecedented strength and bravery, but also by their unshakable belief that their cause is a noble and just one and that their legal claim is one which has long been violated. And now we see that the army of the turbaned shah--a technologically advanced army with modern military expertise--has been rendered weakened and destroyed by our will to fight and by our faith in ourselves. Our proud Arab people are contemplating this victory and are overjoyed at the determination showed by the men in their army.

But there is one question which is being asked by every honorable Arab. The question is: What is the reason for the existence of the disgraceful attitude--characterized by the very lowest level of treachery, subservience, and unprecedented hatred--which has been adopted by the butcher of Syria? The best allies that he has been able to find are Khomeyni the charlatan and their friend the colonel, the one with

the complicated theories. Even his ambassador in Prague has said that the secret and the strength of Qadhdhafi's theory is that no one can understand it because it belongs to an age which precedes the one that we are now living in. Perhaps someone who has lived more than 100 years, and who has remained in possession of his faculties, would be able to understand and analyze it, breaking it down into its basic elements.

But the basic issue here is the dictator in Syria. There are no words or labels which can describe him because he has gone beyond the definitions of such words and labels due to the degree of baseness and depravity which he has demonstrated. He is now caught in the neck of a bottle, and it would no longer do him any good to jump out of it onto the ropes because the ropes have become fragile like his regime and they have become torn apart just like the cliques which surround him. It would do no good for him to spew his poison and hatred on this impregnable fortress because no howling on anyone's part will do any damage to it. This fortress is as steadfast as a towering mountain, and its heroes have etched their names in the clouds of heaven, and the banner of their victory is flying above the clouds of heaven.

Whoever has leaders who believe in our people, who have lived their causes, and who have dedicated their lives to making them happy, will see only banners of victory, greatness, and sovereignty flying above their heads. There is a great difference between someone who sells land and someone who regains it and returns it to its rightful owners. There is a big difference between someone who takes a visitor and shows him "liberated land," which is still the target of Zionist artillery, which is under international trusteeship, and where both he and his visitor undergo inspection, and someone who shows his visitor the most modern weapons which the imperialists have been able to manufacture, and shows these [captured] weapons as if they were captured enemy soldiers--submissive and with bowed heads. A visitor is always towering in posture and he is always the one who shows the initiative. The humble ones are the allies of the ruler of the Persian empire which has been humiliated under the hooves of the horses of the Arab Iraqis. The good tidings have reached all Arabs, including the patient Arabs of Syria who are living under the regime of a person who has hoisted the banner of progress and exploited the name of the Ba'th--a person who is devoid of all that has to do with progress and with the Ba'th movement. The Arab people of Syria are now torn apart with sadness and grief as they see their comrades from the October War--who share their ideology, national identity, and Arabness--fight the battle of honor alone. But their hearts and their cries for victory are supporting them and they are traveling inside each bomb and inside each bullet which is being directed at the enemy. And victory will inevitably be ours. We are just as certain of this as we are certain of God, the truth, all of the divine prophecies, and every drop of chaste blood which has been shed on Arab land. Very soon the nightmare of despotism will vanish from Syria and the Arab banner will fly in the skies of our Arab nation and will bring smiles back to every Arab face and break down the barriers so that, in spite of those who are subservient and those who are full of hatred, the Barada River will meet the Tigris and the Euphrates. Oh mercenaries of history and people who are alien to the Arab nation! No matter what you have done, no matter what you do in the future, and no matter how well you have mastered the methods of coercion and despotism, your end is near, and it is nearer than you think. Rejoice, O Arabs, wherever you are. Saladin is rising again. Oh hero of the modern-day Battle of al-Qadisiyah--Syria and its people are waiting for you so that their eyes will sparkle when they see you in Damascus, hoisting the banners of greatness, victory, and glory.

9468

CSO: 4802

## PROPOSED PLAN FOR NEUTRAL PALESTINE ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Sep 80 p 9

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "The Plan: A Neutral Palestine"]

[Text] A new trial balloon for a solution to the Palestinian problem was set aloft recently by the PLO. It was done through a research study published by the UN affiliated Institute for Peace Research. Details of this work, "Beyond Security," which appears amid threats apparent to all parties of the Middle East conflict, were cited in another article in HA'ARETZ (15 September). It is known that the compilers of the study held meetings with PLO leaders, and it may reasonably be assumed that the latter agreed to the proposals for a solution presented in this work. It should, then, be noted that only two proposals for a solution are presented. The first, a confederation between a Palestinian state and Jordan, is not a new proposal, and has been debated on numerous occasions in a variety of forums. We will not deal with this proposal here. The second proposal is defined by the editor of the study, John [Murrow], as a "neutral Palestine." Incidentally, no serious consideration is given in the book to the Autonomy Plan agreed upon at Camp David, even as a program for a transitional period. In fact, both proposals clearly express opposition to the Autonomy Plan, even as it is interpreted by the Egyptians or the Americans.

For tactical or other reasons, quotes are cited from certain Palestinian notables who say that a neutral Palestine is not exactly the ideal solution. They regard it as a sort of punishment which is the means through which their independence will be secured. In any event, it is emphasized that this solution cannot be imposed and must be independently decided upon by the Palestinians on the condition that it will not be detrimental to their right to self-determination. They add that a neutral Palestine can be the first stage in the process of the whole area becoming a neutral zone in the distant future.

## The Austrian Model

From the outset it becomes apparent that there can be a coexistence between differing approaches and models for the concept of neutrality, and even disagreement concerning the obligations and rights of a neutral country. The study emphasizes that numerous Palestinians would criticize the model of a neutral country like Sweden, whose neutrality is not based upon international law or the Swedish Constitution, and does not depend upon international guarantees of any sort. It is a political neutrality which does not prevent Sweden from taking strong and one-sided stands, as occurred regarding the Vietnam War. More significantly, Sweden's neutrality depends upon great military strength. In other words, it is an armed neutrality.

To the researchers, and apparently to PLO leaders, the Swedish model could not be popularized, even among zealous doves in Israel. Therefore, two other models of neutrality were presented. Both are based upon international laws and national constitutions. One example is Switzerland. That country has political and military neutrality, while its citizens may hold any views they wish. Switzerland as a country may trade with warring parties. Again, in order to defend itself and its neutrality, Switzerland maintains a relatively large military force for a country its size.

The second model is Austria. Clearly this is the preferred of the two models, not only by the study's organizers, but also by the Palestinians concerned. The reason is repeated often by those Palestinians: Austria's neutrality was established as a condition for the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from that country. The Austrians also objected to partial Russian withdrawal and the deployment of Soviet forces in certain strategic points in their country (which is similar to the Israeli proposal to place IDF forces in the Territories when autonomy is established for their residents).

When the Austrians agreed to declare their neutrality, the Russian forces withdrew and Austria regained independence in 1955. The Austrians committed themselves not to join military pacts nor to permit construction of foreign military bases in their country. This neutrality is mentioned in Austrian law. While world powers made no collective pledge to respect this neutrality (in order to prevent a situation in which one of the powers alone decides or is requested to help Austria), Austria committed itself not to arm with nuclear weapons, missiles, submarines, certain types of aircraft, or artillery with a range of more than 30 kilometers.

Though the organizers of the study try to indirectly persuade us that there are similarities between the two cases, this is obviously untrue for several reasons. Even if we ignore historical and religious factors related to the struggle over the land of Israel, there is still no similarity in the realm of defense. Austria is not a threat to the Soviet Union. In the case of Austria and the Soviet Union, there is an entirely different balance of power (population, territory, wealth and other resources) than there is between Israel and the Arab World to which a neutral Palestine would belong.

Moreover, a neutral Palestine would continue to demand transfer of eastern Jerusalem to its territory as its capital. When Austria regained its independence it did not pose an irredentist threat to the Soviet Union--the threat that Soviet citizens of German extraction would suddenly seek to join their territory with Austria. The establishment of a neutral Palestine does not eliminate several basic dangers which Israel fears. For example, the irredentist threat posed by Arab residents of Israel living in Galilee and the Triangle.

The proposal also includes placement of UN forces between the borders of neutral Palestine and Israel. The majority in Israel would clearly oppose a proposal which involves the UN because of that organization's evil one-sidedness towards Israel. But this is not the main problem, nor is the fact that even in a neutral Palestine, the core of a small army would be established according to the plan, in addition to police. The problem posing the greatest danger is that even the creators of the plan for a neutral Palestine realize that if accepted, it would not solve what is referred to as the Palestinian problem. One can read between the lines how the PLO leaders hope to solve the refugee problem.



### What Guarantees Will There Be

Because of population density and a high rate of natural increase in the Gaza Strip, they realize that refugees should not be returned to this area. The West Bank could, they feel, absorb up to half a million Palestinian refugees from neighboring countries. They do not suggest that Jordan absorb the rest of the refugees who want to leave the camps. Lebanon also clearly hopes that all or most of the Palestinians will leave its territory. Thus, even this proposal will not completely solve the refugee problem. This would be used as a weapon against Israel and form a human reservoir for rejectionist organizations.

In the clarification of the refugee issue, a PLO plan concerning Jerusalem is unfolded. It appears that in addition to half a million refugees to be settled in the West Bank, there are plans to settle hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in eastern Jerusalem and its vicinity and to turn it into a city with a large Arab majority. They plan to achieve this through Saudi and other Arab money. Because there are not enough areas in the Jerusalem region to settle hundreds of thousands of people, the PLO is talking about construction of entire zones of multi-storied dwellings like those constructed in Hong Kong over the past 10 years.

This is one of the obvious weak points in the plan, both because it ignores the historical and religious perspective and its potential effect upon Israeli Arabs. Some of the Palestinians quoted in the study try to put our worries, and those of others who read this book, to rest. They say that they pose no danger because they are tired of wars in which they have paid dearly, that their (the PLO's) parliamentary committee is the most democratic in the Arab World, and that just as Jordan prevents terrorist activities from its territory, so will Palestinians prevent them, if and when a neutral Palestine is established. These are appropriate guarantees. Clearly the degree of democracy of the PLO committee is of no interest to Israel. But in Israel it is remembered that before Husayn's success in preventing terrorist crossings from his territory to Israel, he had to fight a bloody civil war with the Palestinian organizations, and nearly lost his throne. It is likewise remembered in Israel that despite the Palestinians' battle fatigue, they were the main cause for the destruction of Lebanon, a country regarded by many as the Switzerland of the Arab World. Therefore, the guarantees that Israel requires in any agreement with the Palestinians cannot be unsubstantiated words and promises uttered by the PLO. Moreover, the central PLO organization, the FATAH, recently reiterated in its declaration at a meeting in Damascus that it aims to destroy Israel, and that the only road to a solution is through armed struggle.

The burden of proof in this matter lies with the Palestinians, not with Israel. The territorial card is still in Israel's hand, but the rest of the cards are held by the Palestinians and the Arabs. It is true, the writer of the report says at one point, that there are no absolute security guarantees. He proposes that these guarantees, particularly those of the great powers, be viewed as policies issued by insurance companies, which generally try to limit or delay payment, bargain and even evade payment, pointing to the other party's liability. He still seems to suggest that Israel rely on such guarantees, from the UN, the great powers and primarily from the Palestinians themselves. Israelis, of course, hold a different view.



## ATTENTION CALLED TO VIEWS OF ARABS IN COUNTRY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Sep 80 p 9

[Article by Knesset member Shmuel Toledano: "After Shfar'am"]

[Text] At face value, the Shfar'am conference has no special significance because everything written and said in the "National Pact of Israeli Arabs" that was brought before the participants has already been written and said, including the PLO's designation as the representative of the Palestinian Arab people, of which the Israeli Arabs consider themselves a part. From this standpoint, there is no factual basis for what was written in an editorial in HA'ARETZ (8 September). It said that "the attempt by RAKAH to pull Arab merchants not identified with the Communist Party to its side and, in an Arab nationalist cloak, to present motions for views and slogans which RAKAH, as an established Israeli party, dare not publicize on its own, is misleading."

If we examine RAKAH's platform as presented to the Ninth Knesset, it will be seen that it clearly states that the Geneva Peace Conference should be convened "with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the PLO as the legal and accepted representative of the Palestinian Arab people."

Though this would appear to be nothing new, it actually is. The question is, are the people who said these things the same spokesmen, or have their numbers grown and a change in their character occurred. There is a vast difference between a RAKAH document and a document intended to represent a broader sector of Israeli Arabs. That is the unique and dangerous aspect of the "National Pact." The seriousness of the pact lies in the intention of its writers and coordinators that it be accepted by the Israeli Arab public sector which formerly hesitated or feared to adopt its principles. The danger is, then, in its legitimization.

If RAKAH does succeed in drawing more people, like the Qadi of 'Akko Muhammed Hubayshi and Knesset member Abu Rabi' and several council heads not identified with RAKAH, to give their support to such a document, then we shall undoubtedly be faced with a new situation requiring close scrutiny. In my view the "Conference of the Arab Population" to be held in Nazareth in November will see a larger number of Israeli Arabs not connected with RAKAH taking part. Some are even known as moderates, which will break the barrier of hesitation and fear. We witnessed a similar phenomenon prior to elections to the Eighth Knesset when state workers, particularly teachers and a variety of public figures, openly identified with RAKAH and took an active and open part in its election campaign.

This new phenomenon of open identification with a party whose leadership sees it as a nationalist anti-Israel party, a fact well known to the Arab public, resulted in RAKAH's adoption in Arab settlements among social strata and bodies not counted among its supporters. If we face the likelihood of a similar situation today, and open identification with the PLO, previously supported only by students on the campuses, the "Sons of the Village" movement which attacks RAKAH for its moderation, and the "National Progressive Party," which is the extremist arm of the Arab intelligentsia, becomes popular among young people in Arab settlements, teachers, council leaders and heads of clans, it should not be ignored and we must not regard the Shfar'am conference as just another conference.

In an interview given by the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, Mr Binyamin Gur-Arye, he said that the pact contains no formulas not regularly used by RAKAH in its publications and in the writings of its accredited representatives. Therefore, he believes, there is no need for a government reaction. As the facts stand, he is correct. However, the government, which surprisingly and unfortunately has not devoted even one meeting to a comprehensive discussion of the problem of Israeli Arabs, ought to examine this event in depth, because it is highly likely that its significance is different from that of other similar events.

As I have said, we must not oversimplify the meaning of this event and should realize what it portends, as did Knesset member Amnon Lin when he said that "the conference represents an attempt by RAKAH to create an organizational, ideological and spiritual foundation for the over-involvement of Israeli Arabs in the Palestinian issue so that if, in the future, the Soviet Union decides to activate Israeli Arabs against the state, an infrastructure will already exist." Putting it in this perspective only adds wood to the fire without contributing to the problem's solution.

An examination of RAKAH's policies from its founding to the present day shows the clear line guiding its policy: that neither Israeli Arabs nor RAKAH should organize or act in a way which would give the authorities legitimization or pretext for taking measures against the Israeli Arab population or against RAKAH. No circumstances have arisen causing RAKAH to stray from this course, which has always received the blessings of the Soviet Union. This does not mean that such a situation may not arise at some point, when part of the Arab public decides to organize in such a manner as will allow it to act at the right moment. Israeli Arabs have, since the birth of the state, succeeded in guarding the balance between two foci of strength influencing them: one is the State of Israel, whose influence has been primarily upon material wealth and everyday life; the second, the Arab countries, primarily the Palestinian factor, whose influence lies in national ideology. In recent years this balance has increasingly tipped against Israel's favor, though as yet only ideologically without conclusions being reached forcing Israeli Arabs "to the barricades" or to infringe upon laws in any manner. This achievement is the outcome of a policy followed for many years which succeeded in defining to Israeli Arabs the degree of infringement upon the balance tolerable to the state.

#### Danger to the Balance

Over the past 2 years many highly significant developments have taken place among the Arabs while RAKAH, fighting for its position, has been forced to take a more radical position in order to prove to the Arab public the falseness of accusations by the

"Village Youth" that it is moderate. On the other hand, the extremists are taking their extremism to great lengths to prove to the young Arab in Israel that it is fighting for his rights and the rights of the Palestinian people. "The Arab lobby," rehabilitated lately and its name acknowledged with the aim of bringing moderation to the stand of Israeli Arabs, while emphasizing the damage likely to occur to Jewish-Arab coexistence, remains weak. Its chances for success are not bright. One could compare what is taking place between RAKAH and the "Sons of the Village" to relations between the "National Progressive Movement" and the Likud and Tehiya. Both try to gain public support by trying to prove their "pure nationalism."

The government can no longer hide behind the formal and simplistic response, once given in the Knesset by its representative, which stated that Israeli Arabs are citizens of the state and there is no need to chart a policy course regarding this matter. If only the problem of Israel's Arabs was so simple. But every schoolboy knows how complicated this problem is and how much it demands attention, follow-up, awareness of all developments, analysis of developments, a policy and arrival at conclusions.

The Shfar'am conference necessitates one conclusion: the time has come to again clarify, leaving no room for doubt, whether the acceptance of this pact by the Arab public in Israel endangers a balance we are all interested in preserving. The State of Israel cannot accept a situation in which hundreds of thousands of its citizens openly and publicly identify with the PLO. This unequivocal clarification must be made before the opening of the "Conference of the Arab Population" in November this year.

## EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL'S PLAN FOR JERUSALEM ASSESSED

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 18 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Gabri'el Stern: "A Proposal and Its Assessment"] [A Reply to Proposal by Egyptian Foreign Mins-ter Official Usama al-Baz]

[Text] Following the American example, the Australians overcame competition between Melbourne and Sydney by founding Canberra. The Brazilians created Brasilia.

Actually, King David preceded the Americans when, in a stroke of genius over 3,000 years ago, he turned Jebus, which he had recently conquered, into the capital. In the same place, according to the Book of Hosea, passed the border between the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, and more important--Jebus, the city of David, Jerusalem, was destined to be a connecting link between Shekhem, the northern capital, and Hebron, the southern capital. But the package fell apart after David and Solomon. The north again became independent as the Kingdom of Israel, later Samaria, which was under Jewish rule only for brief periods, though settlement enthusiasts try to deny this fact. As for Hebron, after the first return from Babylonian exile it was in Edomite hands until the Hasmoneans imposed their rule and religion on Edom. This was not necessarily to their advantage, for Herod and Edomite took possession of this legacy in a bloodbath.

## A Federal Framework

As an experienced jurist, al-Baz certainly knows that Virginia and Maryland are partners in a federative framework, the United States (and in effect, Washington today spreads into these states). Does he foresee a federation between Israel and the Palestinian state (or the Palestinian-Jordanian state)? For only then does the American (or Brazilian or Australian) model apply. If so, there is not a great gap between his plan and one of the possibilities proposed by Ya'akov Hazan. He also speaks of the parallel with the Vatican as an autonomous unit within the city of Rome (Rome's status is shared by Mt. Athos in northern Greece [sic]). Such an arrangement, with rule by religious factors, cannot be realized in a populated city, but only over restricted holy places. Hazan also talks about autonomy, but there is a fly in the ointment. The question of a Moslem Temple Mount is relatively simple: there is only one sect, Moslem, which effectively controls the site, even now under the Israeli "occupation." Mayor Teddy Kollek said recently that he has no objection to flying a Moslem flag there. The place is, firstly, sacred to the Jews, but so holy that according to the majority of interpreters of religious law, it is even

forbidden for Jews to set foot on it. I once presented to the late Chief Justice Silberg the theory that from the time of Maimonides, that is, the Crusader period with its increase in Moslem fervor, this law became more severe. It is known that prior to this time Jews even worked in the service of Moslems on the Temple Mount. Silberg was an observant Jew to whom Begin once offered candidacy for the presidency. He said that my theory was quite reasonable. His last ruling before his death was based on his own considerations. It states that the government is authorized to prevent Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount.

#### How Many Christian Communities

The Christian holy places present a different situation. Unlike the Vatican, which belongs to the pope's church alone, Christian holy places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem are overseen and frequently fought over by several denominations, and the status quo, particularly important to the Greek Orthodox Church, actually necessitates the presence of a decisive neutral factor. It is no coincidence that for the past 800 years a man from the Nusaybah family sits at the entrance of the Holy Sepulcher holding the keys to the entrance. The decisive factor (once, through bribery or pressure) was Moslem in Turkish times, Protestant (a group with no direct stake in these places) during the British Mandate, later Jordanian (again Moslem), and now the Israelis.

Without a neutral police, the status quo would collapse and bloodshed would occur; however, the situation is much improved, and cooperation between Greeks, Armenians and Roman Catholics has proven possible in the enormous task of restoring the Holy Sepulcher, though the Ethiopian-Coptic conflict over certain adjacent sites continues. I won't say there is no solution to this problem, but all those who speak of "self-management" ignore the complexity of this problem. In any event, al-Baz's proposition, just like the interesting article by Professor Walid al-Khalidi, member of the Palestinian National Council, for an open city with an umbrella city government and a council representing each of the three religions under separate Israeli and Palestinian sovereignty, as already discussed in 'AL HAMISHMAR, shows that the Arab side is devoting thought to this special question. No idea should be ignored. At the proper time all the plans put forth by all sides should be brought to the negotiating table.

President Johnson of the United States, in a speech to B'nai B'rith in the late 1960's, called upon all sides to "use imagination" on the issue of Jerusalem. Let's all exercise our imaginations.

#### The German Model

There are precedents for an urban area over which several states have sovereignty: Basel, for example, the city where the First Zionist Congress was held. Basel is Swiss, but its airport is across the French border, and one of its main railroad stations is across the German border. A similar situation prevails in Salzburg, where the German customs is in Austrian territory.

An example in wording "beneficially ambiguous" agreements (as Abba Eban and Hayim Herzog call them) can be seen in the agreement between the two Germanys and the four great powers from the early 1970's, particularly as it concerns Berlin. East Berlin, as it is called by the West, is the "capital of the German Democratic Republic" to



the east, and nowhere in the world have I heard the word "capital" used as much as I did during a brief visit there, except, of course, in reference to the Jerusalem of Ge'ula Kohen and her satellites in the coalition and opposition. West Berlin is, in eastern talk, "the independent political entity of West Berlin" which identifies with the Federal Republic of Germany, while the West identifies it as one of the states making up the Federal Republic, with several qualifications: Berlin's representatives in the Bonn parliament have no voting privileges, and the West German military draft doesn't apply to Berlin, in accordance with an order by the conquering powers. (This actually applied to East Berlin too, but a youth there who attempted to use this to avoid military service received a lengthy jail sentence.)

The two Germanys have almost complete diplomatic relations, though their representatives' title is not "ambassador." There are a few other minor differences.

The normalization process proceeds slowly, but confidently. Setbacks caused by East-West relations occur, as in the postponement of the summit between the leaders of the two Germanys, H. Schmidt and E. Honecker, first due to Afghanistan and now because of the crisis in Poland.

But the key is the mutual agreement to refrain from use of force in achieving the final aim of either side. If this agreement stands, it is possible to live with different interpretations and "dreams," as Yasir Arafat said. In this spirit, in the words of Shem-Tov and Yariv, mutual recognition and the renunciation of force are likely to be a starting point for negotiation.

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## SOLAR ELECTRICITY MAY MEET FUTURE ENERGY NEEDS

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHEH in Hebrew 24 Sep 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Yanon Shenker: "Dead Sea Miracle--Success of Israeli Scientists in Producing Electric Energy at Experimental Pool in the Dead Sea Gives Hope of Self-Sufficiency for Israel in Energy through Solar Means by Year 2000"]

[Text] It was an exciting moment. Around 7:00 on 16 December 1979 hundreds of scientists and senior officials of the Ministry of Energy, headed by Energy Minister Yitzhak Moda'i came to the shore of the Dead Sea at 'Ein Boqueq. The distinguished group stood before a seven and one-half dunam pool surrounded by a fence and covered with green plastic nets. On one bank stood a large turbine.

The numerous guests were bundled in their coats because of the night chill. They strained their eyes in the dark, waiting for a "miracle" which was going to happen at any minute. At 7:30 all brakes were released, all buttons pushed, and the turbine began to hum. Lights were turned on all around--the Dead Sea and the Ormat turbine had converted the solar heat into electric energy.

There was much applause--as if Edison had just turned on his first light bulb. Minister of Energy Yitzhak Monda'i pointed out the symbolism of dedicating the solar pool at 'Ein Boqueq right before the Feast of Dedication and Lights, Hanukkah, and expressed the wish that soon solar pools will provide all of Israel's electric consumption. Yehuda Bronitzki, general manager of Ormat Turbines Company, who participated in the entire process of developing solar pools in Israel, said that Israeli scientists are taking part in developing solar pools in California. It was a good feeling. Everyone seemed optimistic and soon the guests went home.

The opening of the solar pool in 'Ein Boqueq was an important phase in the progress of solar research in Israel, which is distinguished by originality, pioneering, and many successes. The idea of the pools which extract energy from the sun was born in the 1940's.

Rudi Bloch was a young boy when he went to swim in the saltwater Lake Midva in his native Transylvania. Each time he took a swim he noticed a strange phenomenon: the temperature of the water varied at different levels. The deeper it went the warmer it got, while the top of the water remained cool. "It didn't make sense, since the top is warmed by the sun, while the bottom is away from the sun," he said to himself.

In later years, when he arrived in Israel as a distinguished professor, Rudi Bloch was still pondering his childhood experience. Years later, he was able to solve the mystery. He concluded that the degree of concentration of salt at different levels in the water caused the difference in temperature. There was more salt concentration at the bottom, and so the water did not rise and mix with the water at the top. Thus a great deal of heat was concentrated at the bottom.

In fresh water, where there is no concentration of salt, there is constant mixing. The sun heats the deep water which becomes lighter and rises up to mingle with the shallow water, and so the heat spreads throughout the water.

Professor Bloch maintained, after he developed his theory, that this natural law of Lake Midva could be applied artificially. He collaborated with Professor Tzvi Tabor (now head of the fund for scientific research) and the two, in perfecting the theory, gave the signal in the late 1950's to go ahead with solar pool projects.

Those were years of severe shortages in energy. Various bodies, including the physics laboratory of the prime minister's office, in which Professor Tabor worked, were looking for new sources of energy. They even worked on improving kerosene stoves and developing sun absorbers which were put into use.

#### The Law of Solar Pools Out of Zion

The idea of Rudi Bloch, who worked as chief scientist at the Dead Sea Potash Works, was given priority at the physics lab. The assumption that a small Lake Midva could be created in the laboratory prompted the research team to build experimental models of pools. In 1960 an experimental pool of several square meters was constructed to prove the theory, but before the results could be checked out, the government decided to postpone the study of solar pools "because the improved economy no longer makes it urgent."

The motto then was: "More electricity and less work!" The use of electricity was encouraged, which went on until the Yom Kippur War and the oil crisis, according to Binyamin Doron, coordinator of the solar pools project.

The scientists who did the research on developing solar pools, especially Professor Tabor, did not accept the government's decision and turned to the private sector for help to fulfill what they regarded as the future of Israel in energy. This is how Ormat Turbines Company of Yavne came into the picture. Its general manager, Yehuda Bronitzki (46), had practical interest in developing the project, in which he invested a great deal of money. His company developed a special turbine which can convert solar heat in a solar pool into electric energy.

The development of the turbine gave impetus to scientific research. Experimental solar pools of varying sizes were built in different parts of Israel, and the scientists found out that their theory about imitating nature was correct.

How does a solar pool operate? The existing pools (of which the largest is the one in 'Ein Bodeq) imitate Lake Midva in Transylvania. "We built an 80 centimeter deep pool and put salt into it," Binyamin Doron explains. "It now has 12 levels of water with different densities of salt. In the top level the heat is close to the temperature of the environment, but at the bottom the heat reaches 95°C. The solar heat

enters the water and is caught in the bottom levels which have a high density of salt. This creates a kind of a sandwich which captures the heat inside and keeps it from going out. When this hot water is drawn and run through the turbine, it produces electricity."

"We have adopted the motto: 'Energy for Israel!'" Doron says, and adds, "In 1975, after our experimental pool in Yavne worked out well, we were given a pool by the Dead Sea Potash Works and continued our experiments. We found out that the pool can be damaged by the wind, which causes waves and mixes the water, and by accumulation of salt, which changes the density in the pool and also damages the pool. We prevent waves by putting nets on the water. The accumulation of salt is a slow process, and we deal with it by adding salt to the low levels."

The energy crisis and the use of oil as a political weapon after the Yom Kippur War brought a new interest in solar energy, and a search for new sources of energy. The developers of the solar pools have been able to produce 104°C heat, and have thus convinced many that what they are doing is practical.

The developers themselves, along with Israeli academicians and scientists, have begun to think in far-reaching directions, since they believe that by the year 2000, solar energy may become Israel's main source of energy.

It is interesting to note that Israel, a pioneer in installing sun-heated boilers and in solar energy research, helped the rest of the world "see the light" in the area of solar pools. The tenacity of Israeli scientists Rudi Bloch and Tzvi Tabor and their colleagues has borne fruit. The experimental pools at Yavne, 'Atlit, and 'Ein Boqueq, as well as the Ormat turbine, have proved that the pools have practical application. "Nature provides tremendous energy which is within reach, and the Israelis have shown how it can be used," experts around the world have been saying.

This "seeing of the light" has prompted scientists around the world to look for more lakes, similar to the one of Rudi Bloch's childhood. Such lakes were found in Antarctica under the ice fields, in the U.S., and also in the fiord near Elat, which are natural solar pools, and scientists have begun to enlist the help of Israeli experts to develop solar pools in their countries.

#### From Plans to Implementation

The research and experiments continue in Israel, sponsored by the World Bank, the Ministry of Energy and the universities.

"We are not looking to provide solutions for the next 2 years," Doron explains. "We are saying that if we work intensively on our research, we can see results in 5 years. Our calculations show that if we can convert the entire Dead Sea into a solar pool, it will provide all the energy needs of Israel."

The Dead Sea, because of its high concentration of salt, is the near-ideal lake for use as a solar pool. Since the pool was first built, its economic value has been constantly discussed. In effect, all the experiments in small pools are intended to test the implementation of Bloch and Tabor's theory in a large area which can absorb enormous quantities of heat that can yield a great deal of energy. At first, large areas in the Negev were considered for this purpose, but then it was found out that the Dead Sea is the best place.

The scientists have calculated that the average family needs 8 kilowatt-hours per day. The 7.5 dunam pool at 'Ein Boqeq can provide electricity for 50 families, without regular supply problems. "We wanted to show," Doron says, "that we can solve a problem which exists today and supply regular electricity even when everyone is using their televisions, washing machines, and lights. In other words, we wanted to show that peak consumption is not a problem for solar pools as it is in existing power plants. To prove it we installed a unit at the 'Ein Boqeq pool with five times the pool's capacity and ran it in December, a cloudy month, during the night. We have shown that the pool can operate without being affected by the environment, and provide regular supply."

If the entire Dead Sea could be converted into a solar pool, it could provide 200 megawatts and more, which is a substantial part of Israel's energy consumption.

But these beautiful plans are not easy to implement. First, on the other side of the Dead Sea is Jordan, which has sovereignty over half of it. A joint project to derive energy from the Dead Sea had been proposed to King Husayn in the past, as providing much of Jordan's needs, but to date no positive answer has been given. Jordan's silence does not prevent Israel from doing its part of the project on the Israeli side of the Dead Sea by building a dam at the border, which will contain the Israeli part. This, of course, will limit the amount of energy, but in this case, too, hundreds of thousands of petrodollars will be saved.

The second problem which the developers face is the feeding of less salty water into the Dead Sea, to create the salt layers of the pool. This problem will be solved when the sea canal, which will bring water from the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea, and which will be a source of energy in itself by means of the system of locks which will take advantage of the different water levels in the canal, is dug.

The third problem is changing some of the uses of the Dead Sea. If the entire lake or its Israeli half becomes a solar pool, it will cause whirlpools and waves and swimming will not be allowed. Also, the extraction of sulphur and salt from the lake will be affected because of the change in use of the water, but it is not known yet in what way.

In any case, the conversion of the Dead Sea into a giant solar pool which will provide all of Israel's energy needs is a long-range plan. It has to wait for the digging of the sea canal or the investment in water pipes, and in order to derive energy in the winter, it takes at least 2 years for the heat to become fully absorbed in the various layers of the pool.

The developers and the scientists have no intention of sitting still. In the near future another experimental pool will be constructed, with a 20 million dollar investment, in the Dead Sea. This pool is expected to yield 5,000 kilowatt-hours from solar heat, and if it succeeds, it will be enlarged fourfold and provide 20 megawatts of electricity. Solar pool research in Israel is slowly but surely moving toward its goal.

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**BOND MARKET EVALUATED; SOME RESTRICTIONS LIFTED**

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 4 Jan 81 p 9

[Text]

IN 1980, the Kuwaiti Dinar bond market has passed through probably the most difficult period since its creation in 1974, says the annual market report released by the Arab Company for Trading Securities.

Unprecedented high rates of interest, large fluctuations in the foreign exchange markets and political tensions have had their effects on all the major bond markets in the world.

Turnover, however, in terms of secondary market trading has suffered considerably during the uncertain market conditions of last year, and the new issue market has remained practically devoid of fresh offerings as a result of the moratorium imposed by the Council of Ministers in 1979. The lifting of the moratorium in the fourth quarter of 1980 did nevertheless provide an opportunity for one prime borrower to make a welcome reappearance to the KD bond new issue market. The reception given to the City of Oslo 9½ per cent bond due September 15th, 1980 was extremely favourable, despite the subsequent rapidly deteriorating conditions in interest rate structures which precluded any further new bond offerings.

The floating rate CD has emerged as being the most interesting form of diversification for institutions that had historically committed funds to the fixed income area. Two new floating rate CD issues, managed by Kuwait International Investment Company in April and July of last year for Gulf Bank and Kuwait Real Estate Bank, totalling in KD 10 million received excellent demand and were successfully placed.

The outlook for the KD bond market in 1981 remains unclear. Several of the restrictive measures imposed during 1979 and 1980 to reduce the liquidity crisis have now been formally removed, most importantly perhaps the lifting of the moratorium on further offerings of KD bond issues. The market not only needs a fresh injection of investor interest to stimulate turnover, but through the natural course of redemption of outstanding issues, a new supply of paper will have to be introduced to the market in order to compensate for the reduction of paper available.

Rising inflation levels and the concomitant rise in interest rates however continue to be the biggest enemy of the markets, and conditions in the local money markets will be the determining factor as to the future course of the KD bond market in 1981 as they were in 1980, ACTS said.

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## BRIEFS

**MUNICIPAL PROJECTS**--Kuwait Municipal Council sanctioned the proposed sites of four major centres to be constructed at a cost totalling KD 600 million, it was reported yesterday. The 300-million dinar centre in Fintas district will include a market complex, a botanic garden, cinemas, theatres and car parking facilities. [as published] The main telecommunications centre in Morgab will provide for revolving bus parking facilities and office accommodation for traffic staff. It will cost KD 100 million. The trade centres in Jahra and Salmieh will cost KD 61 million and KD 34 million respectively, the report said. Meanwhile, a contract worth KD 139,000 for setting up a multi-storey car park was yesterday concluded between the Minister of Public Works Mohamed Al Adassani and Bourhan Trading Company. The new car park will be set up near the Passport Department at Shuwaikh industrial area. Another contract worth KD 30,000 was also concluded with the Engineering Consultancy Firm to plan and set up a central workshop unit for medical equipment maintenance. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 8 Jan 81 p 2]

**FORMER MINISTER CANDIDATE**--Kuwait's former Education Minister Khalid Al Masoud, who was fined on Wednesday KD 20 found guilty of insulting civil servants on duty, has registered as a candidate for the forthcoming elections to the National Assembly. Informed sources said yesterday that he would contest from the Kifan constituency. While fining the ex-minister, the State Security Court had acquitted him on the main charge that he had uttered words of insult against the ruler of the state. During the trial Masoud had claimed that the charges were levelled against him with a view to prevent him from entering the race for the Assembly seat. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 3 Jan 81 p 1]

CSO: 4820

# RECONCILLATION BETWEEN BASHIR AL-JUMAYYIL, DANY SHAM'UN IMMINENT

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-6 Dec 80 p 13

[Article by May Kahhalah: "Promised Day Dropped Threat of Partition; Lebanese Front Completes Unification of Its Forces With Bashir-Dany Reconciliation"]

[Text] Contrary to all expectations, which were actually rumors whose reverberations were heard long before 22 November, nothing has been issued by the Lebanese Front in the direction of partition, of declaring a "free state" or even in the direction of initiating transmission on the "Free Lebanon Television," i.e. channel 12.

It is evident that Lebanon has lived under the anxiety of the unknown which was evoked by posters distributed in the eastern area carrying the slogan of "promised day" in which many saw a warning that something important and serious would be declared. The preparations for the rallies on the Phalange Party anniversary were preceded by rumors which spread quickly and which caused many to miss the significance of the unification of the military forces of the Phalange and the Liberals. After 'Ayn al-Rummanah events and at the secret meeting between ex-President Camille Sham'un and Pierre al-Jumayyil and in their frank discussions on these events which ended with the Phalangist handover of al-Hanash and al-Zaghlul centers, al-Jumayyil asked ex-President Sham'un: "How is Dorry?" This act of courtesy was the beginning of a bilateral cooperation which was blessed by the Lebanese Front when it declared the unification of the Lebanese Forces and the formation of two commands: A political command assumed by Dorry Sham'un, the secretary general of the Liberal National Party, and a military command assumed by Bashir al-Jumayyil, the Lebanese Forces commander.

In the successive meetings held later between Sham'un and al-Jumayyil in the presence of officials from both parties, agreement was reached on fundamental lines for forming the new forces and for applying this in a practical manner whereby the Liberal Party, as an acknowledged party, guarantees itself and its military forces without the need for returning to the two commands and the two decisions which led to the 7 July movement. The most important of what has been agreed upon is abolition of the Liberal Party's Defense Secretariat and of the Phalangist Military Council removal of heavy and medium weapons from all partisan centers and retention of individual weapons only. What is more important than all this is the formation of an executive committee to take charge of implementing the Lebanese Front's resolutions, with the military wing of the committee under the command of Bashir al-Jumayyil and the political wing under the command of Dorry Sham'un who has to form a political leadership comprised of experienced and specialized people to carry out the front's financial,

educational and informational resolutions. Both Bashir and Dorry have become front members. Moreover, Bashir is a permanent member of the Political Command and Dorry a permanent member of the Military Command. Cooperation and the coordination of positions are thus secured. The Liberal Party has nominated new representatives to the Lebanese Forces command, in addition to Dorry Sham'un. They are lawyer Charles Ghustin who will assume the post of deputy commander and lawyer Eli Aswad. Each party will retain its special structure and its ideological and popular inclinations which cannot be in conflict from now on if actual partnership is realized in adopting the decisions that affect the eastern area's security and if they are carried out by the new executive committee.

#### Reconciliation With Dany Shortly

The urgent question continues to be: Why Dorry Sham'un and when will his brother Dany return to the Lebanese Front or, at least, to al-Ashrafiyah?

The oldest son of the Liberal Party chairman who withdrew from partisan action at a delicate phase which followed the 2-year events was not new to politics, unlike his brother Dany. From the early 1960's, Dorry exerted serious efforts to give the National Liberal Party a firm and developed structure so that the party may not be just a Sham-unite current or a parliamentary bloc established on a popular base. This is why he sought to set up the youth organizations (which later became the military wing) and the worker and student organizations. Dorry dealt with partisan affairs quietly and far from the limelights and developed firm and practical ideas which were evident in the role he played in organizing Sayyidat al-Bir meetings.

On the other hand, his brother Dany seems to be new to partisan and political action because he started engaging in such action in 1975. But he gained popularity, especially in the military sphere, rapidly. He is the one with the credit for developing combat awareness among the Liberal Tigers. In the wake of the appeal addressed by Bashir al-Jumayyil to the "comrade in arms," it is expected that Dany will return from abroad shortly, that reconciliation and frank discussions will take place and that it will become then possible to give Dany a political position within the framework of the Lebanese Front so that the unification of forces may be completed morally and practically, especially if Dany approves the recent measures.

It is expected that a call will be issued shortly for volunteers to join the Lebanese Forces and that this call will be addressed to all the parties and organizations in the eastern area. A source close to the front asserts that agreement has been reached to accept any fighter who meets the requirements regardless of his partisan affiliation, especially since the front has been eager not to set certain percentages for each party on whose basis fighters are enrolled. This will be a first step toward eliminating the narrow and limited partisan characteristic from the front fighters and will lead to fusing the partisan sensitivities that culminated in the July movement. These measures will not take long [to be implemented], especially since the (feared) 22 November has passed without exploding the Lebanese situation as some people had imagined and without Bashir al-Jumayyil's declaration of the "independence of the liberated areas" as some other people had predicted.

#### Non-Partition Day



What is interesting is that the "promised day" which made the Lebanese hold their breath ended with a speech and a call addressed by the Lebanese Forces commander to the Muslims in an endeavor on his part to assert that he will never accept the partition of Lebanon.

Why, then, the fear of partition?

Sources close to the front say that those who disseminated this rumor relied on the outcome of the agreement which took place among the parties in the eastern area and on the conclusion that unification of the fighting forces will turn this young military force into an equal to the Lebanese army--an equal who cannot coexist with this army, as evidenced by the events of 'Ayn al-Rummanah--and that, consequently, the clash will inevitably occur or that Bashir al-Jumayyil will, at least, demand withdrawal of the army from the eastern areas so that he may take control of matters there and may finally surmount the duality under which these areas live, even though it is "theoretical" duality.

It also seems as if Bashir al-Jumayyil had severed all his "diplomatic" relations with the president of the republic. He attacked the president's way of governing and held him responsible for the state of fragmentation and laxity reached by the country. This is why some people concluded that the Phalange anniversary would be a turning point in the Lebanese Front's plan--a turning point at which a frank declaration would be made of a separate rule in the eastern area until the state takes the initiative and presents an acceptable formula for the restoration of a single and united Lebanon.

It seems that the front has avoided falling into the trap of the initiative of splitting the country and has proceeded, through Bashir al-Jumayyil's speech, toward opening up to the "Muslim Lebanese faction," thus underlining its concept of the dually (Muslim and Christian) structured Lebanon.

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RAMIFICATIONS OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ARMY OFFICERS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-6 Dec 80 pp 10-11

[Article: "Separation, not Divorce, Between B'abda and al-Yarzah; Sarkis Has Given al-Wazzan What al-Huss Could Not Wrest"]

[Text] The chapters of the consequences of the clashes which occurred in 'Ayn al-Rummanah almost a month ago between the Phalange and Liberal Parties and which ended with the ouster of the Liberals and the Lebanese army from the area have not been completed yet.

The political leadership which adopted disciplinary measures against the military command, holding it responsible for negligence in defending the army positions in 'Ayn al-Rummanah, has quickly found itself in a confrontation with the military embodied in the refusal of Gen Victor Khuri, the army commander, to carry out the disciplinary measures taken against Brig Gen Munir Turbiyah, chief of the general staff; Col 'Abbas Hamdan, deputy chief of the general staff; and Col Adib Sa'd, commander of 'Ayn al-Rummanah position. Meanwhile, the army commander has agreed to carry out one of two sanctions taken against him personally, namely a 60-day suspension. He has actually refrained from engaging in any administrative activity whereas he has rejected the decision putting him on administrative leave because it is illegal. The regime backed down on this measure after becoming certain of its illegality.

The army commander's refusal to carry out the disciplinary actions against his subordinate officers came at a meeting with President Ilyas Sarkis during which General Khuri explained the illegality of the disciplinary actions against the chief of staff and the other officers on the basis of two points:

The first is that article 26 of the defense law makes the army commander solely responsible for military operations in the country, regardless of how negative or positive the consequences are. Consequently, the commander's subordinates carry out his orders and do not make the decisions.

The second point is that the army's disciplinary system gives the army commander alone, and not the political authority, the right to punish his subordinate officers because the army commander, and not the other officers, are accountable to this authority.

The army command sources say that General Khuri informed President Sarkis that the responsibility for 'Ayn al-Rummanah events is a two-fold responsibility: A political responsibility shouldered by the regime that has failed so far to deal seriously with the explosions taking place on the Lebanese arena, has neglected the army and has failed to secure for it the necessary military cover and a military responsibility shouldered by the army because it was not able to confront the Phalange in 'Ayn al-Rummanah because the battle had it taken place [between the Phalange and the army], would not have been confined to the area's streets and quarters but would have extended to most parts of eastern Beirut where army units, some of them token units, are present. This would have meant igniting the eastern area in a battle with no clear-cut features and a battle whose consequences would have inevitably been negative at both the military and political levels.

#### Role of Intelligence Directorate

The same sources add that on the basis of these facts, the army commander preferred to deal with the issue deliberately and without emotion, considering what happened in 'Ayn al-Rummanah a dispute between two parties and deciding that the army should not intervene between two partisan factions so that its intervention may not be interpreted as favoring this or that faction and, consequently, as turning the army into a party in the dispute. We should keep in mind that the army entered 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Furn al-Shubbak a year ago with the consent of the Phalange and Liberal Parties and at the request of Camille Sham-un and Pierre al-Jumayyil, the leaders of the two parties.

Despite this visualization [sic], the same sources add, the fighting went on for 4 consecutive days without intervention on the part of the political leadership to ask the army to intervene militarily in 'Ayn al-Rummanah, keeping in mind that when such intervention occurs the military responsibility vanishes as a result of the responsibility of the political decision adopted by the political authority and that the army commander's violation of the political authority's orders in such a case becomes a punishable act of insubordination and rebellion. But the regime failed to act even though it was aware of the details of what was happening in 'Ayn al-Rummanah as of the first moment of the eruption of the clashes through reports submitted to President Ilyas Sarkis by Lt Col Johnny 'Abdu, director of the army intelligence, who was one of those advocating against intervention by the army to settle the issue in 'Ayn al-Rummanah militarily because such intervention would not be in the army's interest. Despite this fact, the disciplinary actions taken have not touched Lt Col Johnny 'Abdu, keeping in mind that the role of the army's Intelligence Directorate is to provide the political and military information necessary to shed light on a certain issue -- information on whose basis the military command, and often the political leadership, makes its final decision. Within this framework, certain political and military circles raise question marks regarding Lieutenant Colonel 'Abdu's role.

However, the army commander, according to the command sources, does not deny there was negligence on the part of the army in 'Ayn al-Rummanah in protecting a number of vehicles seized by the Phalangists and in the fleeing of a number of military men from the area. Because of this negligence, the army commander has asked the Inspection Authority of the Ministry of Defense, an authority which is independent of the command, to investigate the matter from both the administrative and disciplinary aspects. He has also asked an investigation committee to keep up with the Inspection Authority's work so that the investigation may be comprehensive and may define the responsibilities clearly and without bias.

The commander has also asked the military judiciary to take charge of the issue so that the judiciary investigation may complement the investigation work. The commander told those who talked to him after issuance of the disciplinary measures that the regime did not wait for the outcome of the investigation and relied on a preliminary report that was neither complete nor accurate to decide punishing a number of officers whose military dignity and morale have been stabbed. Who will return to these officers their dignity and morale if the final investigation proves their innocence?

In this regard, the commander has insisted on taking sole responsibility for what happened in 'Ayn al-Rummanah and on his right to punish the negligent subordinate officers. This is why he has refused to carry out the disciplinary actions taken against them, thus nullifying these measures despite the legal interpretations that have emerged in this respect.

#### When Cause Is Known

The question raised by observers concerns the reason why the regime hastened to adopt these measures which some people have described as another mistake in the chain of mistakes committed by the regime in dealing with the events in the country on the basis of reactions and not on the basis of action.

Informed sources are unanimous that the hasty adoption of the disciplinary measures against the officers and the leaking of the measures to the press despite their confidentiality was aimed at saving the head of the cabinet which was about the "roll" before the cabinet could reach the Chamber of Deputies because of the attacks to which it has been exposed since 'Ayn al-Rummanah events, since the Shi'ite problem that has not been solved yet and since the reservation expressed by some Sunna deputies and other deputies who have been seeking ministerial posts but have been denied them.

Some politicians were convinced that Damascus will not "go along" with this cabinet. So acts of conspiracy and "national" positions became numerous until it was proven that this conviction was wrong. This is why the regime thought that settling 'Ayn al-Rummanah issue quickly by putting the blame on the army command, officers and rank and file gives the cabinet a "good conduct certificate" that will enable it to pass the Mansur Palace [parliament] test and will block the path in the face of those engaging in conspiracy and using 'Ayn al-Rummanah as 'Uthman's shirt [rallying call] through which to achieve their objectives, the most important of which is the objective of slandering the army and dealing it a fatal blow that would obstruct its movement in any part of Lebanon and would keep it confined to its barracks.

Such a decision gives Prime Minister al-Wazzan a role at the level of "participation," considering that most ex-prime ministers clashed with the presidents of the republic on issues pertaining to the army and its command in particular. Such clashes usually ended with the resignation of the prime ministers and the continued presence of the military command. However, al-Wazzan has been able to register [elicit], perhaps for the first time, a [positive] response from the president to his prime minister's request for disciplinary measures against the army commander and the high-ranking officers. The history of the independent Lebanon registers for the first time punitive measures against the army commander and the high-ranking officers. In the past



the president was content to transfer the army commander to a diplomatic mission, to appoint him ambassador at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or to entrust him with non-military tasks (as happened with Gen Emile Bustani, Gen Iskandar Ghanim and Gen Hanna Sa'id).

This is why al-Wazzan has been able to "boast" that he has been able to wrest from the president of the republic a stance against the army command even though the president is considered historically opposed to undermining this command because it is under his control to start with. Despite his friendship with the president, Prime Minister al-Huss was not able to wrest from the president this gain which al-Wazzan has wrested from Sarkis.

On the basis of this consideration, certain political circles believe that President Sarkis is still paying one concession after the other from his credit without getting anything in return.

#### Tactical Mistake

It is the opinion of these circles that the regime committed a serious tactical mistake with its quick approval of the punitive measures against the high-ranking army officers. The regime has created restlessness among the ranks of the army which was not accustomed, as we have already pointed out, to such a jolt even when at the peak of its strength. So how can it get accustomed to it now that it is in the stage of development and what prestige will the commander and his major aides have among their subordinates when the authority takes punitive measures against them without waiting for the report of the investigation committee, keeping in mind that the event because of which the officers were punished reflects a political, and not a military, aspect which has to be dealt with.

The circles add that the jolt has affected many officers who have rallied behind their commander, have refused to carry out the punishment and have put their resignations at his disposal if he does so. This affair has created a split between the military command and the political authority because the military have refused to be a "mop" for the mistakes of the politicians in charge, as some military circles have said. Moreover, punishing a number of high-ranking officers and ignoring other officers who are accountable to the military command has also formed, in the opinion of those protesting the regime's measures, a serious precedent and an unjustifiable act of bias that cannot be explained logically.

It is the opinion of the same circles that the second mistake committed by the regime has been evident in the fact that the regime has not been able, contrary to what it had hoped, to employ the decision in the interest of the cabinet because criticism has risen from two sides and because the Lebanese Front and the National Movement have met on rejecting the measures, each from its own viewpoint. Instead of producing positive results, the punitive measures have produced negative ones, keeping in mind that the vote of confidence in the cabinet is, ultimately, not a pure parliamentary decision but a decision that usually comes as a result of contacts, stances and hints, not to mention the common "interests."

What is more important, in the view of the same sources, is that the army return to 'Ayn al-Rummanah if the regime wants to score a victory through which to gain popularity among one faction of the Lebanese, and hostility among the other, because



the mere punishing of the officers will not return the army to 'Ayn al-Rummanah's streets and quarters and this return is something demanded by ex-President Camille Sham'un, by the National Movement, by the Islamic Grouping and by other parties.

These sides fear that the authority adopted the punitive measures to preoccupy the people with them and with the reactions to them, thus making them forget the demand for military deployment and saving itself a confrontation with the Phalange--a confrontation whose outcome is known in advance.

While we wait to find out whether the regime's measures against the officers will produce positive results, it is certain that this precedent in the history of the relationship between the regime and the military will have consequences that may not emerge in the near future but which will leave their impact on both leaderships and which will not be in the interest of those who have created this split, be they military men or politicians.

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CSO: 4802

POSSIBILITIES OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM DIALOGUE ON TELEVISION EXPLORED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-6 Dec 80 p 12

[Article by 'A. B.: "Salam and al-Jumayyil: This Is How Detente Was; No State Veto on Inviting Anybody to State Television But Fear Is of Veto of Guests"]

[Text] Finally, the decision: Detente through the television. It seems that the authority has decided to make the opponents engage in dialogue and there is no way to make them engage in dialogue unless they promise to appear before all the Lebanese. Such appearance would be tantamount to an opportunity for every side to present and clarify its ideas and an opportunity to discuss the conflicting ideas and principles. Even if matters develop between the debaters into a new conflict, the state will emerge triumphant because it will have asserted once again that the only framework that can reconcile the various opinions is the legitimacy [legitimate government].

There are in the world many kinds of presidents and televisions. In the United States, television contributed a lot more this year, as in the past, than the radio, the press and the speech rallies to making the new president. In France, the opposition--now that the country is on the threshold of next spring's presidential elections--complains that the authority monopolizes all the magic of the small screen. Some politicians have even charged that President Giscard d'Estaing eats and sleeps in this small box which brings him to the homes of the French every evening and which will bring him back to the Elysee in a few months.

In all the Arab states, the presidents are the ones who have made the television. This is why they sleep and wake up in the television and why nobody else appears on it unless he is with them. But there may be some exceptions. Some presidents do watch television like the rest of the citizens.

On the evening of 17 November, the Dossier--a television program produced by colleague 'Arafat Hijazi--touched on the issue of the Arab summit and hosted, among others, two notables, one of them a Palestinian Shafiq al-Hut and the other a Phalangist Karim Paqradi. Even though a friendly agreement had been reached with the two not to speak outside the summit issue, the watchers heard Paqradi proceed from hints to open statements regarding the Palestinians and the Syrians. The watchers also saw al-Hut embarrassed because he was not authorized to discuss Lebanese issues and because he had not come to defend the Palestinian resistance against the Phalangist accusations but had come to present the PLO view on the Arab summit.

The evening passed peacefully. The people saw an extraordinary Dossier [program] and the authority found that some words developed with time to become myths and that the mere (airing of the words exposes them and strips them of their harmful consequences). The republican palace asked for a videotape of the meeting between Paqradi and al-Hut. President Ilyas Sarkis liked the idea and asked the minister of information to continue it. The minister, Michel Iddih, held consultations and then drew up with Hijazi, the program producer, a preliminary schedule for a number of meetings among representatives of the Lebanese factions. The minister then asked: With whom should we start? It was then agreed to get ex-Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam and Pierre al-Jumayyil together in the first part.

Various formulas were projected for the meeting of the two leaders: Meet at one studio with each in a separate room, debate each other while each is in his home or debate one another face to face. The final formula triumphed. The two men are old friends and the dispute between them has never turned into personal hostility but has continued to be within the framework of disagreement.

On the morning of 24 November, the two men went to Mansur Palace, the premises of the Chamber of Deputies, where ex-Prime Minister Salam wanted the debate to take place. The leader of the Phalange had no objection. Minister Iddih received them and talked to them for a few minutes before the start of recording. In those minutes, the two men registered the first agreement between them when they met in the media.

Then the dialogue started. The subject: The national charter and the formula. Salam announced from the first moment that the charter is still fit because it means, in his view, one thing: Agreement between the Christians and the Muslims. Pierre al-Jumayyil declared the same thing, adding: "But..." Here, the real dossier started: Ex-Prime Minister Salam came in his capacity as a Muslim "voice" that does not claim to represent the Muslims but represents a Lebanese opinion, thus justifying his silence over all the attacks made and accusations cited by his debater. But Pierre al-Jumayyil came as chairman of the Phalange and in his capacity as representative of the Christians, in addition to insisting that he represents Lebanon's opinion.

Even though Salam avoided addressing any accusations to al-Jumayyil, though he never used the form "you" [in the plural] and "we," though he made no mention of eastern or western [Beirut] and though he did not even hint at dealings with Israel, al-Jumayyil did all this for him and waded into the issues for which he is censured and the issues for which he censures others. He started by telling Salam that he doesn't consider him a debater because Salam debates in the name of Yasir 'Arafat and the Syrians. Al-Jumayyil concluded by saying: "The Muslims have done Lebanon no favors." Answering an accusation, he said: "By your honor, Sa'ib bey, am I an Israeli agent? Isn't it disgraceful? They accuse us of sectarianism. You are the agents of Israel and you are the sectarians..." Salam's reply was: "You think from a Maruni and Phalangist angle while I am talking at the Lebanese level."

Hijazi asked: Why shouldn't the dialogue take place through the legitimate government? Salam hastened to say that "legitimacy is the Chamber of Deputies," hurling a few words at the president of the republic which were then edited out. Statements by Pierre al-Jumayyil focusing on what he called "the Palestinian and Syrian occupation" were also omitted. Al-Jumayyil supported Salam's view, pointing out that

the present Chamber of Deputies, along with the President of the Republic, is the legitimacy and "we may reach something in this chamber. The chamber that will come after it will represent the alien ideologies."

What has remained of the Salam-al-Jumayyil dialogue and what comes after it?

It is most likely that this dialogue formed the maximum to which the dialogue can go. What Pierre al-Jumayyil said is not new. What is new in it is that it was said in the presence of a politician from the other side, in front of the Lebanese and within a framework of detente. What ex-Prime Minister Salam did not say would not have been new if he had said it. What was new was Salam's decision to be patient. If it were possible to translate what was said, we would say that one came to say that he does not debate and that the other came to welcome the first man and the dialogue.

Those organizing these dialogue series now have the impression that the Salam-al-Jumayyil experiment may not be easy to repeat with leaderships of the same level or with young leaderships. This is why the dialogue organizers will give themselves some time to study the reactions and the less harmful formats. In principle, there is no veto by the state, which patronizes the dialogue, against any party. What remains to be done is for the parties to lift the veto against each other.

Minister Iddih has said that it is President Sarkis' hope that detente will be established by the end of his term or, at least, that the dialogue leading to this detente will begin in the hope that it may develop into collective meetings. Iddih has also said that Sarkis will announce the gist of these dialogues. But the Lebanese citizen who watched Salam and al-Jumayyil saw how far apart they were from one another and how far he is from both. Yet, this is only a beginning...and until another dialogue.

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CSO: 4802

## LEBANON

### PHALANGE RADIO CHIEF DEFIES GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 21 Dec 80 p 19

[Article: "Joseph al-Hashim (Director of Radio Phalange) to AL-QABAS: Private Broadcasting Has Proved Its Superiority"]

[Text] Will the Lebanese government succeed in closing down seven private radio stations and retaining the sole official broadcasting station?

Before after the 1975 events, Lebanese would joke in private gatherings about the proliferation of television stations in the state of the United Arab Emirates, saying, also in jest, that every citizen in the emirates would have a private television station in the future.

Naturally, that reflected the Lebanese peoples' amazement over the state of prosperity dominating the Gulf area.

After a number of years, the amazement at others turned into a "lack of amazement" at the self, after almost every Lebanese has come to have a special broadcasting station!

In Lebanon there now are seven private stations which belong not to people but to certain parties. They are: The Voice of Arab Lebanon (the al-Murabitun), the Voice of Lebanon (the Phalange), the Voice of Free Lebanon (Sa'd Haddad), Ihdin Radio (Sulayman Franjiyah), the Classical Station (the monastic orders), Radio Mount Lebanon (the Liberals), and the Radio of the Arab Revolution (the Arab Army of Lebanon) — in addition, of course, to the official Radio Lebanon.

In the following special meeting, Mr Joseph al-Hashim, the broadcasting manager of the Voice of Lebanon (Phalange) sheds light on the actual state of this station, which is the considered one of the most powerful of the private ones.

[Question] When was Voice of Lebanon broadcasting station established?

[Answer] It was established for the first time in the 1958 events; it continued broadcasting for 6 months, stopping after the election of Fu'ad Shihab as president. At that time, technical and human resources were modest. The radio resumed broadcasting again on 13 October 1975, and then developed until it assumed its current form.



Question? What are the most prominent events which the station has covered in an exclusive fashion?

Answer? Our station has had a special victory as far as local and world events go, while the Lebanese media have withdrawn into themselves. The first event was the direct transmission of a mass celebrating Christmas from the Vatican and then coverage of the beatification of Saint Charbel in Rome. It covered the engagement and wedding of King Husayn, the ruler of Jordan. It also covered the Camp David meetings, the SALT summit, the summit meeting between the American president, Carter, and the Soviet Brezhnev, the Tunis summit, the latest American elections, the Amman summit, and many events besides those. It was also the first information medium to proclaim the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, the resignation of President Ilyas Sarkis, and the events in Aleppo, and it had radio scoops with Lebanon's delegation to the United Nations, Kuwait's representative there, Mr 'Abdallah al-Bisharah, Zuhli al-Tarzi, the Liberation Organization observer to the United Nations, as well as a scoop with the king of Morocco, King Hassan the Second.

#### Commitment to Objectivity

Question? It is well known that yours is a party station. To what extent can you exercise actual objectivity?

Answer? We are following a style which seeks to present the facts to the people without proceeding from a subjective angle which has been prepared in advance as is the case with some other elements in the media. The Voice of Lebanon is not a private station, that is, it does not belong to one group of people to the exclusion of another group. We are a private station aimed at the public, that is, the general public.

Mr al-Hashim went on to say,

"Our method of operation is liberated and mobile at the same time. Liberated from the restrictions imposed on the official media in general and mobile because it presents the news on time and follows up on news events in the field everywhere in the world. We are open to various groups and tendencies and give all the news without discrimination, distinction or sensitivity and without reliance on the principle of embellishing people's minds or slandering it on the channels of other parties, or the principle of innuendo and disparagement."

#### Commercial Announcements

Question? Private broadcasting depends on commercial announcements, or at least that is what it is supposed to do, in order to cover its expenses. In the light of this state of affairs, can you compete with the official broadcasting behind which the resources of the state stand?

Answer? We view competition through what one gives, not through material things. Perhaps the media's sole capital is the people's trust in them. Voice of Lebanon broadcasting has managed to enjoy such a trust by giving the correct news and by relying on the principle of information, not the principle of propaganda. We believe that the use of propaganda should be restricted to people promoting

ideologies and "messages", that is, ideas that have been put in firmly sealed cans. The media depend on the presentation of uncanned facts to the people.

*Question:* The Bayt al-Din conference resolutions included a resolution calling for the shutdown of private broadcasting. Why haven't you bound yourself to this resolution?

*Answer:* Voice of Lebanon broadcasting has no relationship to the other private stations because it is operating by an official permit, contrary to the other stations, which are operating without permits. Therefore, the Bayt al-Din resolutions in the section referred to do not include us.

*Question:* Do you believe that the proliferation of private stations and media are proof of good health or the opposite?

*Answer:* No, the opposite — they are proof of chaos.

#### Widespread Broadcasting

*Question:* To what extent do you believe that your broadcasting has a wide audience? Are there polls or indications to confirm that it is?

*Answer:* Our wide broadcasting audience is not restricted to Lebanon and the immediate environment, but goes beyond it to the Arab world, especially the states of the Gulf region, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. We receive letters from European countries and America on the degree to which the broadcasting is heard there. The British organization for audience-investigation (ABC) has conducted more than one census on broadcasting in Lebanon, and our station occupied first rank, since it has the broadest audience.

Going by a group of statistics, and as a result of samples taken from various areas of Lebanon our station has received 68 percent of the total people listening to broadcasting programs in Lebanon, that is, 24 percent more than the percentage received by the station occupying second place after us.

At that point the exclusive conversation with Joseph al-Hashim ended. Through it, it is clear that implementation of the resolution to shut down private broadcasting stations in Lebanon seems to be the fourth impossibility. It also appears that the official tendency, which is aimed at opening the door to permits for private print, audio and visual media, is what will prevail in the end.

Thus in the future every Lebanese will have his own newspaper, his own radio station, and perhaps his own television station too!

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CSO: 4802

## CUSTOMS REVENUE FIGURES FOR 1980 REPORTED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MIDDLE in English 19 Jan 81 pp 5-6

[Text]

Lebanon received LL 683.5 million (LL 1 = \$0.27) in customs revenue last year, it was learned in Beirut recently. This represented an insignificant, 0.11 per cent, increase over the 1979 figure of LL 682.4 million, and was 14.6 per cent below projections. As in so many cases, the explanation for such a poor performance is largely to be found in the inability of state institutions to recover their authority, this is especially true in the economic sphere, where traditionally there has been a minimum of *etatisme*, given Lebanon's laissez-faire economic orientation.

As one customs official told our sister publication *An-Nahar*, "when customs authority diminishes, the amount of excise revenue received also diminishes." The growth of illegal ports (some estimates put their number at 15 on a coastline of 210 kms) on the one hand, and smuggling, tax evasion and frequent insecurity at legal points of entry on the other, have contributed dramatically to eat into the state's already inadequate revenue. Thus, in the last year, monthly excise revenue fell from LL 58 million in January to LL 42 million in December, despite an overall increase in the volume of imports, reflected by portuary activity figures.

In 1980, the Beirut port cashed in LL 453.8 million, 31.7 per cent more than in 1979, when the figure stood at LL 330.9 million. However, apart from this notable rise, all other legal points of entry in the country registered negative results.

Beirut's International Airport saw its excise income diminish by 9.2 per cent, from LL 152 million in 1979 to LL 137.9 million.

Tripoli, the country's second largest port, received LL 60.4 million last year, against LL 119 million the year before, a 49.2 per cent drop, the main southern port at Saida fared no better with a 46.3 per cent drop in customs revenue, which last year stood at LL 5.8 million against LL 10.8 million in 1979. The port at Jounieh saw its excise income drop by a dramatic 81.1

per cent to LL 5.4 million from LL 28.9 million. Finally, the overland entry point at Masina's on the Syro-Lebanese border earned LL 37.4 million in 1980, against LL 40.7 million in 1979, an 8 per cent drop.

According to some reports in Beirut, tax evasion from the legal points of entry in Lebanon entails greater losses to the state than the illegal ports. Such assessments point to the actual growth in the volume of shipping in legal ports, especially during the autumn, when because of rougher seas illegal ports are unable to receive vessels as easily as in the more clement months of the year.

The loss in customs revenue is the more disturbing since new legislation was enacted last year raising many of the duty charges on imported goods; even supposing the volume of imports had stayed unchanged since 1979 - which was not the case - the state should have received more in revenue from excise in 1980 than it actually did. Informed sources in the Lebanese capital point to two additional factors which have arisen in the last year to explain this anomalous state of affairs.

Apart from the appearance of illegal ports several years ago and the frequent tax evasion at legal points of entry, more recent phenomena have been the alleged exaction of protection money by militias from customs officials and clearing agents at legal ports, and the reported take-over of one of the five berths of the Beirut port by rightwing militiamen. According to these reports, the Beirut port authority has been unable to regain control of the fifth berth, while customs officials have threatened to go on strike if no adequate means are found to protect them from the exactions of the private militias.

One of the consequences of these demands for protection money by the various militia groups which have access to ports, has been requests by clearing agents for additional payments from their clients, in order to

meet the exactions. This, according to local press reports, has prompted some importers to bring their merchandise in through illegal ports, paying the lower dues charged by private military organisations controlling them rather than pay the ordinary exche at legal ports, plus what is basically a subsidy to clearing agents who have to meet demands for protection money. As these reports print out, it may be illegal, but it is certainly cheaper.

## QATAR

### NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDER WAY ON NORTH WEST GAS DOME JOINT VENTURES

Negotiations on possible joint ventures to develop Qatar's huge North West Dome offshore gas field are being held with several foreign firms already operating in Qatar. It was announced in Doha last week. Dr Ali Mohammad Jaidah, Managing Director of the Qatar General Petroleum Company, said feasibility studies for development of the dome have been concluded and that total investment for the project might be as high as \$4 billion, a figure that

some observers believe is on the low side. Dr Jaidah, a former Secretary General of QGPC, said the costs of drilling, production, pipelines and other upstream activities were estimated at about \$1.5 billion and a further \$2 billion would be needed for a gas liquefaction plant and other onshore facilities. Dr Jaidah did not, however, mention the cost of LNG tankers needed to ship the gas to foreign markets. This, observers believe, could add as much as \$3 billion to the development bill.

Dr Jaidah said eventual foreign partners in the venture would be allowed a 20 per cent participation in return for their share of development costs. Late last year, a West German consortium headed by the Wintershall oil company stated that it had put forward a \$4.5 billion development scheme and Qatar has also held talks with Royal Dutch Shell (*An-Nahar Arab Report & ANALYSIS*, December 8, 1980). About 20 per cent of the gas field lies in a concession held by Wintershall and the remainder is in an area where Shell is the operating company. French, American and Japanese firms have also expressed keen interest in developing the field.

Customs Receipts by Port of Entry in 1980  
with Comparative Figures for 1979  
(In LL '000s)

		Beirut Port	Beirut Int'l Airport	Jurrah	Tripoli	Manna's	Saida	Total
First Quarter	1979	32,400	33,600	12,700	44,100	7,900	3,355	134,255
	1980	111,085	36,171	2,057	14,141	8,212	956	172,626
Second Quarter	1979	81,400	39,500	8,200	34,000	11,600	5,890	178,590
	1980	124,465	34,609	1,805	14,549	9,438	2,489	187,357
Third Quarter	1979	96,900	23,600	3,410	23,200	11,010	2,160	170,380
	1980	112,156	35,265	1,202	16,421	10,720	1,265	177,033
Fourth Quarter	1979	119,900	45,120	3,230	17,500	9,700	1,200	196,650
	1980	88,183	31,861	973	15,323	8,091	888	145,319
Total	1979	330,600	151,820	27,540	118,900	40,210	10,805	679,875
	1980	435,889	137,907	6,038	60,476	36,435	36,462	682,336

## RECONSTRUCTION COUNCIL SEEKS EASING OF BRITISH EXPORT CREDITS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT &amp; MEMO in English 26 Jan 81 p 6

[Text]

Dr Mohammad Atallah, the President of Lebanon's Council for Development and Reconstruction, began a visit to Britain last week to study how public and private enterprise can cooperate in the reconstruction of a war-ravaged country. Dr Atallah was scheduled to tour areas of Britain devastated by German bombing in World War II. British diplomatic sources said he would be visiting Leeds, which lost much of its business district, and Hull, where the port was badly bombed.

Last year, the Council for Development and Reconstruction drew up a LL 1.2 billion (\$320 million) interim reconstruction programme, designed to be funded by loans raised by the Council, as well as by Arab and international funds. About LL 175 million (\$46 million) of this programme was allotted to reconstruction of the Beirut port. But the business district in the city-centre remains gutted, with construction unable to start because of poor security.

British sources said Dr Atallah would be seeking advice from government and local authorities in Britain on how different municipalities carry out major projects. Several CDR projects, notably road improvements, have fallen behind schedule because of problems with municipal authorities.

During his 10-day visit Dr Atallah was scheduled to hold talks with Britain's Export Credits Guarantee Department which were expected to centre on Lebanon's wishes for an easing of current tight controls on the supply of export credits to the country.

In talks with regional officials of the Bank of England, Dr Atallah is expected to sound them out on British methods of financing regional projects. Towards the end of his trip, he will hold talks with British engineering companies interested in tendering for projects in Lebanon.

British officials said Dr Atallah may well raise the question of British economic aid for Lebanon, although observers believed he was more likely to secure an easing of export credits than outright governmental loans at this stage. The CDR has suffered in recent months from the failure of some Arab states to implement aid pledges made at the Tunis summit of November 1979, and which came to \$2 billion over five years. By last October, Lebanon - in effect the CDR - had received only \$153 million out of \$400 million originally decided for 1980.

Such shortages of funds mean the CDR has not been able to do more than carry out some reconstruction work, leaving development schemes largely untouched.

Dr Atallah is particularly concerned with increased environmental problems in Lebanon and talks have been arranged with Britain's Department of the Environment. The visit was arranged by Britain and British sources say Dr Atallah's trip was primarily one designed to acquaint him with the British approach to reconstruction and development problems, rather than one aimed at achieving increased economic relations between the two countries in the immediate future.



CIVIL AVIATION RECORD IN 1980 BETTER THAN AVERAGE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 19 Jan 81 p 13

[Text]

Lebanon's two airlines, Middle East Airlines and Trans-Mediterranean Airways, have achieved some of the best performances in 1980, according to the Board Chairman of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, Mr Assad Koteit. Though 1980 was not a particularly good year for the civil aviation business, with an overall increase of 2.5 per cent in passenger traffic, both Lebanese airlines increased their traffic by more than that average.

Although TMA is currently seeing its services drastically cut - especially by European countries -

with a threat to the airline's very survival, Mr Koteit said it ranked tenth among the cargo airlines of the world last year, in terms of the volume of business it handled. MEA, for its part, came 22nd in the world league of international passenger and air freight carriers.

Mr Koteit also pointed out that the ICAO had extended about \$60 million worth of technical aid to developing countries, to help them upgrade their aviation services. This figure is expected to reach \$100 million in 1984, when half the airlines and airports of the world will be owned by Third World states, Mr Koteit added.

CSO: 4820

## MAURITANIA

### BRIEFS

REPORTED EXISTENCE OF SLAVERY--An anti-slavery society said this week that about one Mauritanian in ten is still in slavery despite the abolition of the practice by the government last July. According to John Mercer, a member of the society, there are still 100,000 slaves in the country where masters had complete rights over their slaves' lives. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English 5 Jan 81 p 43]

CSO: 4420

## COMMERCE MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON EASTERN BLOC TRADE RELATIONS, FISHING

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 16 Dec 80 pp 1-2

[Interview by Abdelhai Bouzoubaa with Minister of Commerce & Industry Azzedine Guessous: "A Talk with Azzedine Guessous--Our Exchanges with the USSR Are Destined to Undergo a Remarkable Evolution in 1981--Access to the National Fishing Resources Can Be Envisioned Only through the Intermediary of Moroccan-Law Joint Companies"; date and place not given]

[Text] The equilibrium of our trade balance with the USSR in particular and the countries of the East in general; the fishing agreements made between Morocco and the Soviet Union; the future of trade relations between our country and the CEMA countries--such as the themes developed by Azzedine Guessous, minister of commerce, industry, merchant marine and maritime fishing, in the course of the interview that he has kindly granted us and the complete text of which follows.

[Question] Mr Minister, you have paid a visit to the Soviet Union, and during your stay in Moscow you had talks with members of the Soviet Government. The subjects taken up dealt mainly with the trade relations between our two countries, and on this subject, would you kindly tell us, Mr Minister, where these relations stand and what specific areas they fall into?

[Answer] Before replying directly to your question, I would like to place our exchanges with the USSR in the framework of our overall trade exchanges with foreign countries.

In 1979, the USSR was our ninth-ranking supplier, with 2.7 percent of our imports, and our eighth-ranking customer, with 3.6 percent of our exports.

It should also be stressed that the USSR--and for many years--has always figured among our top 10 trading partners. This expresses the importance of trade exchanges in our overall relations with the USSR.

To return to your question, it should be pointed out that these trade exchanges are governed by the long-term Trade Agreement signed on 3 July 1979, which provides in particular for return to a payment system based on convertible foreign exchange as of 1 January 1982 and the drawing-up of lists of products that may be traded each year.

There is also a Protocol of Agreement between the government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the government of the USSR on exchanges of products, signed in Moscow on 10 March 1978 in parallel with the agreement relating to exploitation of the phosphates of Meskala.

By this protocol, and on a 5-year basis, exchange of chemical products, and phosphates in particular, is agreed on within the framework of a convertible-foreign-exchange payment system, which has been in force since 1978 for these particular products.

Thus our trip to Moscow enabled us to conclude two protocols of application for these agreements that I have just mentioned.

The first one concerns exchange of various products for 1981, the last year of application of the clearing system. Among these products we mention oil, citruses, canned foods, machinery and equipment goods, textiles, etc.

The second one deals with exchanges of phosphates and chemical products in general during the period 1981-1985. Thanks to these agreements, our exchanges with the USSR are destined to undergo a remarkable evolution in 1981, to reach a total of nearly 2 billion dirhams.

[Question] What is the scope of the fishing agreement signed between Morocco and the Soviet Union?

[Answer] The agreement of 27 April 1978 constitutes the appropriate legal framework for mutually advantageous cooperation in the matter of maritime fishing. It is obvious that the USSR, which has accumulated impressive experience in this area but which must adapt itself to the generalized extension of the 200-mile economic zone, can only find it in its interest to cooperate with a country that has such great fishing resources like Morocco's. Morocco, for its part, can only find advantages.

This agreement provides for creation of joint companies in the areas of boat-outfitting and fish-processing, but does not grant fishing rights to Soviet-flag boats in waters under Moroccan jurisdiction.

[Question] What can you tell us on the subject of our trade balance with the countries of the East in general?

[Answer] First of all, at the overall level, our trade exchanges with the CEMA countries totalled 1.46 billion dirhams in 1978 and 1.5 billion dirhams in 1979--that is, an increase of nearly 3 percent from one year to the next.

On the level of imports, the CEMA countries represent a little more than 6.0 percent of total purchases abroad in 1978 and 5.2 percent in 1979.

As regards exports, the CEMA countries absorbed 11.4 percent of our total sales abroad in 1978 and 10.5 percent in 1979.

For these countries, the rate of coverage of imports by exports was nearly 95 percent in 1978 and was stable at nearly the same rate in 1979.

For the first 6 months of 1980, the rate dropped sharply to about 86 percent.

Overall, our trade relations with the CEMA countries are characterized by:

- a steady increase in the volume of exchanges;
- stability of the rate of coverage;
- maintenance of the relative position that they occupy in our foreign trade.

[Question] How do you see the future of Morocco's trade relations with the countries of the CEMA?

[Answer] Regarding the future of our trade relations with the CEMA countries, I would say simply that there are certain possibilities for broadening them.

These countries occupy a considerable position in our policy of diversification of our exchanges. Moreover, it is clear that for a majority of the products that we export, they constitute--and have done so for a long time--a potential market of steadily increasing demand. The essential thing is to know how to achieve balance of the exchanges.

[Question] How do you view the future of the exploitation of our fishing resources by and for our nationals after the signing of the fishing agreements with Spain and the USSR in particular?

[Answer] Morocco possesses a fishing potential that has strategic importance.

Indeed, the world demographic outlooks and those relative to world food production bring out the vital role that fish are destined to play in supplying the protein that is indispensable to balanced nourishment.

On the national level, fishing will also have the role of contributing significantly to:

- the nutrition of the population;
- employment;
- regionalization;
- and the equilibrium of the trade balance.

In order to achieve all these objectives through harmonious development of the maritime fishing sector, a certain number of preliminary conditions must be taken into account, such as:

- training of the cadres who are presently lacking in all activities connected with fishing;
- the presence of port, fish-processing and fish-distribution infrastructures;
- mastery of modern and appropriate technology in the area of exploitation of fishing resources;
- knowledge of our fishing resources with a view to rational exploitation of them.

The fishing agreements signed with Spain and the USSR and those which Morocco will sign in the future are integrated and will be integrated with the framework that I have just explained.



In effect, what is sought through these agreements is mutually advantageous cooperation in which Morocco provides the resource and the other countries contribute in various forms to the plan and programs that will have been identified for development of the fishing sector.

Finally, I would like to say that access to the national fishing resources can be envisioned only within the framework of joint exploitation through the intermediary of joint companies organized under Moroccan law--that is, by boats flying the national flag.

11267

CSO: 4400

## BIDS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF RIYADH, DAMMAM RAILROAD INVITED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 22-23 Jan 81 p 3

[Text]

DAMMAM, Jan. 21 — The new railroad line linking Riyadh with the Eastern Region and the Gulf coast will cost more than SR1 billion and take three years to complete. But it will also shave off nearly 100 km or one hour traveling time.

The president of the Saudi Government Railroad Organization, Sheikh Faisal Al Shehail, said the time between the capital and Dammam will be cut down to four hours and the distance reduced to 465 km.

Meanwhile, he said, the organization was buying new goods carriages and opening a new customs station in Riyadh. Studies also are underway to link the Western and Central Regions and Jubail with Dammam. Jubail is the site of the petrochemical industries and a new city which will eventually accommodate 300,000 people.

Shehail visited Pakistan, India and Australia recently to find out about their latest techniques since all three countries have vast networks of railroads. He made tentative proposals to acquire passenger and goods carriages and experts for training Saudi Arabian apprentices.

The organization has invited 33 consortiums to bid for the construction of the Riyadh-Dammam railroad, which is the

largest project in its current five-year development plan. The project will be tendered in three sections with no one company allowed to win more than two. "This will encourage competition and leave the organization an alternative if it has trouble with one contractor," Shehail said recently. Along with this project new stations in Dammam, Hofuf, and Riyadh and a new telecommunications system will be tendered next year.

The new line will be parallel to the present track as far as Hofuf, a distance of 145 km but where the old track loops southward before arriving in Riyadh, the new one will cut directly across for 320 km. Not only will this reduce the distance but the trains will travel as fast as 150 kilometers per hour, rather than at the present speed of 100 km per hour.

No other lines will be built in the third plan, though a Riyadh-West Coast rail link will be studied. Shehail explained that in order to maintain and improve existing services, the organization decided to undertake a second Riyadh-Dammam line rather than establishing new services elsewhere.

Another major undertaking of the organization will be to build a modern shopping and hotel complex. Together with the Saudi Hotels and Resort Areas Company, it formed a joint venture called the Dammam Real Estate Complex Company.

CSO: 4820

## PRESIDENT'S BOOK ON ISLAMIC THOUGHT REVIEWED

## Reflections on Islamic Method

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 29 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] Containing the Revolution

With throbbing hearts the people of Sudan listened closely to the radio as it broadcast military music beginning 6 a.m. on the 25th of May 1969. This was an indication that the armed forces had taken over power in the country. When the music died down and the people heard the statement of the first commander of the revolution, their hearts beat with joy not because they were happy with the new-comers who were unknown to them, but rather because they had been vexed with those who were leaving. They had brought the country and the faithful to the brink of disaster: the country was split; it was fragmented; and it was in poor condition. Any change in this situation was being called for and was desirable. Accordingly, no tears were shed for those who were gone. People waited [with feelings of] joy and hope for what would happen to them after hearing the words of the leader of the revolution. The principal features of his revolution and its general orientation had become clear to the people.

But the joy and hope lasted no more than 2 hours when the new government organization was announced. People were baffled [by it]: they found themselves torn between the nationalist statement that had been broadcast, which was an expression of the innermost thoughts of all the people, and the cabinet organization that followed the statement. The cabinet organization demonstrated a clear partiality to a small group of dogmatists known by the people as an inseparable part of that past which the revolution had overthrown on the morning of the 25th of May 1969.

Ever since that moment, and for 2 years and several weeks hence, the revolution and the people were engaged in a battle which the people could have done without had it not been for the communists and their tireless efforts to contain the revolution and keep the rest of the people away from active participation in the national accomplishment to which all the people are entitled. The fact of the matter is that there had been no argument between the revolution and its people who believed in it from the moment it had broken out. But because the communists had control over many of the state agencies, they portrayed the situation as though the people

were on one side and they and the revolution were on the other. The people, however, did not believe the communists despite the tightening of their siege and their containment attempts because the revolution in the person of its leader got out of the enclosure that had been set up around it and met directly with the people in all the areas of Sudan. This broad action by the leadership undermined the communists' power and revealed many of their plans in many locations. Ultimately, there was nothing else for them to do but conspire or commit suicide. Thus did a stage in the life of the revolution come to an end, and the revolution began a new stage wherein it proceeded to act according to its initial disposition to express the innermost wishes of the people and comply with their feelings in its plans and its reconstruction [efforts] to build the homeland and the citizen despite all circumstances and overpowering conditions.

### The Nationalist Orientation

It was evident that this communist cloud which had sought to no avail to set up a barrier between the people and their revolution was essentially incompatible with the requirements of this stage that had brought the revolution to maturity and granted it the factors of its success. In Africa and elsewhere, the failure of nationalist regimes to elevate independence from its political context to its social, economic and cultural context after years of independence was clearing the field throughout our Third World for radical changes in regimes and in the concerns of ruler. Most of these national leaders that had taken over the leadership in their countries from the colonialists did not confront the stage of independence with the required comprehensive social change programs that would not stop at changing the political front only, but rather go beyond that to institute radical change in all the plans that colonialism had made and in its economic, educational, cultural and legal institutions as well. People would thus regain their economic, social and cultural independence along with their political independence; they would establish continuity between the people's past and their present; and they would discharge their latent capabilities so that, in time, they can regain the components of their national character, a character based on a deep-rooted civilization flawed by adversities of time which sapped its vitality but did not impair the essence which lies in people's hearts and minds awaiting the moment for revolutionary change to dawn on people's lives, revive the civilization and build the homeland.

Communists in our Third World were an inseparable part of the Western experience because of their ideology, which grew out of the experience of Western societies, and because of their humiliating subordination to the Eastern camp. In this respect they were like those people who were influenced by the Western method regardless of the orientation. Hence, it was not strange for us to see Christianity, Zionism and communism standing in one rank with communist armies standing against Arab hopes in Palestine during the 1948 war. In essence the May Revolution was an expression of that nationalist impulse in most states that had recently acquired independence to overthrow many traditional leaders that had come [to power] with independence and were then overthrown when they failed to achieve the concept of independence. But the communists with their imported thoughts, which opposed the heritage and the ideas of the people, were not about to aid the national revolution in its efforts to make up for what was past, to put the people in touch with their heritage, to bring out their real values and to demonstrate all the good qualities of the nation on the scene of national action. The ranks would thus hold firmly

together and [people's] hearts would agree because the sense of direction was one, the leadership was one and a sacrifice made for the homeland was a sacrifice made for oneself and for God. The personal would merge with the public; religion would come to terms with the world; and the world would indeed become a planting ground for eternity.

People would thus regain their sense of identity, and they would feel their active presence in the pulse of their revolution as it takes action on the national scene, since it would be moved by all that which moves the innermost thoughts of the people. The defeat of the communists was inevitable because in all this they had clashed with the direction of the people and of the revolution. They were swept away by the nationalist impulse which had set off the revolution in the first place. [Our] brother, the president [and] commander Ja'far Muhammad Numayri was in all this and in other things as well a living personification of this nationalist impulse. In this respect he presented a true portrait of the authentic Sudanese citizen who is the product of a heritage, who interacts with his past and his future and who aspires to future horizons. By experience and practice the people of Sudan sensed in him what each one of them sensed in his own innermost feelings: love for the homeland, [an interest in] promoting it, and adherence to the values of its heritage with humility, gallantry and affection for people. Hence was his success as a leader.

#### The National Strategy

The book which [our] brother President Numayri published early in the 15th century Hegira and which he entitled, "Wherefore the Islamic Method?" is very briefly the story of this national orientation to get Sudan out of the stage of passive political liberation and into the stage of active social and cultural liberation. Sudan would thus play its destined role to elevate the struggle of Third World nations from the long-standing status of political, social and cultural subordination to the nations of the West both in the east and in the west. These nations would then stand on their own feet, inspired by the values of their [own] national cultures which had been subjected to the ferocious war of colonialism. Humanity would thus regain its equilibrium as the nations of the Third World stand up to the nations of the West which have tried and are still trying to strip the rest of humanity of their independent identities so that they will remain subordinate to them, revolving in their sphere and continuing to serve as an inexpensive source of primary materials and a profitable market for industrial products as well.

It is evident that this cultural battle in which Third World nations are engaged in this post-colonialist age--and Sudan is among those nations--is an extremely expensive and long-term battle. This is because it is being fought on two fields. The first field is that of reviving this civilization, renewing its energies after long centuries of inaction and backwardness and presenting it to modern generations in a manner that their minds will accept. [This field also involves] connecting this civilization with the movement of active life from which it had been separated for many centuries. There is considerable difficulty and hardship involved in all this, especially since this battle is taking place despite all the pressures that are exerted by an active and an energetic Western civilization which with its technology and modern methods has prevailed in all areas of life.



The second field [of battle] is that of the enemies of this civilization who are lying in wait for it and who are no longer confronting it directly; rather, they have been able to create among many of its citizens enemies who are more harmful than its direct enemies. It is for this reason that we have seen all the incompatible [theories] of the West--communism, Zionism and secular Christianity--coming together in a vicious struggle against Islam and Muslims. [It is for this reason] that, accordingly, we have Muslims coming together who were influenced by these incompatible [theories], especially in the area of communist thought and Christian secular orientation, in their hostility to Islam and their aversion to everything that reminded them of it.

#### The Integration of Religion and Worldly Existence

Anyone who ponders the book, "Wherefore, the Islamic Method?" notices a clear, intellectual course [that is evident] between the lines, a course linking thought and action; it combines detailed presentation with philosophical speculation; and it sets off from the positions [assumed by] individuals and groups a spirit of tolerance that is ultimately the essence of the Islamic method for which we need not search beyond ourselves. This spirit is in fact hidden in our hearts even if we fail to perceive it, because our point of view is influenced by that of the prevailing civilization. This is evident in those sensitive human touches which the book presents in many instances where particular details express the personality of a man who is in touch with the motives (and the) values of [Islam's] heritage. It is in those instances that we can plainly see the greatness of this heritage and its unsurpassed ability to mold people into free human beings so as to make them unable to escape their humanity no matter how gloomy the conditions and how great the troubles become.

In all this there is the suggestion that this Islamic method, which the revolution has been advocating and whose values it has used to direct society's political and social programs, is not a matter isolated from people's lives. This Islamic method is in fact as close to the people as they are to themselves when they perceive the reality of those souls that were lost behind the clouds of centuries and the plans of colonialists. Each of us is in fact an effective personification of the values of our civilization. But we have lost our effectiveness in historical circumstances which must be confronted for us to regain the effectiveness of our personalities by regaining the effectiveness of the civilization from which we derive all our spiritual, moral and social sustenance. Had it not been for this civilization, we would have become things of naught on the margin of life. The effectiveness of the national character cannot be regained unless it is connected with its roots and its intellectual, cultural and practical origins. This can only come about through the integration of thought and action to bind the individual to society and to move the values from the sphere of private practices to that of public practices. Thus the alienation of Islam in our contemporary world lies in the fact that it is practiced as ritual on an individual level but it is not practiced as social conduct on the group level. Islam exists on the individual level, but it is missing on the group level. The real revolution in our contemporary world lies in achieving this step: to move Islam from the level of individual conduct to that of group conduct so that it ceases to be merely a private matter between the individual and his creator and becomes a public matter between all people and their creator.

It is this that distinguishes Islam as the final message. Islam had come primarily to deal with this separation between religion and world existence. This is what [our] brother, President Numayri concentrated on in the introduction to his book as well as in its first, eighth, tenth and eleventh chapters. He touched upon it [also] in the remaining chapters in the course of his treatment of the questions of the homeland and the revolution as well as the questions of the Arab world, the Islamic world and the Third World in general. Whether the discussion was about Numayri's private life, which he touched upon in passing, or about public questions inside the country or abroad, the theme that runs through all this is that of an Islam which forged human beings in a manner that would make them in all their actions a living image of Islam within the boundaries of time and space. The lesson here is that Islam is a true formula for the individual and the group; this is clearly evident in the positions of individuals, among whom is Numayri, and in the positions of groups and nations which the book touches upon.

### The Need for the Islamic Method

The book is not an autobiography of Numayri; nor is it a detailed account of all the events of the revolution. It is rather a survey of some of the important events in the leader's life and in the course of the revolution, such as its relationship with the communists which the president details in the second chapter entitled, "The Path of Thorns." This is followed by a chapter in which Numayri discusses the course that the revolution took after the communists were driven away. In the fifth chapter Numayri discusses the conspiracy of the mercenaries and the beginning of national reconciliation. In the sixth chapter he deals with the nation of Islam, comparing its glorious past with its fragmented present. This is interspersed with chapters in which he deals, as we have seen, with the experience of Islam as thought and practice, citing verses from the Holy Koran and [examples from] the Prophetic Tradition. He provides vivid examples from the life of the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, and from the lives of his companions and followers, may God's favor be with all of them. In adopting this course in dealing with the present and the past of people it is as though Numayri wants to point out the basic thesis that is being proposed throughout the 300 or so pages of the book: the Islamic method is necessary to reform the condition of Muslims and change their lives. This method is the intuitive appeal which emanates from the innermost thoughts of individuals and from group relations. Individuals and groups sense it in all their actions, and they respond to it in all their affairs, making no distinction between private and public conduct.

All this does not exist in the lives of people, but it requires that all of us [participate in] crystallizing [those ideas] in contemporary molds that would guide the progress of society in this extremely complex time. At the end of the book the president provides details on his view of how this Islamic method can be put into practice in the life of the contemporary Muslim society in order to change group relations and develop individuals' characters through knowledge and culture. It is from a Muslim society that a Muslim state can emerge. [This can come about] with ease and tolerance, without haste and impetuosity, but rather through a tireless march on a course of permanent change so that society and the state can ultimately become a genuine expression of the people's strength of character, which emanates from their religion and their civilization.

## The Importance of the Book

In all this the book is unique among books by leaders because it draws upon the vivid subject of positions and events to devise a new strategy which Sudan offers not only to its brothers of the Islamic world, but also to all its brothers in the Third World as a model for what the nation can be whenever it can revitalize its heritage and so renew its life and change its character. [Such a nation] would thus achieve its real independence in a world in which the struggle between the advanced countries and the backward countries is shaping up around the cultural gap between the people and the state. This is a world in which a nation or a state whose identity has been obscured will not survive; it will vanish in the vicissitudes of those who gain the upper hand.

Muslims before others are being called upon to abide by this method which God has commanded them to follow to guide humanity around them so they can be witnesses for people and the Prophet be a witness for them.

May God reward Numayri the best reward for Islam and for Muslims. May He provide him with His determination to pursue this honorable struggle to exalt the word of God on earth in justice among people and in brotherhood among human beings.

## Call to Fundamental Principles

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 1 Dec 80 p 3

[Text] In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

When [our] brother, the president announced his program for election to his second term in office and [his] selection of the Islamic course, I feared that he would proclaim an intellectual doctrine that was based on a particular understanding of Islam to convince people of it just as al-Mansur had set out to do when he asked al-Imam Malik, may God be pleased with him, to prepare for people a book that would show them what was permissible and what was not. But my fears were soon dispelled when I read that the appeal that was being made was an appeal to adhere to fundamentals and to be guided by good example. "There is a good example in God's apostle" [The Confederate Tribes: 21].

I had suspected that the book by [our] brother, the president, "Wherefore the Islamic Method?--and "auspicion is a crime"--was a book that included a theory similar to those theories that advocate placing Islam in the framework of contemporary thought, as some would say. Today we read and hear about what is called Islamic socialism and Islamic democracy and so on. May God be praised for guiding [our] brother, the president to [his] natural instinct. He reproached the disputants for their arguments and said: "We are spoiling people's natural instincts and Islam is natural instinct, for we do not present to them the essence of Islam, but we present instead those points around which there is controversy" (page 364). Then [our] brother, the president called for liberation from the bonds of western culture, which he called westernization. He said that westernization had led us into alienation, meaning that we were so swept up by western culture that we are now defending ideals that are strange to us and we are forgetting in the glow of

western liberal philosophy that western philosophies and theories were the result of circumstances and realities which these societies experienced and lived with in accordance with what was destined for them in the course of history.

This appeal for the fundamentals of Islam finds a responsive chord in my heart and bodes well as a time when nations are about to rally against Islam. There are many Muslims, but they are in a state of confusion like that [one finds] in a torrential stream.

May God be praised fully for His blessings and His additional benefits. May God's blessings and His peace be bestowed on the noblest of God's creatures to please him and to please God and to shield us from sin.

Praise be to God who extolled Himself for revealing the Koran which is the Straight Path along which we travel and in whose direction we are guided. God, the Sublime said, "Praise be to God who has revealed the Book to His servant shorn of falsehood and unswerving from the truth, so that he may give warning of a dire scourge from Him, proclaim to the faithful who do good works that a rich and everlasting reward awaits them." (The Cave: 1-3).

The book [we are talking about] is the Koran, God's ancient law which the noble prophet announced, may God grant him the best of blessings and the utmost in salvation: "We have revealed to you the Book only so that you may declare to them the truth concerning which they are disputing. It is a guide and a blessing to true believers" (The Bee: 64). The prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, explained the precise and the ambiguous [parts of the Book] as well as those verses which supersede others and those that are abrogated by others; he left no room for equivocation. "It is He who has revealed to you the Koran. Some of its verses are precise in meaning--they are the foundation of the Book--and others ambiguous. Those whose hearts are infected with disbelief follow the ambiguous part, so as to create dissension by seeking to explain it. But no one knows its meaning except Allah. Those who are well-grounded in knowledge say: 'We believe in it: it is all from our Lord. But only the wise take heed' (The Irons: 7). God pledged its preservation: "It was We that revealed the Koran, and shall Ourselves preserve it" (Al-Hi: 9).

This preserved Book with its complete blessed verses, which are unsurpassed in goodness and which permit no shamelessness, constitutes the Islamic method which will survive until God inherits the earth and everything on it.

The holy Islamic awakening whose early signs have appeared all over the globe restores one's confidence that this confusion will be turned to an advantage by educating people and liberating them from alienation, cultural subordination and cultural dependency, despite the fact that the Islamic awakening began with an attempt to place Islam in a framework, to modernize it or at least to place it into the intellectual and methodological molds of the western world.

It may be foolish to allow the various schools of thought to distract us in several ways so as to make us appear to be apologizing for Islam as though we did not know that these notions bore the seeds of their destruction. Islam is nothing



else but Islam. God Almighty called it Islam and said, "...the faith of Abraham your father. In this as in former scriptures He has given you the name of Muslims, so that His apostle may testify against you, and that you yourselves may testify against your fellow-men" (The Pilgrimage: 78).

Islam is based on established and well-known principles. People who follow their own whims argue about that. Books of theology were only written to show the details of Islam in the context of the fundamentals about which scholars do not disagree.

Islam is distinguished by the fact that it devoted its attention to man as no other system before it or since has done. The Koran is addressed to man, to people and the faithful; it made faith the object of action. Therefore, God does not reckon with people because of the guilt of one person or several persons: "No soul shall bear another's burden" [Cattle: 164]; and "The fate of each man We have bound about his neck. On the Day of Resurrection We shall confront him with a book spread wide open, saying: 'Here is your book: read it'" [The Night Journey: 13]. Responsibility is individual, and a person is not excused from responsibility because he objects to what people have done and is tired of saying, like the ancient poet:

"I am a mere warrior; if [my company] attacks

"I attack; if an attack is called for, I go along."

The Noble Tradition warns one of becoming characterless and saying that one will be charitable if people are charitable and doing evil if people do evil, instead of being charitable whether people are or not.

Islam, therefore, concerned itself with the individual. It set forth in detail [the individual's] relationship with his spouse and explained how a child should be cared for, including nursing, weening and upbringing. It determined family relationships and relations with women, and it explained [the rules of] inheritance. This is because the family is godly if the individual is godly; and a society become godly when the family is godly; and the nation is involved in all of this.

It is in the context of this notion that the systems of government in an Islamic society are determined. The role of the individual appears prominent and influential, and the machinery of government does not appear as dominant and as dominating as it appears in other systems. Every Muslim is responsible for the affairs of [other] Muslims as much as the imam or the prince, because religion is good counsel, as the true religion has said, and the good counsel is from God to His prophet, the leaders of the Muslims and the people in general.

This is because the foundations of Islam are known: they are the Koran and the Sunna [the sayings and doings of the prophet]. There is no disagreement about these two foundations, and there is no need to go into anything else now.

The Book is the law in the language of the age--I used that metaphor to make my point clear. Every Muslim is compelled to abide by the Book in his speech, in his works and in his observations. Upon this [fact] are based the precepts which must be adhere to. Among these precepts, for example, are justice, taking counsel, enjoining good and forbidding evil.



## Justice

Justice is the foundation of a strong Islamic system. "Give them your judgment in accordance with justice." "Do not allow your hatred for those who would debar you from the Holy Mosque to lead you into sin. Help one another in what is good and pious, not in what is wicked and sinful. Have fear of Allah, for He is stern in retribution" [The Table: 2].

Justice is to be construed in its broad, comprehensive sense. A leader has to be just in everything: in dividing awards, in [assigning] work, and housing, in apportioning land and in remedying estrangement.

The Koran brought us accounts of people who lived before us; these were lessons indicating the need for justice. The people of Thamud could not bear [the thought of] sharing water with God's camel which had its portion of water as they had theirs on a known day. It was as though the camel represented God's right; they did not need their drinking water on the day the camel needed it, but they could not bear [the thought of] justice.

The Jews lessened the value of people's possessions. They reduced weights, trifled with measurements and caused havoc on earth. Pharaoh became exalted on earth and divided people into factions, weakening one faction by slaughtering its members and violating its women. Pharaoh never gave an order that followed the right path. Then Moses, may the peace of God be with him, became concerned with the folly and the crimes of the Jews after having saved them from Pharaoh. They had broken the Sabbath, worshipped the cow and adopted their learned men and their monks as deities other than God. They hurt Jesus, the son of Mary; they slandered the Virgin Mary; and they were blasphemous.

Islam completed the brick [wall] in this soundly built structure as the prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation said, "I was sent to fulfill noble character traits." Justice lies in obedience to God (page 367), and justice in Islam is what the ruler prefers more than himself and his family (page 370). The slogan of justice is [treating] people equally like the teeth of a comb (page 374). Justice lies in freedom from exploitation (page 383).

Islam is the total of noble character traits and of supreme principles and ideals. Therefore, it was the last of the messages which come to an end with Islam. Islam is therefore comprehensive and complete and must not be taken piecemeal for a piecemeal approach would be construed as faithlessness: "Do you believe only in part of the Book?" God Almighty threatened anyone who would do this with shame in this life and torture in the hereafter.

## Taking Counsel

[Our] brother, the president focused on taking counsel and cited evidence [on the matter] from Islamic history, especially from the early period of Islam. Taking counsel is required: there is no dispute about that, and I don't think I need evidence for this. But there is disagreement about being bound by the opinion of counsel and how counsel is to be given. To explain this let me say that a ruler

has to seek counsel, but there is a difference of opinion about being bound by the opinion that is generated by that counsel, and there is also difference of opinion about whose counsel a ruler should seek.

The public [favors] seeking the counsel of those in power, and there is nothing to block the road to independent judgment. The noble prophet said, "You know the affairs of your world best."

### Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil

This is one of the most important fundamentals of Islam distinguishing it from other systems and giving meaning to the principle of taking counsel. God Almighty said, "May you become a nation that shall speak for righteousness, enjoin good and forbid evil. Such men shall surely triumph" [The Imrans: 104]. He said, "The true believers, both men and women, are friend to each other" [Repentance: 71]. It is from this friendship that the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil comes, and it is from it also that the need for the principle of taking counsel comes.

People argued about the holy verse, "Believers, you are accountable for none but yourselves; he that goes astray cannot harm you if you are on the right path" [The Table: 105]. It has been said that our lord Abu Bakr said, "People, you are reading this verse and interpreting it in a way that differs from the way it should be interpreted. I heard the prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation say, 'No people who were sinners and among whom there was one who could rebuke them and did not, but God shall punish them with great torment.' 'A'ishah, may God be pleased with her said, 'He tortured the people of a village which had 18,000 people whose works were the works of prophets. They said, how can this be, O messenger of God? He said, 'They did not defend God Almighty, nor did they enjoin good and forbid evil.'"

God reproached the Jews for "committing evil and never restraining one another from wrong-doing" [The Table: 79].

The freedom of thought is inseparably tied to this fundamental principle.

### Freedom of Thought

Islam is also unique in its respect for the human being. It concerns itself with the human being, as we have already stated, from the time he becomes a fetus: "He molds you in your mothers' wombs by stages..." [The Hordes: 6]. Therefore, the individual was commanded [by God], and he was held accountable for his actions. This individual, therefore, has a significant position in society. To be significant, an individual must reveal his opinion. There are many examples [of this] in Islamic history and ample examples in the Book. When a man of religion became agitated in the presence of the prophet and our lord 'Umar was about to bear down on him, the noble prophet said, "A man with the truth on his side should speak." A woman in a mosque objected to our lord 'Umar when he wanted to limit dowries. He retracted [his proposal] and said, "A woman was right and 'Umar was wrong!" And so on. All this indicates that an Islamic government has to make room for opinion and must not be impatient with anyone who expresses his opinion. It must refute

his arguments with its own arguments. Our lord 'Ali was cursed by the Kharijites [dissidents] because he accepted arbitration. 'Abdallah ibn al-Kawwa' told him in front of the Kharijites, "You were truthful in everything you said, but you blasphemed when you appointed the two arbitrators."

'Ali said, "Woe unto you, ibn al-Kawwa'. I appointed Abu Musa and Mu'awiyah appointed 'Uman."

He said, "Abu-Musa was a non-believer."

'Ali said, "When did he become a non-believer? When I sent him or when he acted as arbiter?"

Ibn al-Kawwa' said, "When he acted as arbiter."

Imam 'Ali could have imposed the legal punishment against him because he had blasphemed. But he exchanged arguments with him, and he did not fight with the Kharijites until they took their swords out of their sheaths against him.

This is freedom of thought in its noblest sense because it stems from an understanding of the faith. It is a dimension of worship with which a person approaches his creator. The prophet is supposed to have said that the most sincere holy war is a word of truth spoken to a tyrannical sultan.

This freedom of thought then is a responsible freedom which is bound by the conditions of faith. It is a freedom that has its dimensions and its conditions. Opinion must be based on a principle, and freedom is a coin with two sides. It works for one and against one. One's practice of freedom of thought forces one to respect the freedom of others for it would not be right for one group to practice freedom and another group to be denied that freedom. It is wise in all this to adhere to the Book and the Sunna.

But this is easier said than done. We did not come in contact with such freedom except in the early ages of Islam and during the caliphate of 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz. Afterwards religion turned to speeches and sermons. God says, "Believers, why do you profess what you never do? It is most odious in God's sight that you should say one thing and do another" [Battle Array: 3].

[Our] brother the president is particularly brilliant when he said, "We have to put an end to the tragedy of separation between knowledge and action, between religion and professional and vocational specialization. The foundation of our new society must be the Muslim engineer, the Muslim physician, the Muslim journalist, the Muslim craftsman, the Muslim farmer and the Muslim worker."

This means that all stages of education are to be tied to religion, which had been an island separate from all educational curricula.

"We have to connect life and religion. Our mosques should not be filled during the hours of prayer and left vacant between those hours. The mosque should be a gathering place for everything that can be useful to people. It is to be therapy, education and guidance [for people]. It is the lighthouse that radiates light and an oasis that abounds with blessings."

"We have to stop comparing our present with our past: [we have to stop comparing the state of Muslims] when Islam strengthened them with their state when their alienation from Islam weakened them.

"We have to confront the currents of thought and the various doctrines in our world with Islam. These ideas and doctrines are mutable, but Islam is immutable; they are ephemeral, but Islam is eternal. They constitute a separation from religion as though religion were not suitable to the world, and Islam is a doctrine for religion and for the world" (page 447).

If we fulfill all this and bring it to a conclusion, we will have found ourselves and we will have borne the flame just as we did the first time. The latter days of a nation will only be improved by those things that reformed its earliest days. God grants success and guides one on the right path.

8592

CSO: 4802

SYRIAN TV BROADCASTS CONFESSION BY MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OFFICIAL

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 24 Sep 80 p 19

[Article by Khalil al-Taqi: "Moslem Brotherhood Military Official Tells How He and His Comrades Escaped From Prison"]

[Text] Syrian Television recently interviewed the Moslem Brotherhood's military training officer, who related the details of his escape from prison last June and explained the nature of the assignments he was given before his arrest.

This 30-year-old official, named Amin ibn Muhammad al-Asfar, was arrested on 13 April 1979, and managed to escape from prison last June in the company of 16 other detainees. But the authorities quickly re-arrested him along with a large number of his fugitive comrades, in addition to arresting Jailor Tahir al-Hawri, who had helped them escape.

It should be pointed out that President Hafiz al-Asad issued an amnesty decree, Number 49, in which he gave the members of the organization a last chance to declare their resignation from it or else face harsher penalties.

Amin al-Asfar, who comes from Hamah, explained that he received about 500,000 Syrian pounds in installments from a neighboring Arab country, and said that with this money he bought 12 revolvers, 9 military rifles and ammunition for them, as well as several small trucks and taxis.

At the beginning of his confession, he said that he was married and had a secondary diploma from a Shari'ah school. He discontinued his studies because of pursuit by the security authorities for his connection with the Moslem Brotherhood.

The military official spoke of his connection with the Moslem Brotherhood, saying, "In 1969 Hasan 'Usfur, a relative of mine, invited me to join the Moslem Brotherhood. I accepted because of my religious feelings, since I was from a devout family. I joined up with a group composed of 'Ali al-Iblibi, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Arrabi, and Hasan Salamah, and we would all read books by Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna and similar books, in addition to books on exegesis, the Prophet's life, the Koran and religious sciences. Thus things continued until 1975, when there came to me two young men whom I knew from the mosque in the quarter where I lived, Mustafa Khalluf and Zuhayr al-Zarif, who were wanted by the security authorities. They asked for shelter in my house for a while, until the pursuit let up. I welcomed them, and they stayed for 10 days until security forces raided the house.



They were unable to arrest us, and we fled to Aleppo. I managed to travel to Europe on my passport, which was still valid. I stayed in Europe for a while, and went back and forth to Syria on a forged passport. In Europe, I got to know a young girl and married her. We returned to Syria illegally."

Military Training Officer Amin al-Asfar added, in his interview with the Damascus television announcer, "We settled in Aleppo. When my passport was almost expired, I asked the organization to help me renew it again, but to no avail. I also asked it to help me leave Syria, so I could go to work to repay my debts.

"After some time in Malta, Ahmad al-Jamal, a student of religious education and an organization member, came to me from Hamah. He asked me what I knew of military matters, which I told him went no further than what any educated student would know. He told me that they would send someone to train me in weapons and military regulations. From the athletic angle, I was prepared, for I had been practicing sports. Then they sent me a group to train.

"On my part, I relied on military books. I studied and read and summarized, until I attained good results. They began sending me groups to train, and I trained them well in taking apart and reassembling hand weapons and in marksmanship, in addition to athletic training including self-defense, judo and karate.

"Then Ahmad al-Jamal came to me again and connected me with 'Abdallah al-Tantawi, secretary general of the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria, who in turn connected me with 'Adnan Shaykhuni, military official in Aleppo. We began working together and coordinating our efforts until 13 April 1979, when I was arrested and put in prison."

In response to a question about his assignments and what he did for the Moslem Brotherhood other than training activities, Amin al-Asfar said, "What I primarily did was training, in addition to some other assignments such as tearing down signs, effacing pictures, or breaking the cornerstone of some new project."

#### Details of the Escape Plan

With respect to how he escaped from prison and what he did until his second arrest, the organization's military official said, "After the investigations ended, we were put in the Kafr Susah prison, where we stayed a while until one of the jailors, named Tahir al-Hawri, came and suggested that we escape. He took me out of the cell to his office and suggested the idea, telling me that things were all arranged on the outside, that 'Abdallah al-Tantawi had told him to tell me this, that everything--houses, trucks and weapons--were ready, and that we only had to work on getting out. I agreed to the idea. Some detainees had been transferred to the Tudmur Military Prison, and Tahir al-Hawri asked us to carry out the escape quickly, fearing that we also would be transferred to this prison. We actually set the date in agreement with him, and this date was communicated outside the prison. He got us some narcotic injections prepared by some of the doctors in prison, including Dr As'ad Bisatah and Dr Malik 'Uqayri. At 1230, the zero hour, the operation began. One prisoner claimed he was sick and needed help, and Tahir al-Hawri contacted the proper branch, and a vehicle came to pick him up. We overcame the drivers and put them in the cell, and we got out and fled in the vehicle which had come. There were 17 of us.

Amin al-Asfar continued, "We moved from one rural village to another around Damascus, until we managed to rent a house in the village of Manin, 12 kilometers from Damascus, until we could buy 2 houses, one in the al-Maydan quarter and the second in the Yarmuk tent camp. We rented a third house in al-Maydan and a fourth in the village of Balda. We also bought a number of small trucks--Suzukis and Hondas--and three taxis, in addition to 10 revolvers and nine Kalashnikovs with ammunition.

"We were getting money through a messenger called Abu al-Faraj, who would give us all the money we asked for, which was coming from an Arab country bordering Syria. I received close to 500,000 Syrian pounds in installments."

#### The Armed Organization's Official

The Moslem Brotherhood's military training officer answered a question about the armed organization's Damascus official, saying, "In Damascus I was in contact with Abu-al-Faraj, in his capacity as general official, and with Abu Maysir, the military official. His real name was Faruq Abu-Tawq, and he was an engineer from Hamah whom I had known for a long time. Then there was a political official from Damascus named Abu-Nabil. After him, the armed organization sent another person named 'Umar Marqah, known as Abu-Hazim."

Amin al-Asfar spoke in detail of the personality of 'Umar Marqah, who earlier had been expelled from the Moslem Brotherhood. He said, "It is true that he was expelled from the organization for a long time and travelled outside Syria. The reason for his expulsion was that he was hiding in a house belonging to one of the Brotherhood members, and in the night committed a misdemeanor against one of those present. This caused the leadership to expel him with the approval of the general supervisor, the Executive Bureau, and the Consultative Council, all of whom met in Beirut and decided to expel him."

In response to a question about how he knew this before ever having worked with 'Umar Marqah's wife after his escape from prison, he said, "In fact, what I saw the first time was a big surprise. When I met him in the company of Abu-Maysir, I didn't mention this matter to anyone, but I began reconsidering. This man had been expelled, and morally discredited. How could he return to the organization? I was quite upset."

#### Contacts Outside Damascus

The Moslem Brotherhood's military training officer acknowledged his contacts with organization officials outside Damascus when he said, "Yes, I had some correspondence with 'Adnan 'Awlah, who sent me a letter from Aleppo congratulating me on my escape from prison, and expressing his joy and happiness. Shortly thereafter he sent me a letter asking me to go to Aleppo to take over his position in the organization, because he was depressed and miserable over the difficulties facing the organization, especially from the security agencies. From this correspondence I concluded that despair was beginning to permeate the leadership.

"I refused to go and take over this position because I knew that 'Adnan 'Aqlah was a temperamental man--untruthful in what he said. I knew that he could never step down because he was known among organization members as a stubborn man with inflexible opinions, who never left a man room to act freely. In the pursuit of attaining his own ends, 'Adnan 'Aqlah trod on the opinions of everyone.

"I knew all of this about him, and I knew that a man of this sort occupying this kind of position could never step down from his position. This was one reason. Another reason was that I knew that he wanted to acquire my popularity and mass appeal in the organization. I have my status, and he wanted to get it. By getting me into the organization, he would bring in everyone in contact with me, everyone connected with me, everyone who trusted in me. That is to say, merely mentioning my name would mean that everyone who trusted in me would be behind me.

"The second reason was that I was afraid to oppose his opinions. I was afraid that he had not given up the idea of physically liquidating me, because there was nothing preventing him from doing so. He threatens and menaces and strikes and kills. Anyone who disagrees with him he eliminates."

At the end of the interview, Amin al-Asfar spoke in detail of his sorrow and regret over his connections with the Moslem Brotherhood. He called on President Hafiz al-Asad to show leniency and mercy, and asked him to "look upon us as a merciful father does when his small son makes a mistake--he calls him to account to straighten him out."

8559

CSO: 4802

## BRIEFS

**CRACKDOWN ON BROTHERHOOD**--Syrian authorities, in cooperation with the legitimate Lebanese authorities, have successfully pursued the Moslem Brothers who managed to leave Syrian territory for Lebanon, especially the North. Syrian security forces were able to arrest some fugitives while killing others in 'Akkar, when they tried to escape from their detention camp. Security patrols on the main roads of 'Addar are looking for wanted Brotherhood members, especially at night, while special teams are raiding suspicious places. In this context, there have been reports indicating that Syria has ended the Moslem Brotherhood myth which had persisted in the minds of some people, and is making an effort to prevent the Brotherhood from going on to penetrate Lebanon and make use of some parts of Lebanon in pursuing their destructive activity against the existing regime in Syria. [Text] [Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 3 Oct 80 p 8] 8559

**BROTHERHOOD MEMBER KILLED**--Syrian Arab News Agency said yesterday that a member of the Moslem Brotherhood was killed in Aleppo the day before yesterday by policemen. The man was 'Adnan Shaykhuni, one of the organization's fugitive members wanted by the police. In his home were found arms and documents indicating the organization's connection with the foreign enemy. In another context, during an interview on Syrian television the night before last, two persons, one of them Lebanese, confessed to smuggling quantities of Israeli-made weapons from Beirut to the Syrian port of Latakia. The two persons said that they transported Israeli weapons and Egyptian ammunition sent by a militia known as the Revolutionary Guard to Moslem Brotherhood members in Latakia. In addition, smuggling is done under the supervision of Israeli officers and the "Cedar Guards." [Text] [Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 10 Oct 80 p 1] 8559

CSO: 4802

**BOURGUIBA CABINET RESHUFFLE ANNOUNCED**

**New Appointments**

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 4 Dec 80 pp 1

[Text] President Bourguiba conferred yesterday morning at Carthage Palace with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, and the upshot of the interview was the following pronouncement:

By virtue of a decree dated 3 December 1980 the Chief of State made the following appointments:

Beji Cald Essebsi, minister delegate to the prime minister

Tahar Belkhoja, minister of Information

Fouad Mebazaa, minister of Cultural Affairs

Mohamed Sayah, minister of Equipment

Moncef Belhaj Amor, minister of Housing

Nezri Chekir, minister delegate to the Prime Minister, for Administrative Reform and Public Offices.

The President of the Republic also signed a decree creating a Certificate of Advanced Studies in History of the National Movement at the Faculty of Letters and Humanities.

President Bourguiba also signed the following legislation:

Law abolishing the office of Director of Public Prosecutions;

Law ratifying the Panafrikan Postal Union Agreement;

- Law authorizing Tunisia's participation in the Arab Fund for Activities and Agencies of Youth and Sports;

- Law ratifying the Technical Cooperation Agreement between Tunisia and Morocco;

- Law ratifying the Financial Cooperation Agreement concluded 11 July 1979 between Tunisia and the FRG;



- Law ratifying a loan agreement between Tunisia, the National Bank of Tunisia and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (agricultural credit project);
- Law ratifying the protocol of agreement between Tunisia and China concerning sending two medical teams;
- Law ratifying the credit agreement codicil to a loan contracted for by BITEP (Italian-Tunisian Petroleum Exploitation Company);
- Law modifying Article 64 of the Urban Code;
- Law modifying Article 14 of Law No. 78-14 of 4 February 1976 regarding building permits;
- Law authorizing the increase of the pro rata contribution by Tunisia to the IMF;
- Law modifying the decree of 21 June 1956 regarding the organization of the territory of the Tunisian Republic;

President Bourguiba also signed the following decrees:

- Decree appointing Naceur Charbi to the office of Director of Social Development at the Ministry of Social Affairs;
- Decree appointing Abdelmajid Esseghir Inspector General at the Ministry of Social Affairs;
- Decree appointing Mohamed Karboul Director of Wages and Working Conditions at the Ministry of Social Affairs;
- Decree appointing Mr Ali Tekaya Permanent Deputy Ambassador of Tunisia to the United Nations Organization, New York.

#### Biographies of New Appointees

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 4 Dec 80 p 4

[Text] Caled Essebsi

Beji Caled Essebsi, just appointed by Presidential Decree as Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister, was born 29 November 1926 at Tunis. Following secondary schooling at College Sadiki he took graduate studies in Law at the Faculte de Paris, where he received his law degree.

In 1951 he was elected vice president of the Association of North African Students in Paris, and in the course of his stay in France also assumed responsibilities within the organization of the Paris "Destour" Cell.

Back in Tunis he was called to the bar and elected to the Committee of the Hammam-Lif Cell.

In April 1956 Beji Caied Essebsi was Charge de Mission in the office of President Bourguiba, then Chief of State. Following that he was appointed Secretary General of the Governorate of Tunis and Environs, then Charge de Mission at the office of Mr Taleb Mehiri, then Minister of Interior, until 1958.

Beji Caied Essebsi thereafter held following assignments successively: Director of Regional and Communal Administration and Director of the Office of Tourism.

In January 1963 he was appointed head of the State Police until July 1965, when he was made Secretary of State for the Interior. From 7 November 1969 to 12 June 1970 he was Minister of State to the Prime Minister for National Defense. On 5 August 1970 he was appointed Ambassador in Paris, which post he held until January 1972, when he resumed his profession as a lawyer.

Beji Caied Essebsi holds the Grand Cordon of the Order of Independence and Grand Cordon of the Order of the Republic.

#### **Tahar Belkhoja**

Tahar Belkhoja, who has just been appointed by Presidential Decree, Minister of Information, was born on 9 June 1931 at Mahdia. He holds the degree of agricultural engineer. Secretary General of UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students] from 1957 to 1958, he was elected President of the International Association of Students of Agriculture in 1958. In 1959 he was Student Delegate in the Politburo.

Cabinet Chief for the Foreign Secretary in January 1960, he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary in January 1961, then in the same year he served as Charge d'Affaires at the Tunisian Embassy in Paris.

From December 1962 to 1966 Tahar Belkhoja was Tunisian Ambassador to West Africa (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Mali, Guinea and Mauritania), residing in Dakar. Made Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Planning and the National Economy in September 1966, he was appointed in June 1967 General Director of State Police. On 9 July 1969 he was appointed Tunisian Ambassador to Senegal, which post he held until his appointment on 9 March 1970 as Tunisian Ambassador in Madrid.

Since June 1970 he successively held posts of Secretary of State for Education, Research and Vocational Training at the Ministry of Agriculture, Minister of Youth and Sports (1971), Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the Specialized Agencies of the UN at Geneva and Ambassador to the Holy See with residence in Geneva (1972), Minister of the Interior (1973-1977). He was Tunisian Ambassador to FRG in March 1980, a post he held until his recent appointment.

Tahar Belkhoja has been a member of the Central Committee of the Party from 1965 to 1970. From 1970 to 1971 he was a member of the High Commission of the Destourian Socialist Party. From 1974 to 1977 he was a member of the Politburo and from 1974 to 1976 he served as Deputy in the National Assembly.

Mr Belkhoja is Grand Officer of the Order of the Republic and of Independence.

## **Mezri Chokir**

Mezri Chokir, who has just been appointed by Presidential Decree Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister for Administrative Reform and Public Office, was born at Monastir on 1 August 1933.

After secondary schooling at the Souasse Lycee, then at College Sadiki, he took graduate studies in psychopedagogy and Education Sciences in Tunis and Paris.

From 1954 to 1959 he was a teacher. Director of the Bourguiba Children's Community in 1959, in 1967 he was admitted by competitive examination to the Commissariat of Children, charged with Child Service at the Ministry of Youth and Sports. Charge de Mission at Tunisian Radio and Television (RTT) in 1955, he was Office Attache at the Ministry of National Defense in 1968. In 1969 he was Chef de Cabinet at the Ministry of Youth and Sports in 1970, he was Governor of Bizerte in 1971, then of Gafsa in 1972, which post he held until appointed President and General Manager of the National Office of Family Planning and the Population in December 1973. On 24 April 1980 he was appointed Staff Manager for the Office of the Prime Minister, a post he held until his recent appointment.

Mezri Chokir was a militant in the Party ranks since 1950, and repeatedly served as Cell President.

He is Knight of the Order of Independence and Commander of the Order of the Republic.

Mezri Chokir is married and father of four children.

## **An Important Reshuffling**

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 4 Dec 80 p 4

[Text] The partial reshuffling of ministers decided yesterday by President Bourguiba reveals in more than one way the orientation the Chief of State is resolved to impose on the Government's activity on the eve of a new stage in the Nation's life: the third decade of development and the Sixth Plan. It demonstrates the intent of the President of the Republic to give special attention to two sectors, information and housing which have been raised to the status of full Ministries. It is well known that the Chief of State has always attached great importance to information, as a means of education and forming public opinion, and finally, as a factor in the improvement of man's well-being by reason of its impact on the citizenry and on the work of development as a whole.

Providing for the important national maturity dates facing the country requiring the mobilizing of all efforts, it seems opportune to promote the information sector and give it the means to play a larger role in the implementation of the new orientations of government activity.

The creation of an independent Ministry of Housing is a result of that same concern.

In fact the improvement of housing was one of the constant concerns of the Supreme Fighter (Combattant Supreme) and of the government, which consider housing to be an essential instrument of social policy and a factor in the security of the citizen in regard to his future and that of his family.

The efforts already mounted in this direction, which have taken different forms, are thus crowned by the creation of a ministerial department which will control all the institutions and agencies concerned with problems of housing. This new ministry will thus increase the number of departments of a social character, which constitutes a confirmation of the importance accorded to this sector in the policy defined by the government.

Above and beyond the creation of these two new Ministerial Departments, the reorganization of the government above all demonstrates the constant concern of President Bourguiba to gather around him all the able people, all the militants and all those who share a like vision of the country's future in the political, economic and social fields.

Faithful to his calling as rallying force for all Tunisians, he intends to bring together all patriots attached to national unity, the action of improvement and progress which Tunisia is preparing to implement on the threshold of the third decade of development.

2750

CSO: 4400

## TUNISIA

### EDITORIAL BY HAMMADI BEN HAMMED ON 'INEQUALITIES'

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 15 Dec 80 pp 24-25

[Editorial by Hammadi Ben Hammed: "Inequalities..."]

[Text] At last Saturday's meeting of the sector committees stemming from the Higher Commission for National Planning, Mohamed Mzali asserted once more that the main priority of the next development plan is to give substance to genuine social policy, i.e., to work out structural changes to reduce disparities, which are the major source of inequalities.

Some of these inequalities are structural. Here is an example:

--Disparities between regions.

The prime minister has pointed out several times since 23 April that there are glaring disparities today between regions. Thus, "the Northwest and the Central-West are still the poorest even though the differences between the other regions are tending to diminish somewhat...." Development activity which is concerned about social justice and equity, that is to say which pays as much attention to the "quality" of development as to economic "performance data" and "general estimates," cannot accept regional imbalances, even if it can be successfully demonstrated that "planned and justifiable imbalances" may favor overall growth. Furthermore, the experiments of so-called "cluster development" or development "which crystallizes around an initial crystal," which certain new countries have put into effect, have proved that in the long run they only generate losses and waste.

Another inequality is:

--Disparities between individuals.

In his keynote speech before the National Assembly on 30 May 1980, as well as in keynote speeches at the presentation of the government budget plan on 18 November and last Saturday, Mohamed Mzali indicated the government's concern to achieve greater social justice "by a whole series of measures in matters of taxation...so as to reduce inequalities between citizens..." which makes clear the government's political desire to build a "fair, free and democratic" society. Because even though Tunisia may be "in the forefront of developing countries as regards the



promotion of man and social justice (it devotes 16 percent of its GDP [gross domestic product] to social expenditures compared with the generally accepted international norm of 10 percent), much more progress must be made in order to set up an equitable distribution of income in the country without making false claims about being egalitarian...."

In particular, in the tax area there must be a remedy for the intolerable situation which "tolerates" some people continuing to be able to hide between three-fifths and three-fourths of their true income while others--wage earners--are quite simply taxed through withholding. Tax evasion calculated on that basis is currently estimated at 40 percent. Hence the poverty of many and the shady wealth of others. Hence privileges and corruption.

This does not mean to say, it must be pointed out, that nothing has been done up to now along these lines, but can't we courageously admit that the numerous areas where Tunisian society has to face up to challenges in this new decade--"production, productivity, competitiveness, investment, savings, consumption, employment, and balance of payments"--all depend on solving the central problem, which is to build a society of justice and freedom?

But how can that goal be reached?

Mzali has clearly stated that "in the context of working out the plan and projections for the third decade, the government is currently studying a vast set of in-depth reforms covering the main aspects of economic and social life."

There is no doubt that these reforms are aimed first and foremost at working out a strategy for combatting all kinds of inequalities:

--So that justice and development can go hand in hand: a high rate of economic growth is not enough to promote social justice, because in a democratic society social justice is much more a matter of "Gross National Happiness" than of the "material output" of the economy.

--So that the correction of disparities between individuals and regions really takes place, through mobilizing the most appropriate and effective means, especially in the areas of taxation, payment of social benefits, price controls, and consumer subsidies. On the level both of regional planning and of town and country planning, the rural world, the underprivileged world, during the next decade must once and for all attain dignity and progress or we risk seeing the proliferation of explosive situations such as those experienced by Tunisia on 26 January 1978 or last year at Gafsa.

--So that the spirit of initiative, an essential foundation of an economy centered on productivity, is not changed into a "spirit of opportunism," driven by people with capital and speculators making quick and easy profits, based on government encouragement (for example, FOPRODI [expansion unknown]), to the detriment of the poorer social categories. Today it is essential "to clear profits of suspicion of any kind," because in a society like ours profits can be viewed only as return on risk-taking, on productive activity, on creative activity and in this way answering a basic and morally legitimate need.

--So that along with equality in concrete matters such as income, health and happiness, Tunisia will genuinely be able to count on equal rights and equality before the law, in particular--and this is crucial--by demanding a stern fight against tax evasion, favoritism, privilege, regionalism, and their consequences.

There are thus great difficulties to overcome on this new course. They should not be minimized. This goes for the challenges to be faced as well. However, honest Tunisians can count on the success of this undertaking.

Since last April the government has been able to look reality in the face, with all its wrinkles as it were, and with all the appeals that it makes.

The government has been able to involve all Tunisians, without excluding anyone, "in an ongoing democratic dialog" to get to know about national concerns and to make them known and to seriously and effectively seek solutions to problems, with a view to "guaranteeing invulnerability, independence, and progress, and satisfying the aspirations of young people."

"Ever since it has had the honor of President Bourguiba's trust, this government has promised to make every effort to cleanse the political climate in the country and to put together the right conditions for all active forces--in the broadest meaning of the term--to take part in running the country as well as the right conditions for creating a balanced, authentic and open Tunisian society oriented toward progress."

Because, as Bourguiba once again affirmed in his speech before the 10th Congress of the PSD (whatever his detractors may say): "The point must be made that in our party we remain firmly devoted to socialism as a social philosophy striving for the greater welfare of all social classes on the basis of social justice and respect for basic freedoms."

9631

CSO: 4400

**MZALI ON BUDGET PLAN, CREATION OF TWO NEW BANKS**

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Dec 80 pp 1, 4

[Report on Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali's speech in response to questions in the National Assembly budget debate on 15 December]

[Text] Yesterday the National Assembly started examining the state budget plan for 1981 with several members of the government present, led by Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister.

This first day was devoted to examining the economic budget, the two sections of which list what was accomplished in fiscal 1980 and what the projections are for the following year, and to discussing the operating and capital budgets for 1981.

The debate was characterized by frankness, objectivity, and a high degree of maturity on the part of the nation's representatives.

Mzali gave clear explanations in response to questions raised by the deputies' speeches.

Yesterday afternoon Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali gave a speech in which he answered questions raised by deputies during the debate on the 1981 government budget presentation report.

In his speech the prime minister first thanked the deputies for their interest in the government budget plan and for their support for government policy as laid out in the speeches he gave before the Assembly in May and December. "This policy is very frank in the way it states problems and proposes solutions. We are determined to carry on with this policy, taking inspiration from the Supreme Warrior's guidelines and from the party, and fulfilling the deep-seated aspirations of the people," he said.

Mzali went on to state that the decline in the growth rate, 7.5 percent being forecast for 1981, is principally due to two factors.

The first factor is low oil production. This has shown a marked decline over the last few years. The production growth rate, which was 16 percent in 1977, fell to 0.5 percent in 1980.

#### Why the Creation of New Banks?

"It is also for this reason that I emphasized in my budget presentation speech that development prospects in this new decade would still be dependent on three factors, the first being to reduce energy consumption, find and exploit new resources, and reconsider our energy policy.

The second relates to the tourist industry, which in 1981 will register a growth rate of 1.7 percent. This rate is very low compared to what was chalked up in previous years. However, it should be emphasized that the government envisages taking measures to improve it."

Then Mzali spoke of the role incumbent on the banking sector. "Were some people wondering what the reasons were which led to the creation of new banks?

We are able to say that these new banks were created not only for us to obtain funds but also to start up new projects. For we have noted that the number of projects which have been identified up to now is relatively small. These institutions will therefore be called on to identify and to study and ultimately finance projects."

The prime minister went on: "They will also orient their activities toward promoting small and medium-sized business and the agricultural sector."

The prime minister stressed that promoting agriculture requires developing a new concept regarding work on the land and recasting farming methods and means. It also requires implementing a program of activity involving advisory work, consciousness-raising and education.

Mzali also declared that the reform which the government has initiated cannot be put into effect overnight but is more a long-term task which requires changing mentalities and certain ways of thinking and requires fortitude. It is a task similar in every respect to that which the Supreme Warrior accomplished in order for the Tunisian people to regain their independence and dignity, an effort crowned with success after 20 years of bitter combat, though President Bourguiba still continues his educational efforts to change ways of thinking.

The prime minister also made an urgent appeal for people to conquer selfish tendencies and the inclination to go for quick and easy profit, and he urged respect for the rights of others, particularly the economically downtrodden.

Mzali also affirmed the government's intention to support deposit banks by increasing the resources which will allow them to participate more effectively in commercial and industrial sector financing. In this connection he announced that in 1981 a people's national bank will be set up run through post offices. This bank will have four principal tasks:

--Financing small and medium-sized businesses and craft industries

--Collecting and expanding the savings of the population

--Financing activities at the commune level, which up to now has fallen to funds held by the communes

--Running credit operations for rural and regional development

The government also intends to create a national bank for agricultural development which will be responsible for agricultural sector investment in conjunction with the deposit banks and the people's national bank.

#### Prices: Concern for What Happens to the Most Destitute

Then Mzali answered questions asked by the deputies regarding rising prices. He said that prices had risen 8.6 percent between October 1979 and October 1980, 7.2 percent between December 1979 and October 1980, and 3 percent between March and October 1980.

In this regard he observed that the price rise occurred mostly during the first months of the current year due to price readjustment for certain staples at the beginning of the year.

After recalling that a wage increase was announced in May 1980, Mzali pointed out that the price increases in Tunisia are moderate compared to rates recorded in other countries.

The price increase is imposed on us from abroad because it involves imported goods. In this connection he stressed that controlling prices so as to protect the purchasing power of citizens basically requires an increase in production, improving productivity, reducing costs, and supporting productive institutions, whether they be administrative services, public enterprises, or private institutions. In this area he stressed the need to be concerned about what happens to those who are not wage earners, particularly the most destitute.

Then the prime minister made the observation that the call for reduced consumption must involve all citizens on an equal footing. This also requires the improvement of distributional networks so as to prevent any inclination to speculate. In this regard he insisted on the need to watch out for speculators and anybody who tries to get rich at the expense of the masses, and particularly of the disadvantaged groups. He also called on consumers to defend their interests, individually or through representative organizations.

Mzali stressed that the harmony which should prevail among citizens and the solidarity among all levels of the people are bound to help the government in taking on the responsibilities of carrying out development and therefore of achieving economic prosperity.



Along these lines, the prime minister emphasized the concern of the chief of state about all levels of society and the speeches in which he preached having mercy on fellow citizens, since he is convinced that the goal of politics, which is the rational management of community affairs, must be to develop the citizens and promote their welfare.

The prime minister mentioned that the government is firmly resolved to carry out orientation activity in that same spirit of openness and in accordance with Bourguibist ethics without resorting to repression and despotism.

"We do not believe in class struggle but in national unity, and we have faith in the effectiveness of orientation activity aimed at changing people's mentalities and the way they see things. We acknowledge the right of businessmen, farmers and middlemen to a margin of profit but we do not tolerate excessive profits made at the expense of the citizens, and particularly of the most destitute," Mzali said.

The prime minister made the observation that the rumors which some people have been spreading the last few days, according to which the prices of certain goods will be increased, were aimed at creating an atmosphere of obsessive fear and at creating a fear of shortages in certain goods among citizens. In fact, these rumors tended to cause frantic purchasing activity which must have worked to the advantage of speculators out to realize excessive profits.

Mzali pointed out that the government nipped these rumors in the bud by issuing a scathing denial at the time of the National Planning Commission meeting.

With regard to assets held by French in Tunisia and their transfer from local premises for the benefit of the French owners holding title, Mzali let it be known that these assets represent 85 percent of current operations but only 20 percent of French bank deposits in Tunisia.

#### Film Sector: New Measures

On the cultural side, the prime minister referred to his speech to the National Assembly last May and to the text of the government's declaration giving assurances that it has started implementing several decisions with regard to cultural promotion.

He pointed out that the finance bill includes a set of measures relating in particular to the creation of a special fund for promoting film production, to building film theaters in working-class urban areas and in rural areas, and to giving unstinting support to the film industry in the same way it is given to small and medium-sized industrial developers (profits tax exemption up to a limit of 30 percent for 5 years) because film-making is an industry and significant economic activity.

The prime minister also stated specifically that subsidies would be granted to encourage Tunisian film production (films for children, films of a cultural and educational nature, and documentary films), and that an end will be put to speculative activity in the area of foreign film distribution in Tunisia, so as to spare the public the harmful effects of mediocre commercial films.

In the field of archaeology, Mzali indicated that the creation of a fund is planned for restoration of archaeological sites and the publication of booklets to acquaint the public with the details of those sites. He stressed that culture is not a marginal activity but is as important as other activities.

At the end of his speech Mzali expressed his gratitude to the deputies for the satisfaction they demonstrated regarding the government's approach to opening up the political spectrum, to democracy, to dialog aimed at getting the maximum number of citizens to take part in creating a clear and uniform policy, and to solving student and trade union problems.

He affirmed the government's determination to pursue this policy of political openness and democracy in accordance with President Bourguiba's directives.

The special party congress, he added, will permit the reexamination of relations among all Tunisians and of political life.

Bourguiba has always had a genius for being up to the level of events and being tuned into the deep-seated aspirations of the people, who are not satisfied by bread alone but demand dignity as well.

As regards the stands of some people aimed at sowing doubt about the soundness of the government's policies and thus at creating dissension among Tunisians, the prime minister pointed out that their policy has failed and that Tunisians, since they are equal, consult with each other and work together for the national interest.

At the conclusion of the prime minister's speech, the meeting ended.

The National Assembly will meet again today at ~~0900~~ to take up the budget plans of the presidency, the National Assembly itself, and the prime minister's office.

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CSO: 4400

TUNISIA

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL DATA PROCESSING CENTER INTERVIEWED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 12 Dec 80 p 2

[Interview with Slaheddine Karoui, president-director general of CNI [National Data Processing Center], by S. B. S.: "The National Data Processing Center is Bringing the Regions Into the Whole System; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] In October 1980 the CNI (National Data Processing Center) established two regional centers, one at Sousse and the other at Sfax. It concurrently reached agreement with the Intergovernmental Bureau for Information Processing (IBI) on developing software in Arabic within CNI, and it played a very active role in creating a Saudi-Tunisian company. Data processing, which was conceived as a powerful tool to further economic growth, is on its way to being expanded and adapted to the regions. Slaheddine Karoui, the president-director general of the CNI, has been telling us more about this regionalization and about the creation of a data processing transmission network.

[Question] Two regional centers of the National Data Processing Center have just been set up, at Sousse and at Sfax. In what respect is this regional expansion of CNI justified?

[Answer] The idea of creating regional centers to decentralize CNI's activities has been coming up ever since the beginning of 1979. Since that time two studies on the feasibility of setting up these centers have been carried out, one with the assistance of an office of foreign specialists and the other in the context of an investigation carried out recently. These studies provided proof that such centers were commercially feasible and financially profitable. What is more, they allow the CNI to be relieved of a certain number of functions which were assigned to it by the authorities and which are of general interest, such as studies on the appropriateness of computer acquisition and assistance regarding conditions of sale or purchase and tender invitations.

[Question] At what time were the two centers established and how do you envision the effect of their opening on their respective surroundings?

[Answer] The two centers were set up simultaneously in October 1980. They are already starting operations in the context of research projects with certain firms located in the central and southern regions. Also, two seminars have been organized with the active cooperation of the Faculty of Economics and Management Science in Sfax, one concerned with increasing awareness of data processing and the other with the use of data processing in small and medium-sized firms. A project for cooperation in further training between the Faculty of Economics and Management Science and CNI is in the process of being worked out.

[Question] Aside from profit motivations, is the creation of these centers a response to the government's preoccupation with administrative and economic decentralization?

[Answer] In fact, putting data processing equipment and human resources into the central and southern regions is a matchless tool for speeding up the decentralization of governmental administration. Also, the impetus of the government's administrative reform and decentralization is probably going to lead to our setting up other regional centers. Using specialist services from the prime minister's office we are currently in the process of studying what these centers require in order to decentralize procedures in connection with personnel management and the management of public expenditure at the initial stage and in the short term.

[Question] Are those the main applications of data processing which will be handled by these regional centers?

[Answer] Those are not the main applications but they are the ones which most readily lend themselves to this kind of decentralization at the current level of advancement of our work. Other applications in the framework of administrative reform will be identified in collaboration with the office of the minister attached to the prime minister for civil service and administrative reform, and they will probably be the subject of a decentralization work program.

[Question] You have just been talking about other centers. Where would they be located? Also, do you see data processing as a factor causing economic development or as a tool which follows it up?

[Answer] In our current thinking on this subject it would be premature to be definite about the sites of other CNI regional centers. In large part it will depend on the focus of economic and administrative development that will be specified in the context of the sixth plan. It will also depend on the objectives of administrative reform and therefore on our parent ministry. In any case, administrative reform including decentralization is a fundamental development goal which CNI as an organizational and data processing instrument must promote.

Regarding the role of data processing in development, I can unhesitatingly tell you that data processing is a powerful tool which furthers economic growth and is a constant element of, and one which makes changes for the better in, all the factors involved in the constant efforts to strengthen that growth.

[Question] Now then, when people talk about decentralization they can't help but talk about data processing transmission networks. What do you intend to do in this area?

[Answer] Data processing decentralization absolutely must be based on a reliable transmission network, for economic reasons and for reasons of national sovereignty. To that end, CNI is cooperating with the Directorate General of Telecommunications and has made a start with Raouf Shkir in setting up this network. Also, a study is currently under way to define needs and the resources to bring into play. In this cooperative effort, CNI will be associated with defining the decentralization data processing needs of all firms and branches of government, and will make this available to the Directorate General of Telecommunications so the latter can design and install the network. So the decentralization which fits into the framework of the country's administrative reform will be carried out on solid ground. I would mention that this activity is being carried out with the assistance of USAID in accordance with an agreement reached with the American mission.

[Question] LA PRESSE is aware that there is a plan for software in Arabic to be developed in CNI and a plan for an Arab company. At what stage are these projects and what are their objectives?

[Answer] These two projects, which will be followed by others, are being accomplished because of an interest in opening up toward the Arab countries and particularly the Gulf countries.

Tunisia, which is relatively poor in natural resources, in fact has one rare resource, that of having many people who have attained a very high level of expertise. This resource must be used and put into the service of national development in an Arab context. The demand for organizational and data processing services in those countries is expanding so dramatically that there is no reason why Tunisia should not meet that demand and compete with Western specialists, who have the disadvantage of charging prohibitive prices.

Tunisia has a pivotal destiny. Because of cultural and historical traditions, it is capable of serving as a link between the West Africa, and the Arab world. It can and must get commercially involved in the Third World without inhibitions. That is the reason CNI has made this overture to the Arab world, by developing software in Arabic which will be marketed mainly in the Gulf countries but also in Morocco and Algeria, and via the creation of a Saudi-Tunisian company which will be registered in Jiddah.

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CSO: 4400



## DUBAI AMENDS RULE TO ENABLE EASIER IMPORTS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 22 Jan 81 p 1

[Article by Maruf Khwaja]

[Text]

Dubai, Jan. 21. Rules restricting the right of import to those holding General Trade Licences and Industrial Trade Licences have been amended to permit all Dubai-registered contractors and owners of companies holding trade or professional licences to import any items required for the exercise of their own specific trade or profession.

The amendment was notified yesterday to traders, merchants and commercial organisations by the Department of Ports and Customs following instruction by the Dubai Municipality. As of January 18, the Ports and Customs Department has been acting in accordance with the amended regulations.

The change in Dubai's import regulations, which will have the effect of further liberalising trade and raising the tempo of commercial and industrial activity, has caused ripples of excitement in Dubai's business community. Although detailed official interpretation of the amendment was not immediately available, businessmen who have studied the notification believe it is basically intended to ease the task of contractors in the fields of construction and engineering who may have been experiencing difficulties in local procurement of materials and equipment. The new facility will now enable them to make direct imports of necessary goods pertaining to contracts for which they have been engaged or as the notification says "for the exercise of their own specific trade."

The same would also apply to holders of professional licences such as architects and engineers, pharmacists and doctors, hoteliers and hair dressers, etc.

While the amendment does confer the right on these trade licence holders to import a wide range of goods within or outside the ambit of existing agency systems, informed sources rule out any gross danger of abuse of the new importers who could be tempted to erode the scope of their licensed trade or profession to supersede import and marketing of products. Such a possibility, which could arise when for example a building contractor deliberately over-orders a specific item with the intention of selling off the "surplus" in the market, is restrained by the proviso that import will be restricted to "items required for the exercise of their own specific trade or profession".

Even so, precautions are understood to have been taken to ensure that quantities of imports by such companies are directly related to their specific needs and there is no disruption of existing agency systems.

One very welcome effect of the amendment which should be soon apparent will be a fall in local prices, firstly of goods most likely to be imported by the new beneficiaries particularly construction materials and equipment as well as tools and equipment needed by professionals. This in turn could, according to business circles, lead to lower project costs whose benefits would ultimately filter down to the lowest consumer

levels in lower prices for durable goods and services.

Precautions to safeguard the interest of agency holders notwithstanding, the new category of importers would nevertheless be free to tap overseas sources of supply do not have authorised agents in this country. Thus, a contractor with a building project in hand who finds a particular brand of light fittings either too costly or not immediately available, could obtain other makes of light fittings from exporters who are not bound by agency agreements here. In the case of more complex equipment like lifts, such direct procurement would carry the disadvantage of not having spare parts and servicing locally available. On the other hand, under the existing agency arrangements, the importer would have to obtain the permission of the authorised agent who might oblige if he is satisfied only with the marginal commission, as against the hefty sale profit he would otherwise make.

The greatest visible benefit of the amendment would appear to accrue to small scale professional licence holders like doctors who may want to equip their clinics with medical or laboratory implements or machine appliances which are not locally available in a wide enough range. But even in this case they would have to do without the facility of after sale services which come only with authorised agencies, unless they also manage to include a large supply of spare parts among the items necessary for the exercise of their profession.

## ABU DHABI 1981 BUDGET DETAILS GIVEN

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 27 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Ahmed Mohsin]

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, Jan. 26 (AJ Bayan) Abu Dhabi emirate's budget for 1981 is 3,555,549,000 dirhams as against 2,973,549,000 dirhams last year, marking an increase of 19 per cent.

The figure included in the job chapter of the budget indicates that 1,936 new jobs were approved for various departments of the emirate. The bulk of the jobs goes to the Electricity and Water Department.

Allocations have also been approved for filling 1,077 vacant posts. This raises the total number of the emirate's employees to 24,760 as against 21,730 in 1980.

**Finance**

The Finance Department's budget has increased to Dh. 25,161,000 as against Dh. 21,748,000 in 1980.

The increase was caused by:

- Allocation of Dh. 170,000 for the fixed annual increase in the department's budget.

- An increase of Dh. 705,000 in the salaries and allowances' budget (12 months) for last year's vacant posts.

- Dh. 373,000 allocated for new appointments in 1981 and allocations for furniture allowances to foreign contract employees.

- Other expenditure increased by Dh. 452,000 (travelling allowances and training of employees).

**Purchasing**

The Purchasing Department's budget totalled 236,203,000 dirhams as against Dh. 263,620,000 in 1980 (44 per cent increase).

The increase was due to:

- The increase in allocations for housing the emirate's employees.

- Renewal of the land contracts which the government plans to undertake.

- An increase of Dh. 22,363,000 for accommodation of 547 employees in 1981.

- An increase of Dh. 19,181,000 for accommodation of 465 jobs vacant from 1980.

**Public services**

The public services budget totalled Dh. 126,800,000 (8 per cent increase over the 1980 budget).

The increase included the allocations for pensions, electricity and water bills, insurance of government properties, the expansion in the activities of the studies and documentation centre and the increase in the Public Works Department's budget.

**Municipality**

The allocation for Abu Dhabi Municipality for 1981 totalled Dh. 947,804,000 as against Dh. 793,179,000 in 1980 (19.5 per cent increase). The increase was due to new appointments and expansion of the municipality's services.

Dh. 21,500,000 were allocated to the customs department, Dh. 439,636,000 to the agricultural department in Al Ain and Dh. 146,000,000 to the airports department.

# WORK STARTS IN DH 1.4 BILLION SCHOOL BUILDING PROJECT

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 24 Jan 81 p 1

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, Jan. 23 (WAM): The Public Works Ministry has begun work on a Dh. 1,457 million project for construction of school buildings, part of the Ministry of Education's investment program for 1980-81. The program includes secondary, intermediary and primary schools all over the country.

Work has begun on three secondary schools for boys in Abu Dhabi at a cost of Dh. 27 million, another school in Jurn Yalour at a cost of Dh. 9 million, two schools for girls in Jurn Yalour and Bani Yas costing Dh. 15 million, four schools in Al Ain costing Dh. 24 million and two schools for boys in Musaffah and Bani Yas costing Dh. 12 million.

In Dubai work has begun on a girls' school in Qais costing Dh. 8.5 million, another for boys in Diera costing Dh. 8.5 million, and a third in Diera for girls costing Dh. 9 million.

In the northern emirates work has started on a boys school in Abu

Shaykh in Sharjah estimated to cost Dh. 8 million, another boys' school in Al Rasah costing Dh. 8.5 million, one in Umm Al Quraib costing Dh. 8.1 million and two in Ras Al Khaimah costing Dh. 17 million.

Work on 11 preparatory schools estimated to cost Dh. 76 million is under way in Dubai. In Sharjah eight schools are being constructed at a cost of Dh. 60 million. In Umm Al Quraib work has been completed on a girls' school at a cost of Dh. 7.6 million while another is being constructed at a cost of Dh. 8 million.

In Ras Al Khaimah five schools are being built at a cost of Dh. 28 millions, while in Fujairah work has begun on a girls' school at a cost of Dh. 7.8 million.

One primary school for boys is under construction in Abu Dhabi, four for Al Ain, 18 in Dubai, 23 in Sharjah, three in Ajman, two in Umm Al Quraib, and 20 in different parts of in Ras Al Khaimah.

CSO: 4820

INTENSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN OF REPRESSION ALLEGED

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 10 Nov 80 pp 32, 33

[Article: "With Saudi Encouragement, Rulers in San'a' Escalate Repression Against Nationalists"]

[Text] Sources here in North Yemen report that the coming phase will bring an escalation of military operations by the mercenaries and the army. They say that these operations will be accompanied by all forms of repression and acts of aggression ranging from arrests to assaults and assassinations. The first signs of this campaign began to appear during the last 10 days of October.

With regard to military operations, sources in San'a' confirm that in the province of Dhamar on 23 October, mercenaries from Wahabi groups under the command of Shaykh Mujahid 'Aqil laid an ambush for nationalists belonging to the Democratic National Front and opened fire on them, resulting in a number of injuries among the citizens. This prompted residents of the area to return fire on the mercenaries, of whom a number were wounded, including Mujahid 'Aqil's son. Information from reliable sources in San'a' reveals that Mujahid 'Aqil had been charged by the army and security organizations of the state with attacking the nationalists in this area.

On the same day, government forces in the county of al-Qafr located in the northernmost part of Ibb province carried out arrests on citizens who were on their way to the al-'Atam area. When the relatives of these citizens attempted to join together to secure their release, they clashed with government elements. These elements played an instigative and aggressive role which was indicative of their devious intentions toward the nationalists in the area.

On 24 October in the same county (al-Qafr), 100 followers of landholder Muhammad 'Ayid al-Hamiri were called out to fight and attacked several villages. They opened fire on the residents of the villages, who then returned fire. Violent clashes continued until the following day when the nationalists succeeded in defeating al-Hamiri's band. The nationalists set fire to the house of one of the leaders of the mercenaries, and this compelled the leaders to call for negotiations to bring about a cease-fire. At the same time, the leaders of the mercenaries continued to dig trenches, set up barricades and bring in ammunition and weapons, thus revealing their intention to prepare for further acts of aggression.

On 29 October, the county of al-Qafr was the scene of a large-scale military campaign during which the forces of the landholders led by Muhammad 'Ayid al-Hamiri united with the regular government forces under the command of county administrator Salih Challab (This Salih Challab is the cousin of Salih Ghallab, commander of the army sector in al-Nadira province, who personally murdered seven nationalists in al-Nadira province early last May).

This military campaign was directed at the peasant masses and the positions of the Democratic National Front. All kinds of weapons were employed in the campaign, especially heavy weapons. This resulted in a large number of casualties among the ranks of the masses, while the mercenaries and the army suffered seven dead and a large number of wounded. During the campaign, a number of citizens from the villages surrounding the areas in which the fighting took place were arrested. It is worth noting that landholder Shaykh Muhammad 'Ayid al-Hamiri receives direct support from Saudi Arabia and is considered one of its mainstays in the country. He also receives support from Shaykh 'Abdallah ibn al-Ahmar, a leader of the landholders who is hostile to the nationalist forces.

The sources state that the county of Qa'tabah located southeast of Ibb is the scene of a large-scale campaign of arrests carried out by the government forces with the help of mercenaries from the Wahabi group. Besides the arrests, security and mercenary elements are carrying out assassination attempts against nationalists. Late last October, they succeeded in murdering one nationalist, while others escaped similar attempts.

The sources indicate that the conditions in the prisons where the arrested individuals are held are extremely wretched. The food is incredibly bad, as if prepared as a means of giving poison in small doses. Medical treatment is forbidden. The prisoners have no access to either doctors or medicines and must put up with pain and moaning. Torture, especially flogging, is the daily ration of the prisoners. Visits by families are prohibited, and in most cases the families do not know where their relations are imprisoned.

There are many examples of prisoners who have "disappeared" inside the prisons after being arrested. These include former Supply Minister Sultan Amin al-Qurshi, arrested in February 1978. Government organizations do not now acknowledge that the former minister is being held in prison although they had previously acknowledged his arrest. Other examples include artillery service Commander Maj 'Ali Muthni Jiran, who was also arrested in February 1978, police Major 'Abd al-Warith 'Abd al-Karim, arrested in 1978, and Ministry of Education employee 'Ali Khan, all of whom have "disappeared," according to the official term used by the authorities. "Disappearance" in prison has now become an official state policy, authorized with the seal and signature of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and a number of senior officers in the army, the security organization and the interior department.

In the face of this situation, the political prisoners declared a hunger strike. This strike, which began in mid-October, extends to all the prisons throughout the country. The prisoners are demanding a halt to flogging and torture, improvement of prison and arrest conditions, the right to medical treatment and medication, and the right to a public and fair trial.



## Saudi Ambassador Threatens Nationalists With Hanging

The escalation of the military campaign in some areas of the north comes about a week after the formation of the new Ariyani government. The nationalists in San'a' are inclined not to lay the responsibility for the unleashing of the campaigns of terrorism, destruction, and annihilation on the new prime minister, especially since everyone knows that Ariyani was installed at the head of a new cabinet appointed by President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih without consultation of the prime minister, and this took place shortly after 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's return from his visit to Riyadh and Baghdad.

Moreover, according to informed sources here in San'a', the Saudi ambassador frequently remarks within the hearing of individuals close to him that "if al-Damini (one of the nationalist leaders) was hung by a rope, the other leaders of the National Front will be hung by a shoelace!" It is worth noting that the Saudi newspaper AL-MADINAH, which is published in Riyadh, printed a detailed story on 10 October under the headline "Death of 100 Leftists in Yemen" which described the occurrence of several battles between nationalist elements--which the newspaper always terms "leftist"--and the regular and mercenary forces. This story is the first news item of its kind published in a Saudi newspaper.

As is generally known, Saudi newspapers and information organizations rigorously adhered to a policy of silence on clashes in various parts of the country during the past. However, in the current period, they have tirelessly pursued a policy of openly adding fuel to the fire. This reveals the existence of a coordinated plan between the reactionary forces and countries surrounding Yemen and the ultrareactionary forces and elements in the San'a' regime and the Wahabi group within the country.

The military campaigns, the pursuit of nationalists, and the assassination attempts which began in the second half of October, intensified at the end of the month, and have continued unabated since then indicate that the front of the reactionary forces and countries is now attempting to complete the encirclement of the nationalist and liberal forces from Tehran to San'a', and is even employing the same tactic (military operations). For in Tehran, the revolution is being subjected to a foreign invasion, and in San'a' the nationalist forces are being subjected to an invasion by the government organizations and its mercenary agents with direct military and material support from Saudi Arabia.

The internal invasion to which the national forces and positions in North Yemen are being subjected has become an open disgrace among the masses throughout the length and breadth of the country, and every day the feelings of the citizens against everything which stands for Saudi reactionism grow deeper. Moreover, there is a prevailing belief among ordinary citizens that the ultrareactionary elements in the government supported by the president of the country bear the main responsibility for the renewal of the campaigns of repression, pursuit, and assassination and the resumption of the bloody offensives. This is reinforced by the fact that, as everyone knows, the Democratic National Front has put forth its maximum efforts to arrive at an agreement to end the shedding of Yemeni blood and actually succeeded in reaching such an agreement on 31 January of this year. Moreover, it reinforced this agreement with another agreement reached last May after it had been confirmed that the authorities in San'a' did not intend to apply the January agreement. The front then renewed the agreement with a third agreement last August after the San'a' authorities and the mercenaries moved to resume the military operations.

The citizens are now wondering how long the ultrareactionary elements in the country will retain a free hand and remain under the protection of the head of the state, using the country's organizations and institutions--and especially the army and the security forces--to serve their despicable goal of smashing the National Movement. This is, at the same time, the goal of their masters, the Al Sa'ud group poised behind the borders of the country and in some areas within its borders.

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